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Go, dear friend, if need be give up all else, and commence 
to-day to inure yourself to pluck, reality, self-esteem, 
definiteness, elevatedness, 
Rest not till you rivet and publish yourself of your own 
Personality. 
WHITMAN 
What dost thou Believe in? - In this: That the weights of 
all things must be determined anew. 
NIETZSCHE 
My final merit I refuse you-
I refuse putting from me what I really am; 
Encompass worlds, but never try to encompass me. 
WHITMAN 
My opinion is my opinion: another person has not easily a 





MERIT OF CONTRADICTION. 






OPPOSITION PROMOTES HEALTH AND GROWTH 116 
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GOOD AND EVIL .•. 
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A writer's ideas are often better understood when 
considered side by side with those of another. This 
is especially true when both are of the same intel-
lectual milieu, and their works overflow with 
innumerable parallelisms. Frequently, a thought 
which may sound jejune in one will sound singularly 
penetrating and unique in the other. Sometimes 
what is obscure or ambiguous in the first writer's 
verbiage may emerge as an original insight in the 
phrasing of the second writer. One writer may 
detail his thought processes and thus aid the reader 
who experiences difficulty ciphering the other's 
logic of the intuitive heart. On occasion, a doctrine 
regarded as subsidiary in the canon of one writer 
may mark the precise point of divarication between 
his thinking and that of the second writer, and may 
therefore indicate a need for further inquiry. In 
addition, borrowings as well as demarcations from 
acknowledged common sources afford dependable 
calipers with which to gauge the originality of each 
of two borrowers. 
A comparative study of two authors' works 
makes it possible to become thoroughly, if not 
authoritatively, familiar with their philosophy. No 
study-in-depth of an individual author is more 
exacting and informative than the labor entailed 
by the comparative approach. Constant rereading, 
cross-checking, and collating of similarities in the 
writings of two men is often the means of develop-
ing the student into scholar. The comparative 
approach, moreover, is excellent pedagogy. Nothing 
serves as well as analogy when one seeks to enforce 
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and clarify a particularly troublesome facet of a 
writer's thinking. But perhaps the greatest ad-
vantage of a comparative study is the mental 
stimulation it generates. As the detection of one 
illuminating similarity follows fast upon another, 
one feels an excitement akin to the pleasurable 
anticipation of the explorer or inventor. And this 
holds doubly true when the subjects of a study are 
as dynamic, challenging, appealing, and mesmer-
izing as Walt Whitman and Friedrich Nietzsche. 
The present essay does not aim at completeness, 
still less at finality. It undertakes only to clarify 
the extent and nature of the similarity in the 
thought of Whitman and Nietzsche and to assemble 
parallel texts toward this end. So far as is known, 
there is no evidence which claims Walt Whitman 
(1819-1892) directly influenced the thought of 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Since Whitman 
had virtually finished his life and life's work before 
Nietzsche had hardly commenced his, it is within 
the realm of possibility that the precocious Nietz-
sche, who admired Emerson though he detested 
Carlyle, had read the perfervid disciple of the 
Great Brahmin. But nothing can be produced to 
support this intriguing speculation. No direct link 
between the two exists. Although both Whitman 
and Nietzsche freely admit their respective debts 
to Emerson, Nietzsche never mentions or alludes to 
Whitman. 
The affinities between the two, however, are not 
only unmistakable but remarkably extensive. In 
countless ways, the work of the one inevitably puts 2 
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one in mind of the work of the other. One can 
readily discover many instances where the mode 
and manner of their expression are very much the 
same. Identical arguments are used by both to 
argue for or against a particular doctrine. The 
similarities in their intuitive and psychological 
apperceptions, in fact, are so astonishing - from 
many inconsequent and minor peculiarities and 
idiosyncrasies of statement to very minute details 
of their ideas- that even the respects in which they 
differ make their common features all the more 
striking. Nor can this resemblance be cavalierly 
dismissed or discounted by saying that, actually, it 
consists of little more than the inevitable likenesses 
discoverable in all iconoclasts who spurn conven-
tion. After all, countless others, equally endowed 
and equally articulate, were born into, and inveigh-
ed against, the intellectual climate to which 
Whitman and Nietzsche were exposed. But none 
of these resemble Whitman and Nietzsche as much 
as Whitman and Nietzsche resemble each other. 
Where their ideas are most alike, we are invariably 
reminded of William Blake and D. H. Lawrence. 
Yet, even the latter are closer to each other than 
either is to Whitman or Nietzsche. Nietzsche's 
thought echoes Whitman's in a sufficient number 
of important particulars to command the serious 
attention of both teachers and students. 
In the history of mankind, great discoveries and 
the well-nigh identical formulation of them have 
been known to occur simultaneously in widely-
separated regions of the globe. They occur in all 
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areas of human endeavor. Whitman and Nietzsche 
might be an instance of such an occurrence. Be 
that as it may, we must be mindful that it is the 
fact of the occurrence, and not its cause, which 
concerns us here. It is by a careful examination of 
this occurrence that I hope to show that ·whitman's 
stature as a thinker and psychologist has not been 
accorded the recognition of which it is so richly 
deserving. That no one has deemed it worthwhile 
to pursue at any length the large extent to which 
Nietzsche's thought runs parallel to Whitman's, 
tacitly oppugns the still-proliferating plethora of 
biographical, as opposed to critical, Whitmaniana. 
Despite the commendable pioneering work of 
Frederik Schyberg (Walt Whitman, translated from 
the Danish by E. A. Allen. New York, 1951) and 
Roger Asselineau (The Evohttion of Walt Wht:tman: 
The Creation of a Personality. Cambridge, 1960), 
the comprehension and appreciation of the thought 
in Leaves of Grass remain sadly inadequate. Al-
though Mody Boatright studied Whitman's debt to 
Hegel in the 1920's, and, although, more recently, 
James E. Miller, Jr. has competently undertaken to 
demonstrate that Whitman was a more systematic 
and profound thinker than he is generally acknow-
ledged to have been, the Whitman sceptics and 
disparagers are still among us in disproportionately 
large numbers. In the academician's proverbial 
rationalization for ingurgitation or dilettantism, a 
great deal still demands and has to be done. 
This monograph aspires to be a modest contri-
bution to the increasing number of studies which 4 
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valiantly, albeit not always successfully, have 
sought to present Whitman less as a superior Vachel 
Lindsay and more as a slightly inferior William 
Blake or William Butler Yeats. By investigating 
the similitude in the thinking of Whitman and 
Nietzsche, it hopes to discourage the disrating of 
Whitman through condescending or tolerantly-
amused commentaries. Whitman is so deceptively 
simple, so admittedly awkward in his banalities, so 
professedly prolix, so extravagant and eccentric of 
utterance, so unabashedly frank and forthright, so 
disconcertingly earthy, so terrifyingly honest, so 
unnaturally and inhumanly free of hypocrisy, ul-
terior motivation, and literary pretension, that 
inane misinterpretations, which see him as a tedi-
ous chauvinist, or a mindless optimist, or a 
blathering exhibitionist, or a depraved eroticist, or 
a befuddled invert, continue to pour out of pub-
lishing houses and to be sensationally reviewed by 
Time. It is very like the misapprehension which, 
for a long time, and naturally with a different 
animus and direction, plagued Nietzsche. And, 
even today, despite generous tributes by littera-
teurs such as Shaw, Mann, Sartre, and Camus, as 
well as virtual apotheosis by the existentialists, 
every so often, one comes across abusive attacks 
against Nietzsche as a Socratic empoisoner of 
youth, and as the embodiment of the worst of 
Borgia, Machiavelli, Spengler, and Hitler. But, 
whereas, in the last decade, leastways, Nietzsche 
has been indeed fortunate in having such capable 
and brilliant expounders and apologists as Kazan-
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tzakis in Greece, Camus in France, H. J. Blackham 
in England, and Kaufmann of Princeton and 
Reinhardt of Stanford in America, Whitman has 
not fared half as well. Now, as ever, Whitman is 
cursed with a surfeit of youthful Henry J ameses. 
Altogether too often, Whitman, like a hapless 
Gulliver, has been metaphorically staked to the 
ground by petty Lilliputians who have prodded 
indefatigably and indelicately with distorted per-
spectives, unedifying crassitude, and greedy ex-
pediency. I cannot hope in so brief a survey to 
arrive at precise or definitive conclusions. But my 
exertions shall not be for naught if they can point 
out the need of desisting, for once and for all, from 
underrating the intellect of one denominated, more 
often by way of patronization than by way of 
affection or respect, as 'the old Gray poet,' 'the 
Solitary Singer,' or 'the Wound Dresser.' 
In minor as well as decisively major aspects, 
there is an incredible identity in the lives and 
thoughts of Whitman and Nietzsche. Both were 
closely attached to their families by ties of affection 
and loyalty. Though not immune to woman's fasci-
nation either as bedfellow or companion, neither 
married. Whitman was very found of, and devoted 
to, his mother and brothers; Nietzsche, though he 
sporadically attempted to break away, was very 
much under the sway of his mother and sister. 
Whitman's love of music, particularly the opera, 
has furnished the materials for at least one book 
and several articles; Nietzsche's youthful passion 
for Wagner and his life-long attachment to music is 6 
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well attested. Both were filled with a measureless 
love of life, illimitable confidence in themselves, 
and irresistible personal magnetism. Each extolled 
the life of the senses and hymned death as the 
fairest festival of them all. Instead of bewailing 
man's sorrowful lot and his tragic mortality, Whit-
man and Nietzsche positively flung themselves into 
the affirmation of life and joy. In order that he 
might learn to love and live, man, they both taught, 
must refuse to despair. They were utopians who 
deprecated Utopias. They expounded a humanistic 
ethic that stressed effort and the will-to-utopia 
more than success and Utopia. In the face of hopes 
which betray and despair which debilitates, they 
asked man to emulate Achilles who is never op-
pressed by the future though he knows it holds an 
imminent doom. They anticipated Camus in urging 
man to serve simultaneously suffering (humanity) 
and beauty (art). 
Both were inordinately addicted to self-portrayal 
and self-confessional. More clearly than in the case 
of most others, their writings reveal how large a 
portion of a writer's unfulfilled life finds expression 
and outlet in his work. Each liked to depict himself 
as bursting with vitality and well-being although 
neither was exceptionally robust. Whitman's 
rhapsodies to the sun, like those of D. H. Lawrence, 
were a consequence, in some measure no doubt, of 
his predisposition to be phthisic. During his late 
years, his health deteriorated rapidly and caused 
him untold mental and physical anguish. And 
Nietzsche was, although by necessity rather than 
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choice, practically a hypochondriac. He suffered 
from eyestrain, neuralgia, megrims, and epileptoid 
vertigo. His health, always delicate, underwent a 
severe setback during the second of his service 
stints in the medical corps. Interestingly enough, 
it was his Whitmanian sympathy for the wounded 
and desolate that led to the fatal neglect of his own 
health. Illness, for that matter, preoccupied both 
Whitman and Nietzsche. Quite naturally, they 
viewed it as the most palpable and damaging evi-
dence of the mystery of evil. Both were acutely 
aware that no affirmation of life, no unconditional 
endorsement of existence, could stand up unless it 
reckoned with and disposed of the ugly actuality of 
disease. 
Both were dignified, temperamental, dogged, 
energetic, eloquent, upright, fearless, noble, gra-
cious, generous, perceptive, dedicated, prolix, 
reiterative, proud, didactic, eccentric, melodra-
matic, magnetic, grandiose, and egoistic. In ad-
dition, despite their fac;ade of assuredness and 
bravado, they were introspective, shy, lonely, and 
insecure. Though diametrically opposed to what 
they taught, both wistfully reconciled themselves 
to achieving derring-do, not by feat-performing, 
but by writing. Each gave proof of a remarkable 
capability for sympathy and empathy. Each 
favored the metaphorical over the explicit; and 
each displayed a rare gift for brilliant and graphic 
utterance. Completely immersed in their self-ap-
pointed calling of prophet-seers, they spared no 
pains to win over an audience often absent or, at 8 
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best, indifferent if not hostile. Whitman's outre 
garb, his fabulous catalogues which sometimes 
parody themselves, his erotic poems, his voicing of 
sentiments conventionally deemed indecorous and 
immature, made him an easy target for caricature. 
Nietzsche's reputation in his own lifetime suffered 
a similar fate. His hermit-like manner of living, his 
acrimonious rupture with Wagner, his strained 
relations with colleagues and acquaintances, his 
nervous collapse at Turin, his sister's irresponsible 
publication of his works with drastic editorializing 
and expedient deletions, unauthorized of course 
and designed to serve her own ends, obscured the 
true man and his thought for whatever carnival 
clown and specious doctrine one was of a mind and 
whim to accept as authentic. The crude, gutter-
type abuse heaped upon Nietzsche far exceeded 
anything of a similar nature vented on Whitman, 
who has been dismissed more often as daft than as 
noxious. As Camus averred, we shall never cease 
indemnifying Nietzsche's tarnished luster. For that 
matter, nothing limns man's incorrigibleness and 
scholarship's vagaries so much as the misreading of 
an abiding love of life and humanity for flabby 
maudlinness in Whitman and for nordic ethno-
centrism in Nietzsche. 
Both proved reliable prophets of many of the 
external conflicts and inner distempers that plague 
our era. Whitman foresaw the increasing alienation 
and depersonalization technology would spawn. He 
warned that neither Democracy nor Industry could 
avail man if his spiritual wants were not given 
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priority over the mechanical appurtenancies re-
quired for his material comfort. He was beforehand 
in anticipating the ills which would result from the 
folly of sexual Pharisaism, the fallibility of the 
ascertained knowledge we call Science, the affinity 
between tyrant and priest, the crude fetishism and 
magic we revere as sacred convention and enshrin-
ed law. Nietzsche foretold a number of the ex-
cesses of the twentieth century by lucidly reasoning 
that man's cultural and ethical heritage had hardly 
fortified him for a godless way of life. Nietzsche 
correctly foresaw that, when confronted with the 
Kierkegaardian abyss, the few would negotiate the 
leap, but the many would cringe and would soon 
be in the clutches of the ruthless and unprincipled, 
whose strength derives from the obedience they 
exact from those in whom the need to obey is 
greater even than the will to survive. Both caution-
ed against the modern evils of despair and debili-
tation of will. They appreciated the fact that, 
unless man remained true to himself, unless he 
retained his faith in life, unless he could find mean-
ingful goals to pursue, he would plunge into a 
twilight world of meaningless shadows which repre-
sent nothing the heart can yearn for, nothing the 
mind may delight in, nothing the spirit can cherish 
and exalt. They besought man never to confound 
love and justice; never to sanction equality when it 
was prepared to sacrifice personal expression to 
collectivity. They wisely perceived that the lonely 
crowd is not lonely; that only the individual 
indistinguishable from the crowd and desolate when 10 
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not amid the crowd is lonely. They insisted man 
distinguish sharply between the real and the ideal, 
and not permit himself to become the victim of an 
ideal all his faith and love could never realize. 
They were positive that darkness as well as light 
is bound up with the life of every organism; that in 
creation tiger and lamb are inextricably mingled; 
that man's life has its sunsets and its sunrises. They 
summoned the testimony of biology and psychology 
to bolster their case that differentiation and conflict 
were requisites as well as characteristics of life. To 
them, the only original sin was the sin against life, 
the sin entailed by the fear of pleasure, laughter, 
and death. Both professed to a belief in natural 
immortality; they asserted that the man who con-
summates his life dies his death triumphantly, 
without bitterness, without regret. They pictured 
death as a phoenix perishing in its own flames, 
solemnly saying no when there was no longer time 
for saying yes, willing its destruction as it had 
willed its creation, and as it would will its re-
creation. Always their most aroused polemic was 
against the teachers of gravity and graves, against 
necrophilia and necrolatry. They held with Zara-
thustra that those who do not laugh sufficiently are 
incapable of loving selflessly. Each diagnosed the 
malady of his contemporaries as fear, and the 
despair consequent upon this fear. As Nietzsche 
wrote in the third essay of The Genealogy of Morals: 
\Ve can no longer conceal from ourselves what exactly it 
is that this whole process of willing, inspired by the 
ascetic ideal, signifies - this hatred of humanity, of ani-
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mality, of inert matter; this loathing of the senses, of 
reason even; this fear of beauty and happiness; this 
longing to escape from illusion, change, becoming, death, 
and from longing itself. It signifies, let us have the 
courage to face it, a will to nothingness, a revulsion from 
life, a rebellion against the principal conditions of living. 
To combat this form of suicidal anorexia, Whitman 
and Nietzsche commanded man to leave off im-
bibing the lotus weed, to stop wishing for the 
flower without the stalk, to cast aside the barren 
esse and to clasp to his bosom the fertile vivere. 
They perceived astutely that the worst tragedy of 
herd prescriptiveness would be not stolid mediocri-
ty but a petrifying uniformity that would imperil 
life itself. Both preferred vehement paroxysms of 
Promethean defiance to passive and pacific bab-
blings of hopeless apathy. Though neither would 
have subscribed to Gide's type of gratuitous hedon-
ism, both would have said nautch girlspromotelife 
more than scrofulous monastics. 
Whitman's occasional misgivings which tempted 
him to believe that all of what is designated objec-
tive reality might be Maya would have been con-
temptuously relegated by Nietzsche to the realm of 
sententious rigmarole. And Whitman's belief in the 
eternal real life to come would hardly have received 
a more favorable hearing at the Nietzschean assizes. 
Notwithstanding, both agreed that it behooved 
man to affirm life by affirming self. In the message 
they proclaimed to the world, they implored man 
to reject whatever was not self-created, whatever 
subordinated, subdued, or suppressed self. Their 12 
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writings are a complete vade mecum on individual-
ism. They called upon man to forge new standards 
and goals for himself, employing as criterion only 
what he had experienced as fit and apt in the 
microcosm of self. They called upon man to re-
trieve from programmed electronic circuitry a por-
tion of his instinctual spontaneity. They called 
upon man to sally forth in his own and not in a 
borrowed or convention-enforced identity. They 
believed tradition and the past either had to 
subserve the present or be superseded. Man must 
first be shorn of vain dreams, they said, before he 
can help realize the dream of the future; like 
Shelley's West Wind, man must first be a destroyer 
before he is ready to become a creator. They felt it 
was incumbent upon man to serve truth un-
waveringly and to deify the vital instead of seeking 
to eschew life through aesthetic or ascetic contem-
plation. And, scrupulously faithful to their own 
preachment, they sought no reader who would not 
refute them whenever he failed to confirm their 
teachings through himself. 
Unlike Nietzsche, Whitman was perfectly at 
home with the supernatural and the mystical; he 
had no difficulty in embracing simultaneously both 
the transcendental and the naturalistic. Yet, like 
Nietzsche, he was always urging man to find his 
incentive for living, life's goal and meaning, in the 
joy that is effable, in the grass that can be scented, 
in the hand that can be grasped, in the oenomel of 
perishable grapes. Keat's bittersweet reconcili-
13 ation, arrived at via the Grecian urn's tale and the 
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immortal bird's song, is transfigured into a splendid 
assertion of vitality in Whitman and Nietzsche. 
The taedium vitae of the cynic and the carpe diem 
of the hedonist are alike brusquely brushed aside by 
Whitman and Nietzsche. For they endeavor to 
bring man to an unflinching total awareness. They 
want him to stand unafraid and undismayed before 
the unbearable actuality. They want him to over-
master his panic impulse for oblivion through an 
escape out of life or through a phrenetic submersion 
in life. They want man to take upon himself the 
full burden of responsibility and freedom; they 
want him, like Sisyphus, to heft the rock and trudge 
wearily albeit gladly up the incline braced by the 
very knowledge that human struggle can only end 
in provisional victories that will ceaselessly be 
questioned. 
"It requires great strength to be able to live and 
forget how far life and injustice are one," Nietzsche 
wrote in one of his earliest works, The Use & Abuse 
of History. Nevertheless both he and Whitman 
realized man must learn to do precisely this on pain 
of extinction. Resentment and revenge, they logi-
cally reasoned, were incompatible with saying yes 
to life. Man must oppose with might and main all 
that degraded him as a living being and a source of 
life. Man must unceasingly strive against life-
denying ennui and against the life-negation of ad-
judication. He must emerge from his Cimmerian 
despair and his Empedoclean dudgeon to the full 
stature of his existential being. He must refrain 
from substituting knowledge for wisdom, progress 14 
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for truth, justice for love, morality for vitality. He 
must posit life's patent absurdity and fortuity, and 
then derive from the self-same absurdity and for-
tuity the resolution to embrace them jubilantly as 
the destiny he neither can nor wishes to propitiate. 
Man's life must be built on the further side of 
despair, rather than on the far side of a mythical 
paradise. His hosannas must be directed to the 
palpably biotic and not to cenotaphs. He must 
render unto life the things that are life's and refuse 
tribute to all else. 
Whitman and Nietzsche followed Emerson in 
saying that speculation was a poor substitute for 
life's dictionary. One may object that they did not 
follow themselves what they undertook to teach 
others, but one would have to agree that they did 
preach the need for subordinating ratiocination to 
living. Both withered with their scorn the ipse 
dixit which from Parmenides through Descartes to 
Hegel defined being in terms of thought (Cogito, 
ergo sum). Both would have found equally, if not 
more, valid D. H. Lawrence's 'I don't think I am. 
I know I am!' They did not repudiate one aspect 
of being in the name of another. But they did 
declare that, in order to satisfy the entire man, 
reason should be animated by emotion. They 
distrusted and contemned the jaded idlers in the 
garden of apodictic knowledge. They jolly well put 
in their place those dialectical wiseacres who, fail-
ing to explicate the fact of knowledge by the fact of 
existence, equivocate and attribute to knowledge 
15 the power of creating reality. They pointed out 
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that the rational is not necessarily more veridical 
than the non-rational; that authentic knowing is 
largely interpretation. In "A Song for Occupa-
tions," Whitman wrote: 
All architecture is what you do to it when you look upon 
it, (Did you think it was in the white or gray stone? or in 
the arches and cornices?) 
All music is what awakes from you when you are re-
minded by the instruments. 
They regarded scientific objectivity as delusory, 
and viewed the "passionate intensity" of the scien-
tists as clear indication the latter, lacking faith in 
the old convictions, had neither the courage nor the 
sight and wisdom to formulate new convictions. 
For Nietzsche, science was "the very anxiety that 
springs from having no ideal, the suffering from 
the lack of a great love, the discontent with an 
enforced moderation." Whitman, usually more 
conciliatory though not always more catholic, stood 
ever ready to concede science and scientists had 
their appointed place in the general scheme of 
things and would play crucial roles in moulding the 
glowing future he confidently foretold. Yet he 
invariably qualified all such concessions by re-
marking that the hush of astral presences, the 
intuition of the mantic bard, the sibylline scintilla 
of poetic frenzy, the mystic electricity of human 
touch excelled all scientific and philosophic lore. 
In Specimen Days, he wrote: 
While the contributions which German Kant and Fichte 
and Schelling and Hegel have bequeathed to humanity 16 
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- and which English Darwin has also in his field - arc 
indispensable to the erudition of America's future, I 
should say that all of them, and the best of them, when 
compared with the lightning flashes and flights of the old 
prophets and exaltes, the spiritual poets and poetry of all 
lands (as in the Hebrew Bible), there seems to be, nay 
certainly is, something lacking- something cold, a failure 
to satisfy the deepest emotions of the soul - a want of 
living glow, fondness, warmth, which the old exaltes and 
poets supply, and which the keenest modern philosophers 
so far do not. 
Several decades before Werner Heisenberg, Whit-
man and Nietzsche questioned the principle of 
causality and surmised that there could be a non-
determinist understanding of exterior reality. They 
held that a true knowledge of existence entailed an 
understanding of the interrelation of the subjective 
and the objective. Art as well as external reality, 
they contended, could be cognized relatively not 
absolutely; true cognition required cognition of 
creator and spectator in addition to cognition of 
observed object. In The Genealogy of 1Worals, 
Nietzsche put the matter as follows: 
There is only a seeing from a perspective, only a "knowing" 
from a perspective, and the more emotions we express over 
a thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we train on the 
same thing, the more complete will be our 'idea' of that 
thing, our "objectivity". But the elimination of the will 
altogether, the switching off of the emotions all and sun-
dry, granted that we could do so, what! would not that be 
called intellectual castration? 
Observed reality for Whitman and Nietzsche was 
coextensive with the observer's coenesthesia. Their 
INTRODUCTION 
unwavering trust in man's inner resources convinc-
ed them that reality could be as restricted or as 
limitless as man's power to envisage it. In a verse 
that might be construed as a faint precursor of 
Nietzsche's notorious dictum on his hypothetical 
anguish at not being a deity in a theoretically 
deistic cosmos, Whitman exclaimed: 
Dazzling and tremendous how quick the sun-rise would 
kill me, 
If I could not now and always send sun-rise out of me. 
Whitman and Nietzsche were not prepared to make 
a burnt offering of the living on the sacrificial altar 
of the men of the future. Most of the time, their 
emphasis was on the precious present, on the 
inviolable sanctity of the here and now in opposition 
to the future. They had little liking for those whose 
predisposition to millenia! fantasies and hookah 
visions of superterrestrial felicities blinded them 
to the distinction between the factitious and the 
factual. But Whitman's and Nietzsche's Beatitudes 
to the palpitating, palpable present do not partake 
in the least of hedonistic nihilism or cynical sen-
sualism. Their unconditional endorsement of ex-
istence- "Lux, mea cntx; crux, mea lux!" as Nietz-
sche rapturously expressed it in his notebooks -
specifically indicted nihilism and prominently fea-
tured a halcyon future peopled by superior men 
who would be exempt from the majority of debili-
tating fears and hopes, who would be supremely 
confident yet not arrogant in their absolute indi-
vidualism and self-reliance. Both Whitman and 18 
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Nietzsche prophesied an era in which great men 
- men, that is, who had achieved self-conquest and 
therby attained to true freedom ( " ... befreit der 
Mensch sich, der sich uberwindet," as Goethe ex-
pressed the notion common to Socrates and Emer-
son among others,) - would be the products of 
conscious human direction and human will rather 
than fortunate accidents. After all, a genuine and 
abiding affection for what is would naturally even-
tuate in the hope and determination that it be 
perpetuated or improved. The hope, which springs 
eternally even in breasts that scoff at supernal 
rewards, incorporates the will-to-utopia - the in-
stinctual predisposition not only for the preser-
vation but also for the betterment of man's con-
dition. A romantic idealist, like Whitman and 
Nietzsche, must persuade himself that, since man is 
able to, he will wish to improve himself spiritually 
and psychologically, not to mention physically, in 
order that he and his issue may discover, pursue, 
and achieve higher goals than those scrabbled after 
by the mongrel conformist, the fulsome timeserver, 
the craven lickspit, the abject anonymity never by 
passion quite possessed. (Both recall the wistful 
Don whose magnificently ineffectual sallies in the 
defense and promulgation of what was best and 
noblest instead of safest and easiest made him ap-
pear ludicrous and inane to a wrongheaded world.) 
The romantic idealist feels that only in this way 
can man fulfill the destiny to which he is not called 
but to which he should, nonetheless, be committed 
19 by his noblest parts. 
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Whitman and Nietzsche entertained great ex-
pectations of this imminent noontide of superior 
earthlings: when the total recuperation of man's 
humanity would be effectuated; when the jettison-
ing of herd-forged halters and gelid interdictions 
would arrest the fatal atrophy of man's will and 
restore to him the wisdom of precultural existence; 
when direct reformation of individual life would 
pave the way for far-reaching social, political, and 
artistic improvements; when freedom would be 
both the parent and offspring of personal responsi-
bility. For these superior beings would possess, as 
Nietzsche tells us in The Will to Power, "an over-
flow of energy for beauty, bravery, culture, and 
manners even for the most abstract thought; a 
yea-saying race which would be able to allow itself 
every kind of great luxury- strong enough to be 
able to dispense with thetyrannyoftheimperatives 
of virtue, rich enough to be in no need of economy 
or pedantry." Their banners would proclaim not 
vae victis but amor vincit omnia. Such men would 
easily cope with what Heidegger, in his interpre-
tation of Holderlin, terms the double negation, the 
no-more of the gods that have fled and the not-yet 
of the god who is coming. They would formulate 
what D. H. Lawrence in his discussion of Whitman 
termed a "morality of actual living, not of salva-
tion." Their bible would be a critique of all pre-
vailing values and virtues; their ambition would 
be to become, through self-knowledge and self-
determination, their authentic selves. Their society 
would be the very antithesis of that in which 20 
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anonymity is the most prized virtue, numerical 
strength the decisive factor, and majority opinion 
the divine oracle. This "new race dominating pre-
vious ones, and grander far, with new contests, I 
New politics, new literatures and religions, new 
inventions and arts" ("Starting From Paumanok") 
would admit no speculation whose soundness could 
not be circumstantiated in vivo. Its main concern 
would be essential existence, not conceptualized 
essences. Its pantheon would be life; and worship-
pers would worship by learning to live wholly by 
tellurian precepts. The great individualists com-
prising this exemplary race would rely on their own 
inner resources to combat the temptations of total, 
personal suzerainty and the noxious arguments of 
nihilism. Imbued with the joy of the brave, the 
laughter of the wise, and the mirth of the vitally 
alive, they would scatter "for good the cloud that 
hung so long, that weigh'd so long upon the mind 
of man, I The doubt, suspicion, dread, of gradual, 
certain decadence of man" ("Thou Mother With 
Thy Equal Brood"). 
Lest oversimplification be carried too far, it may 
prove prudent to hint at the differences in Carlyle's, 
Nietzsche's, and Whitman's conceptions of the 
great man or hero. Carlyle's hero subserves history 
since his function, conceived largely in utilitarian 
terms, is to avert or dispel chaos and anarchy. 
Carlyle understood history as the biographical re-
cords of great men. Nietzsche's hero is his own 
justification for being; his greatness derives not from 
21 his utility to history but from his intrinsic worth. 
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Sanction for his actions does not proceed from any 
legal, divine, rationalistic, materialistic, or prag-
matic ethic. He is a law unto himself, a "Roman 
Caesar with Christ's soul," in Nietzsche's phrase 
(The Will to Power). Whitman's hero conforms 
closely to Emerson's fearless, self-reliant indivi-
dualist who does not hesitate to place his trust in 
whim and who laughs to scorn the restraints of 
prudence. The principal difference is that Whit-
man's hero is free of all Emersonian prudishness, 
inhibitions, and delicacy: 
I announce the great individual, fluid as Nature, chaste, 
affectionate, compassionate, fully arm' d. 
I announce myriads of youths, beautiful, gigantic, sweet-
blooded, 
I announce a race of splendid and savage old men. 
("So Long!") 
But both Whitman and Nietzsche would have 
agreed with Emerson that there can be "no interval 
between greatness and meanness. When the spirit 
is not master of the world, then it is its dupe" 
("Heroism"). Carlyle saw his hero as the ruler of 
subjects, Nietzsche as the teacher of disciples, and 
Whitman as a Camerado tramping the open road 
hand in hand with other Camerados. 
Both Whitman and Nietzsche, it is curious to 
note, took exception to Carlyle's notion of heroism. 
In Specimen Days, Whitman pays tribute to Carlyle 
as Old Testament-type of prophet, and even grants 
that Carlyle's withering onslaughts against America 22 
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and Americans are in some measure justified. At 
the same time, however, he deprecates the Scotch-
man's oligarchic preferences: "The great masses of 
humanity stand for nothing - at least nothing but 
nebulous raw material; only the big planets and 
shining suns for him." Nietzsche angrily discounts 
the allegation that his Superman theory owes any-
thing to "the 'hero-worship' of that great counter-
feiter against his own knowledge and will, Carlyle." 
More constructively, in the sentences preceding 
this choice vituperation from Ecce Homo, Nietzsche 
explains his Supermen are not 'modern' men, nor 
'good' men, nor Christian saints, nor nihilists. They 
cannot be produced by institutionalized Christiani-
ty, nor by the doctrine of Progress, nor through 
Darwinian evolution. (Nietzsche, like Shaw, was a 
Lamarckian.) The Superman is best exemplified, 
Nietzsche continues, by Zarathustra, an "'ideal-
istic' type of a higher kind of man, half 'saint,' half 
'genius'." Nietzsche's Superman might suggest to 
some the Superman of G. B. Shaw. But the German 
philosopher was distinctly a-political (possibly anti-
political) and would have looked upon the Irish 
playwright's advocacy of intelligence without cor-
poreity as daft. Nietzsche could espouse rationality 
readily when oppugning the faith of a creed found-
ed on rank superstition and cretinous illusionism. 
Yet he was equally vehement in attacking any 
scientific rationalism that appropriated to itself the 
meaningless rightness of absolute authority. 
In a splenetic moment, Nietzsche cursed John 
23 Stuart Mill as a blockhead. But he, no less than 
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Whitman, seems to have agreed with Mill's con-
tention that freedom for man requires more than 
civil liberties; that true freedom requires unimped-
ed fulfillment. Nietzsche's aristocratic contempt 
for the herd might appear diametrically opposed to 
Whitman's democratic compassion for the masses. 
But such is not the case. Nietzsche despised the 
, herd as herd not the herd as individual men; he 
was of Swift's not Timon's mind. It is to the 
undifferentiated many that Zarathustra tries, 
though in vain, to impart his preachment that man· 
must overcome himself. At the outset of his 
katabasis, down from the mountain, back to man, 
Zarathustra is stopped by a hermit who tells him 
the mass of men are sleepers who will neither listen 
nor awaken and the punishment reserved for sleep-
disturbers is the stake. He remarks that, after ten 
years of solitude, Zarathustra is rejuvenated, his 
eyes bright and clear, and his expression no longer 
filled with disgust at men's ways. The hermit is at 
a loss to understand why Zarathustra is not content 
to remain in the forest and desires to go to man 
again. Zarathustra answers simply that he loves 
mankind. Nor is there any reason to question 
Nietzsche's compassion for his fellow man. It 
might be argued that, had he known Manhattan's 
human droppings at first hand, he would have been, 
unlike Whitman, appreciably less sanguine re-
garding man's capabilities for self-improvement. 
But Nietzsche's voluminous writings on human 
nature, human motivation, and human achieve-
ment prove beyond dispute that, though he knew 24 
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more of human failings and vices than Whitman 
ever saw or imagined, he was not a whit less 
optimistic than his American counterpart regard-
ing man and man's destiny. And, where Whitman 
and Nietzsche are concerned, faith such as this de-
notes love rather than blindness, perversity, or 
worse. No one can devote his entire life's work to 
impressing upon man his great potential for im-
proving himself, developing himself, and rising 
superior to the limitations of his nature unless he is 
imbued with a deep and abiding love of humanity. 
Savage laceration, incessant adjuration, and reiter-
ated assertions of confidence can proceed only from 
a heart that cares- often in spite of itself. Nietzsche 
more intellectually high-strung than Whitman and 
all too familiar with the stings and stinks of aca-
demic pismires and polecats, was understandably 
less skilled in patience and tolerance than Whitman. 
Working out of the chamber of a hypochondriac-
hermit-invalid and leading the existence of the 
inhabitant of such a cell, it would have been very 
easy and natural for him to have embraced that 
same nihilism he predicated as the cornerstone of 
his philosophy of the affirmation of life's joy and 
anguish without transcendence. Ignored, maligned, 
irritatingly and gratuitously misconstrued, he 
never wavered in his crusade to help man disengage 
himself from all that was dead and deleterious and 
help him form a vital connection with all that was 
creative and made people aware of what it meant 
to be an existing individual. In view of the often 
25 blind, inconsidered, and blanket arraignments of 
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the herd that have been so popular in our era and 
have established huge reputations for their authors, 
the wonder is not that Whitman and Nietzsche, 
who anticipated all the arguments against uni-
formity and conformity, despaired many times of 
reclaiming a generation that had sold its birthright 
of intrinsic curiosity for a mass of pre-digested 
knowledge capsules and bartered its artistic sense 
for a mess of potted palms, but that they should 
have persevered in their abiding faith in the human 
race. If one bears in mind Alexander Hamilton's 
notorious albeit basically accurate estimate of the 
people, for whom the Roman had the aptest of 
terms, one may wonder why anyone, aside from 
manifest psychotics like Moses and Marx, would 
devote his life's energies in their behalf. Is the 
Messiah complex universal - latent in all? Or does 
it manifest itself with pronounced strength in cer-
tain temperaments? Are those who labor under 
severe handicaps, or encounter rejection, failure, 
insult, mistreatment, abuse, injustice early in life, 
more inclined to transmogrify their misfortune, 
whether real or imaginary, into a universal agony 
of Promethean proportions, and, with a grandilo-
quent gesture, shoulder the world's ills, and pen a 
gospel of salvation? The role of religion in the lives 
of Whitman and Nietzsche will help suggest some 
of the answers. 
Each was reared in a pious household, and, to 
the end, each retained an ingrained sense of re-
ligious ethos. Whitman is radically unorthodox by 
the criteria of most denominations, and there is no 26 
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doubt that, like Hegel, he felt religion should be 
popular, not clerical, humane, not otherworldly, 
creative, not ascetic, joyous, not gloomy, demo-
cratic, not sectarian. Christ's teachings of brother-
hood and love are written large on every page he 
wrote. Like Emerson, however, he had many 
reservations regarding Ministers and Churches; like 
the great teacher of self-reliance, he, also, believed 
it was the duty of everyone to seek a direct re-
lationship with God himself. Whitman found god 
in nature and in man; in man's flesh and in man's 
spirit; in a leaf of grass and in a Brooklyn ferry; in 
the passionate kisses exchanged in a hayloft and in 
the solemn beads of the holy hermit; in the face of 
President Lincoln and in the countenance of the 
common prostitute; in the benign physiognomy 
of good and in the evil leer of evil. Whitman's God 
was ubiquitous, omnipresent, and immanent in life. 
Though often conceptualized anthropomorphically, 
invoked in the conventional manner, and imaged as 
the Camerado hospitably welcoming new arrivals 
at Heaven's Portals, Whitman even more often 
equates or identifies God with Self andfor Creation, 
and, by this convenient equation or identification, 
dispenses with God altogether. This may appear an 
unwarranted assumption, but one eventually be-
comes exasperated with Emerson's and Whitman's 
dubious logic which enables them to be blithely and 
supremely smug in their reliance on Self because 
Self is God. If one chooses to say his actions are 
correct and right and good because they are so in 
27 his own eyes and because they are conducive to his 
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well being - that is one thing. For, if there is a 
discrepancy between his thoughts on these matters 
and the thoughts of others, such a discrepancy will 
very soon be brought to his attention and he will 
be confronted with Thoreau's choice. But it is an 
entirely different matter when one claims Divine 
endorsement for an act of caprice. Or is it? Emer-
son does not consider the possibility of a conflict 
between God-Reliance and Self-Reliance because 
he could not conceive of a clash of interests between 
the Over.soul and the Self. Many, however, might 
feel such a position to be a flagrant evasion of a 
real and valid question. Emerson would retort 
that a responsible and conscientious person could 
never be misled by the infallible mentor within him. 
And, here, alas, Emerson would be ruthlessly 
impaled by the relentless inquisitor. For where, 
indeed, is individualism when, in the interests of 
being responsible, one must consult the wishes and 
welfare of others, and, in the interests of conscience, 
one must check with the mores, ethics, and codes of 
his society? If Emerson could reassure himself by 
pointing out that his preachment was for the indi-
vidual who was sensible and knew well Aristotle's 
teachings, and not for crackpot anarchists and 
radical malcontents, others were not so easily satis-
fied. Neither Thoreau nor Whitman repudiated 
their master, but both were prepared to carry 
individualism, off the lecture platform, much fur-
ther than Emerson was. There are passages in 
which Whitman exalts the individual to the status 
of sole deity, others wherein he acknowledges and 28 
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welcomes nether impulses scarcely of reputable 
origin, and still others in which individualism finds 
triumphant expression in the celebration of the 
sexual urge. Endowed with a remarkably keen 
pagan receptivity to nature and a richly sensual 
temperament - both of which were intensified by 
his paradoxically ecstatic yet anguished anticipa-
tion of death- Whitman, at his most spontaneous, 
characteristic, and individualistic, laid more stress 
on the fraternity of suffering by which men are 
united, and on the magic of love by which they are 
transported, than he did on supernal panaceas. 
Since his principal objective was to rediscover the 
values of life and happiness, Whitman would have 
been prepared to join Nietzsche in prizing life more 
than god, and, with some qualifications, just as 
ready as Nietzsche to set individual freedom above 
religion, ethics, and state. Perhaps Whitman would 
not have been prepared to concur, but he most 
surely would have strongly sympathized, with 
Camus' conviction that life is the only necessary 
good. At the same time, Whitman, unlike Nietzsche, 
did not think a belief in a transcendent order or 
immutable entity entailed a devaluation of the 
temporal order. Together with Heraclitus and 
Nietzsche, Whitman was prepared to accept change 
as a fundamental fact of existence, yet he still 
recognized order and harmony as immanent in the 
universe and, for the most part, rejected Nietzsche's 
cosmic fortuity. Whitman's mysticism consisted of 
a few Buddhistic notions, an unusual sensitivity of 
29 intuitive perception, and a belief "in what," as he 
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says in Specimen Days, "cannot be defined to the 
intellectual part, or to calculation." As did the 
states in the Civil War, he saw body and soul dis-
solving and dividing at death only to be reconciled 
and become united in a higher unity. Whitman's 
mysticism sought to give to quotidian experience 
the stamp of the eternal, rather than to preach the 
cessation of all effort until the great sabbath of 
sabbaths. Whitman saw no contradiction - and 
would not have been perturbed if he had- between 
his fidelity to the present and presence and his twin 
vision of a superterrestrial and telluric reign of 
perfect felicity. 
Most, if not the whole, of Nietzsche's thought 
stems from his violent reaction to Christianity. 
Whatever topic he may be discussing at the mo-
ment - Greek tragedy, the Will to Power, the 
Eternal Recurrence, Morality, Psychology, Super-
men, War, Science, Good and Evil, Wagner -
sooner or later, he will introduce the topic of 
Christianity. Born the son of a minister, he spent 
his life composing one of the most formidable 
arraignments and one of the most thersitical de-
nunciations of institutionalized and historical 
Christianity on record. His entire philosophy, in 
fact, can be understood as an attempt to re-evaluate 
all values, to understand life, and to define man's 
goals, without reference to, and in defiance of, 
Christian precepts, institutions, and creeds. It can 
be said he anticipated Freud, Marx, and the 
Existentialists by farseeing the day when man 
would have to find the courage to live without god 30 
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or perish. Nietzsche's self-appointed mission was to 
rescue man from the darkling plain; to indicate to 
him the wherewithal to create Man-God to replace 
God-Man. The undertaking, of course, was an 
enormous if not an impossible one. But an even 
more formidable impediment was the uncertainty 
that assailed Nietzsche regarding his finding a 
solution and perhaps even regarding the rightness 
of his course of action. Too often Nietzsche is 
misleadingly portrayed as vaunting himself a God 
like Caligula, gleefully cavorting with the Devil as 
he spouts all manner of blasphemies and impieties, 
or detachedly, with the meticulous precision of a 
mathematician, razing Christianity to rubble. Ac-
tually, however, Nietzsche suffered untold agonies 
as he sought to accept emotionally as well as ration-
ally the fact of God's death and, at the same time, 
circumvent nihilism. The fanatical zeal with which 
he threw himself into his labors readily reminds one 
of the religious frenzy of an Old Testament prophet 
and the supreme dedication of a religious leader. 
The Zarathustra we meet descending from the 
mountain forest to travel to men's cities is strongly 
suggestive of the holy men who after their sojourn 
in the wilderness are ready to commence their 
ministry. The vitriolic vehemence with which 
Nietzsche launches his diatribes against the doc-
trines of Christianity testifies not so much to a 
precocious atheism as it does to the artist's anger at 
the deprecation of beauty; the vitalist's protest 
against etiolation; the naturalist's objection to 
31 considering real what is abstract; the humanist's 
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rage against the gulling and depreciation of man; 
the personalist's indignation against the suppres-
sion and mutilation of man's individuality. A rabid 
individualist and brilliantly original thinker like 
Nietzsche would naturally rebel against the suffo-
cating traditionalism, the benighted dogmatism, 
and the inane absolutism of Christianity. One 
should remember that, Kierkegaard, Hegel, and 
many others assailed the Christianity of the Church 
on much the same grounds that Nietzsche did. It 
may also be helpful to remember that Nietzsche 
was a fervent Hellenist and that he believed the 
Greeks in their marriage of the Dionysiac and 
Apollonian had intuited earth's aim and man's hope 
infinitely better than Europe had under Christiani-
ty. Like that of so many other bitter foes of 
Pauline Christianity, Nietzsche's criticism of Christ 
himself was relatively mild. Even though he hys-
terically attacked Schopenhauer for elevating pity 
to the stature of the supreme virtue, even though 
he pictured God in one place as having died through 
his pity for man, and, even though, inZarathustra, 
pity for man is represented as the last great temp-
tation Zarathustra (who, disappointed with his 
mission to man, has returned to his mountain 
retreat, with a serpent and a lion as companions) 
must avoid succumbing to, Nietzsche was too filled 
with the milk of human kindness not to feel for all 
suffering things as tender a love as felt by Christ 
and Whitman. At times, Nietzsche, interpreting 
Christ in his own terms, commends Him for re-
pudiating tradition and preaching the glad evangel 32 
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of personalism: "Salvation by faith means that the 
heart alone, not knowledge, can bring happiness. 
The incarnation of God suggests that man shall not 
seek salvation in infinity but shall found his heaven 
on earth." At other times, Nietzsche condemned 
Christ for his passivity and likened him to Dos-
toievski's idiot Prince. Especially disturbing to 
Nietzsche was the death on the cross which he 
construed as a renunciation of the this-worldly and 
which he contrasted unfavorably to the shrieking 
dismemberment of Dionysus. To Nietzsche, it 
seemed that Christ embraced death as a release 
from life and that his death was hence a negation of 
life's earthly cycle, whereas Dionysus submitted to 
death as a phase of life's cycle that he might be 
regenerated eternally. At still other times, Nietz-
sche identified himself with Christ, pointing out 
that Christ was a self-proclaimed destroyer of mo-
rality and that Christ saw himself as beyond good 
and evil. During his mental illness, Nietzsche 
signed himself not only as Dionysus but also as The 
Crucified. It was perhaps his last pathetic effort to 
tell a still-incredulous world that what he had al-
ways sought was man's salvation. It may also hint 
at the profound depths of Nietzsche's perturbation 
as he sought frantically, with the frenzied logic of 
an artist's emotion rather than mathematical in-
duction, to substitute for Christian immortality his 
semi-mystical doctrine of eternal recurrence, and 
to shift cosmic responsibility and rule from God to 
Man through his visionary concept of Superman. 
33 It would appear that dissolution of identity was 
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an intolerable thought both to Whitman and 
Nietzsche. To Whitman, it evidently was a greater 
bugbear than physical infirmity and no doubt 
accounts in large measure for his anxiety to es-
tablish that death is a phase of life's cycle rather 
than a termination of it. To exorcise the adamant 
finality of the arch invisible fear, Whitman sum-
mons to the aid of his poetic alchemy every availa-
ble source - theological, theosophic, and even 
scientific. He espoused eidolons - Platonic arche-
types which always have been and which always 
will be. From Emerson, he appropriated the notion 
that every human being is a portion of the Divine 
Substance, out of which he issues and into which 
he is reintromitted - a notion recognizable in the 
organic outgoing-ingoing metaphor so prominent 
in his poems. He saw God immanent in all creation, 
and believed that all things, including God, con-
tinually tended toward the supreme repository, the 
All. Influenced by Buddhism, he believed in 
countless former and future births and deaths of 
himself as avatar of eternity. He believed in the 
immortality of the body through the perpetuity of 
life and in the immortality of the soul through the 
continuance of identity. (Buddhism declares that 
life can never die out entirely since the universe 
will always be and, even if life died out on our 
planet, the conditions that engendered it here would 
reoccur either here or elsewhere.) He believed his 
very being was somehow inspissated in his verse, 
and that he could materialize at the reader's touch: 
34 
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Camerado, this is no book, 
Who touches this touches a man, 
(Is it night? are we here together alone?) 
It is I you hold and who holds you, 
I spring from the pages into your arms - decease calls me 
forth. 
Less multifarious than Whitman, at least in this 
one respect, Nietzsche allayed his anxiety, as we 
have indicated, by his myth of eternal return -his 
version of the Pythagorean &v~Xx,)x/..om:;, an an-
cient doctrine often associated with mystical and 
theosophical movements, which Nietzsche appar-
ently felt was tenable within a naturalistic frame 
of reference. Nietzsche's perpetual cycles theory 
held that no event is unique, that no event occurs 
for once and for all. Every event has occurred, 
occurs, and will continue to occur in perpetuo. The 
same individuals have appeared, appear, and reap-
pear at every return of the cycle upon itself. 
Duration can be cognized only in terms of periodi-
city. The same situations are reproduced that have 
already been produced in previous cycles and will 
be reproduced in subsequent cycles- ad infinitum. 
From his version of the myth, Nietzsche excluded 
the Platonic definition of time as the moving image 
of unmoving eternity. And, of course, he also 
excluded the corollary to this, viz., that the perfect 
and ultimate divine goal of circular motion is 
absolute immobility. In Nietzsche's cosmos, time 
is infinite, but energy is determinate. 
Nietzsche enhanced his belief by providing for 
35 the exercise of free will within the very bastion of 
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necessitarianism. Thus he could reject all idealism 
of the archetype-prototype variety, and, at the 
same time, contend man makes of himself what he 
wills. For the fact that man cannot make of him-
self anything he has not been and will be again does 
not prevent his making himself any one of an 
infinite number of things. There is no contradiction 
in demanding the creation of superior men and the 
reoccurrence of all precisely as it is now. Nietzsche's 
eternal return postulates periodic but not seriatim 
occurrence; all repeats but there is no specific (or, 
what amounts to the same thing, no predetermined) 
sequence of repetition. The different possibilities 
in sequences are innumerable. Man can create 
himself and his immediate future. And in this 
knowledge and in the knowledge that identity is 
forever, reside man's freedom and joy. This twin 
knowledge is, furthermore, man's only and best 
mithridate against the sickness unto death, the 
angst and angoisse which assail man when he real-
izes he is an accident and that creation is a for-
tuitous concourse of atoms. 
Although it might be said that, in one sense, 
Whitman and Nietzsche were anti-romantic in re-
fusing to confound the real with the ideal or life 
with dream, they displayed many of the romanti-
cist's traits: through their faith in the vital instinct; 
through their iconoclasm; through their delirious 
eulogies and renitent denunciations; through their 
rampant egoism; through their libertarianism. 
Both sought to be representative of their times and 
to surmount the problems of their times in them- 36 
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selves. Both would have consented to have Kierke-
gaard's words serve as epigraph to their works: 
"My whole life is an epigram calculated to make 
people aware." 
Both have been dismissed as Goethe dismissed 
Byron: 'When he reflects, he is a child.' In his 
introduction to the Signet edition of Leaves of 
Grass, Gay Wilson Allen quotes T. S. Eliot assaying: 
"When Whitman speaks of the lilacs or the mock-
ing-bird, his theories and beliefs drop away like a 
needless pretext." And Santayana, in his Egotism 
in German Philosophy, spoke banteringly of Nietz-
sche's "genial imbecility" and "boyish blasphemies" 
-epithets endorsed by Bertrand Russell, epithets of 
the kind that greeted almost every edition of the 
Leaves in Whitman's lifetime and several decades 
later. Both, moreover, took an especial delight -
which can be understood as Emersonian greatness 
just as readily as imbecility- in twitting sluggish-
witted panglozers, in assuming the prophet's 
mantle, and in outraging the unco guid. 
Whitman cannot match the urbane irony and 
scintillating wit of Nietzsche. Nor is he capable of 
the clownish impishness, the Tybalt leaps and 
thrusts, the Mercutio ripostes - all embraced in the 
virtuosity of Nietzsche's epigrams. But both au-
thors sound alike when they unclench the floodgates 
of their speech and, like the chiliasts, alternately 
chide, beseech, and inspirit all who choose to hear. 
Whitman and Zarathustra are either verbally 
scourging the money-changers from the Temple, or 
37 sermonizing on the Mount of Olives. Like the 
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waters of a subterranean mountain stream sudden-
ly surfacing with explosive force, their words seethe 
forth in fast thick pants, rush pell mell in spuming 
torrent along a straightaway stretch of the channel 
bed, and, then, along a meandering bend in the 
channel, gradually slow to a lulling murmur. The 
reader cannot choose but hear. 
To appreciate fully the correspondence in the 
ideas of Whitman and Nietzsche, one can do no 
better than to read both authors together in their 
entirety. By way of an aid, rather than an ex-
haustive collation, the more salient parallels to-
gether with corroborative quotations are enumerat-
ed in the following pages. 
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Even a cursory indagation will disclose the crucial 
role played by contradiction in moulding the 
thought of Whitman and Nietzsche. Whether as a 
weapon of rhetoric or a decorative trope, whether 
as biotic law or quintessential signifier of life's 
myriad-faceted mystery, both writers found para-
dox congenial. They insisted that, in order to be 
uninhibitedly forthright and genuinely individu-
alistic, one must liberate himself from prudential 
consistency. They agreed that, if one were to 
exist as an independent human entity who refused 
to enfeoff his individuality to institutionalism, one 
must be prepared to contradict himself and others 
freely and fearlessly. They heartily subscribed to 
Emerson's dictum- "Speak what you think now in 
hard words and tomorrow speak what tomorrow 
thinks in hard words again, though it contradict 
every thing you said today." And, there is little 
doubt they would have seconded Jaspers in as-
serting that freedom can neither be defined nor 
attain cogency without contradiction. 
To Whitman and Nietzsche, contradiction and 
opposition were condiments that lent zest to ex-
istence. Contradiction was the cosmic diastole; it 
imbued life with meaning in the manner death 
defined life and rendered it precious. Contradiction 
was a measure of, and a safeguard for, dissentience. 
Without it, stultifying uniformity and gelid inani-
tion would entrench themselves irremedially. 
Contradiction promoted life, being the lifeblood of 
master spirits. Only craven bezonians who, though 
39 covertly coveting, lacked the hardihood to pluck, 
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deemed life's nectareous sweets sour grapes. Only 
clapperclawers of human existence disparaged 
contradiction. The man who trusted himself to the 
extent of mastering himself was perfectly at ease 
before his inconsistencies, nay, prided himself upon 
them: 
Do I contradict myself? 
Very well then I contradict myself, 
(I am large, I contain multitudes.) 
"Song of Myself," p. 68 
Product and avatar of all past beings, representa-
tive and spokesman for all present beings, insemi-
nator and forerunner of all future beings, ·whitman 
incorporates in himself all human traits and their 
opposites, all human qualities and their counter-
parts, all theses and their antitheses, all assertions 
and their negations, all declarations and their de-
nials. In such a commodious cosmos, no contra-
diction can prove of serious consequence for, in 
such a cosmos, as Whitman had learned from 
studying Emerson's concept of the Oversoul, dis-
cord and disunity are temporary states, mere 
harbingers of the ultimate condition of perfect 
harmony and oneness. In the last analysis, there-
fore, no evil was so inveterate and malignant as to 
be beyond rehabilitation, no contrariety so incorri-
gible as to be beyond rectification: 
We stand amid time beginningless and endless, we stand 
amid evil and good, 
All swings around us, there is as much darkness as light, 
The very sun swings itself and its system of planets around 
us, 40 
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Its sun, and its again, all swing around us. 
As for me, (torn, stormy, amid these vehement days,) 
I have the idea of all, and am all and believe in all, 
I believe materialism is true and spiritualism is true, I 
reject no part. 
"With Antecedents," p. 176 
Whitman was beyond contradiction in the same 
sense in which Nietzsche held that the superior 
being was beyond good and evil; he was not duped 
by bigotry's arbitrary labels, such as decent and 
indecent, moral and immoral, proper and improper, 
pious and blasphemous. He was convinced that the 
contradictions born of impulse and intuition often 
discovered the eternal truths more readily than did 
the positive demonstrations of logic and science. 
His celebration of contradiction is at one with his 
admonition against tutored guidance and expedient 
dialectic, with his admonition against choosing 
understanding over utterance, knowledge over life: 
Let me have my own way, 
Let others promulge the laws, I will make no account of 
the laws, 
Let others praise eminent men and hold up peace, I hold 
up agitation and conflict, 
1 give nothing as duties, 
Where others give as duties I give as living impulses, 
(Shall I give the heart's action as a duty?) 
Let others dispose of questions, I dispose of nothing, I 
arouse unanswerable questions, 
I call to the world to distrust the accounts of my friends, 
but listen to my enemies, as I myself do, 
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I charge you forever reject those who would expound me, 
for I cannot expound myself, 
I charge that there be no theory or school founded out 
of me, 
I charge you leave all free, as I have left all free. 
"Myself and Mine," pp. 173-74 
And his Leaves are defiantly strewn with contra-
dictions. Whitman's most cherished dream, the 
dream of a resplendent America effusing sweetness-
and-light and composed of a strong central govern-
ment under which the individual would enjoy 
absolute freedom, involved a contradiction not 
even he could transcend except at his most vision-
ary. Biographers, moreover, never leave off point-
ing out that Whitman's blustering unorthodoxy, 
his chants of roistering rowdies and common prosti-
tutes, his raucous extroversion, his narcissism and 
exhibitionism - all featured prominently in his 
verse - are at variance with the man generally 
remembered and reported as unobtrusive, gentle, 
retiring, dreamy, soft-spoken, formal, and cautious-
ly reticent. 
Whitman and Nietzsche were not so remote in 
either time or spirit from Sturm und Drang senti-
ments that they eschewed the guise of Promethean 
Rebel. One will seek in vain, of course, if he pores 
over their works for evidence of the gloomy egoist 
or the romantic agony, though there are those who 
would disagree. But the flamboyant image-smasher 
is unmistakably present in both. For Nietzsche, 
conscience meant the moral strength to oppose 
42 
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whatever demeaned life, whatever was held sacred 
solely because it belonged to hoary tradition: 
The ability to contradict, the attainment of a good con-
science in hostility to the accustomed, the traditional and 
the hallowed, - that is . . . the step of all steps of the 
emancipated intellect. 
JOYFUL WISDOM, p. 232 
Whitman and Nietzsche shared Hegel's view that 
contradiction, far from being a symptom of mental 
infirmity, was indicative of brilliance and creative 
insight. Their psychology of contradiction, like 
their psychology of good and evil, is also fundamen-
tally Hegelian: 
According to Hegel the whole earth ... with its infinite 
variety, the past, the surroundings of today, or what may 
happen in the future, the contrarieties of material with 
spiritual, and of natural with artificial, are all, to the eye 
of the ensemblist, but necessary sides and unfoldings, 
different steps or links, in the endless process of creative 
thought, which, amid numberless apparent failures and 
contradictions, is held together by central and never-
broken unity - not contradictions or failures at all, but 
radiations of one consistent and eternal purpose; the 
whole mass of everything steadily, unerringly tending and 
flowing toward the permanent utile and morale, as rivers 
to oceans. As life is the whole law and incessant effort of 
the visible universe, and death only the other or invisible 
side of the same, so the utile, so truth, so health, are the 
continuous-immutable laws of the moral universe, and 
vice and disease, with all their perturbations, are but 
transient, even if ever-so-prevalent expressions. 
SPECIMEN DAYS, pp. 236-37 
Whitman and Nietzsche agreed with Hegel that 
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nothing is new under the sun; that no proposition 
(thesis) is ever fully and finally denied since every 
proposition contains something which eventually 
will give rise to a new proposition; that life and 
man's history comprise an infinite series of creative 
and destructive cataclysms evolving toward a su-
perior humanity and culture. They also espoused 
the Heraclitean monism that repudiates the duality 
of spirit and matter, as well as the Heraclitean 
notion that the eternal flow, fomented and per-
petuated by tensions and conflicts, is the permanent 
reality, the Being from which issues all becoming. 
Their contradiction of status quo ante and status quo 
was not nihilistic negation but an initial step to 
reinterpretation and reappraisal. They controvert-
ed in the spirit of enlightened optimists not in the 
spirit of despairing pessimists. In his autobiogra-
phy, Ecce Homo, Nietzsche wrote: "I contradict as 
has never been contradicted before and am yet the 
opposite of a no-saying spirit." (Quoted by Walter 
Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher Psychologist 
Antichrist, New York, Meridian Press, 1956, p. 211.) 
Whitman and Nietzsche believed that man is at 
one and the same time destroyer, preserver, and 
improver; that man's acceptance of the totality of 
life with its horrors and miseries, its evil as well as 
its good, was a necessary first step in his realization 
of a halcyon future when humanity would attain 
its highest expression and human ideals of love, 
beauty, and truth would be realized. In "Starting 
From Paumanok," Whitman argues that the whole 
justifies all of its parts; that the real poet's reci- 44 
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tatives must comprehend the harmony of the whole 
in the very discord of its parts; and that nothing 
which in the long run propels life forward, even 
though it may arrest it temporarily, is maleficent: 
I make the poem of evil also, I commemorate that part 
also, 
I am myself just as much evil as good, and my nation is-
and I say there is in fact no evil, 
(Or if there is I say it is just as important to you, to the 
land or to me, as any thing else. 
p. 18 
These are the ipsissima verba of Nietzsche: 
What constitutes the value of those good and respected 
things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, 
knotted, and crocheted to these evil and apparently op-
posed things- perhaps even in being essentially identical 
with them. 
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, p. 214 
Bacon's lie is Nietzsche's untruth, but for Nietzsche 
its value is utilitarian (insofar as it furthers and 
preserves life) as well as aesthetic: 
In reality the evil impulses are just in as high a degree 
expedient, indispensable, and conservative of the species 
as the good: - only their function is different. 
JOYFUL WISDOM, p. 40 
However, it is not necessary to pore over their 
works to surmise what Whitman and Nietzsche 
would have taught regarding contradiction. The 
devotee (not to mention the parodist) of the Leaves 
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can readily picture Whitman dialogizing on Brook-
lyn Bridge thus: 
'I will effuse contradiction and show it underlying all. 
Whoever you are, to you endless contradictions! Was 
somebody asking dulcet consistency from me? I hasten 
to inform him or her I am the extoller of contradiction 
and conciliation. vVhatever contradicts me exalts me, and 
whatever is contradicted by me is exalted. Did you think 
it was or could be otherwise?' 
And, in the same way, the student of Nietzsche 
could readily conjure up a glowing vision of Zara-
thustra preaching as follows: 
'0 my friends, I teach you the word of words, the word of 
the Overman. It is the word contradiction. Do you hear 
it, my brothers? Revere it, cherish it. The logos of 
Zarathustra is contradiction. I teach you not veneration 
but desecration, not meek reception but heroic opposition, 
not peace but war, not servile conformity but heroic 
disagreement. There is more affirmation in the strong 
man's self-obeying than in all besotted consistency-
mongers.' 
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Together with the pasquinades they penned against 
milksop diffidence, brash babbittry, and demeaning 
regimentation, they wrote earnestly on the need 
for testing anew the validity of mores, customs, and 
traditions. Like Socrates (whom Nietzsche specifi-
cally mentions in this connection) they urged the 
careful scrutiny of all beliefs commonly accepted as 
axiomatic and self-evident. To them, all systems as 
such were suspect. Consequently, they implored 
man to overhaul the moral laws and doctrines 
whose inviolability was the lie that enabled the 
unprincipled to batten upon the ingenuous. Before 
Whitman's Modern Man and Nietzsche's Overman 
could be brought forth, the way had to be paved 
not by good resolutions alone but by new realistic 
codes of behavior as well. The sacred task to which 
man must solemnly dedicate himself is characteriz-
ed by Whitman in ''Thou Mother With Thy Equal 
Brood" as follows: 
Brain of the New \Vorld, what a task is thine, 
To formulate the Modern- out of the peerless grandeur of 
the modern, 
Out of thyself, comprising science, to recast poems, 
churches, art, 
(Recast, maybe discard them, end them - maybe their 
work is done, who knows?) 
By vision, hand, conception, on the background of the 
mighty past, the dead, 
To limn with absolute faith the mighty living present. 
p. 318 
Jealous guardians of man's steadily-diminishing 
47 autonomy, Whitman and Nietzsche warned man to 
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pay no heed to the whisperings of the herd and to 
give his obedience only to the laws he formulated 
himself. They knew very well that the absence of 
external restraints did not insure freedom, and 
that the freedom to express one's thoughts is mean-
ingless if one has no thoughts of his own to express. 
They reasoned that the man who cannot think for 
himself can command neither himself nor others 
and hence easily falls prey to the unscrupulous 
autocrat. To escape such debasing bondage and 
durance, they asked man to respect himself, to have 
faith in his own wisdom, to embrace earthly truths 
instead of illusory promises, to overcome his fears 
of social ostracism, to realize he cannot only be-
cause he will not, and to oppose with might and 
main whatever threatened the vital instinct. Then, 
partly out of a desire to enforce their lesson, partly 
because they appreciated the need for each age to 
reformulate the truths of knowledge, they taught 
their disciples the need for rejecting and super-
seding them, their own teachers. 
In "By Blue Ontario's Shore," Whitman declares 
he is for those who have never been mastered, "for 
those whom laws, theories, conventions, can never 
master" (p. 250). In a three-line lyric, "To The 
States," he admonishes: 
Resist, much, obey little, 
Once unquestioning obedience, once fully enslaved. 
p. 11 
And, in "Song Of Myself," he foreshadows Nietz-
sche in beseeching man to become his own lawgiver 48 
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and the sole creator of all truth and of all values. 
After dismissing lecture-halls, books, and dogma as 
no better than beds of Procrustes, he cavalierly 
sweeps aside all self-doubts and self-doubters while 
voicing at the same time his faith in man's ability 
to know of himself through himself alone: 
You shall no longer take things at second or third hand, 
nor look through the eyes of the dead, nor feed on the 
spectres in books, 
You shall not look through my eyes either, nor take things 
from me, 
You shall listen to all sides and filter them from your self. 
He that by me spreads a wider breast than my own proves 
the width of my own, 
He most honors my style who learns under it to destroy 
the teacher. 
pp.26;65 
Whitman and Nietzsche attributed many of man's 
ills to Philistinism and Pharisaism. They continu-
ally carped at man's reluctance to wean himself 
away from the misconceptions instilled into him in 
his youth and the expedient lies he devised to allay 
his anxieties. They pointed out that such mis-
conceptions were generally the fabrications of 
neurotics who sought to impose upon the healthy 
the distorted perspectives of the ailing. And they 
inveighed against man's self-deceits because they 
represented a refusal to face reality and because 
they could alleviate the pain but could not extirpate 
the cause of man's despair. They traced many of 
man's compulsions, excesses, and aberrations to the 
unnatural repression imposed by rank superstitions, 
49 benighted mores, and arbitrary, unrealistic precepts 
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for social behavior. They perceptively noted that 
fear is at the root of all rational materialism, and 
cautioned against whatever reduces aspiration to a 
mirage and degrades the dreams of men into a 
mechanical destiny. Their attacks on traditional 
authorities, the past, and books were prompted by 
their convictions that one learns to live by living, 
not by reading or being told about life, that one 
only uses history in the service of the life that he 
has learned to live. Whatever man had not found 
to be true by his own experience was to be discard-
ed. The atomic weights of all moral elements were 
to be ascertained anew. 
Nietzsche's directives for effecting the above 
ends are identical with Whitman's. He, too, asks 
man to utilize "all his honesty, all his sturdiness and 
sincerity in his character, to help him to revolt 
against secondhand thought, secondhand learning, 
secondhand action" (The Use & Abuse of History, 
p. 72). He, too, scorned the blind devotee and the 
unquestioning disciple who mouthed the master's 
words with scant comprehension and no thought 
of testing their truth for himself: 
"Be a man and do not follow me - but yourself! But 
yourself!" 
JOYFUL WISDOM, p. 99 
I now go away alone, my disciples! You too now go away 
and be alone! So I will have it. 
Truly, I advise you: go away from me and guard your-
selves against Zarathustra! ... 
One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil. 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, p. 103 50 
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Nietzsche, too, saw in Socrates' incisive grilling the 
means of piercing through moral mendacities and 
exposing the hollowness of eternal as well as pre-
vailing idols. Whitman, always an indefatigable 
stroller, always consumed by voracious curiosity, 
always in quest of disciples, always a sedulous self-
diagnostician, never a hat-doffer nor fawner before 
the unproven great, naturally felt an affinity with 
the Athenian peripatetic: 
I am he who walks the States with a barb'd tongue, 
questioning every one I meet, 
Who are you that wanted only to be told what you knew 
before? 
Who are you that wanted only a book to join in your 
nonsense? 
BY BLUE ONTARIO'S SHORE, p. 242 
And Nietzsche was equally impressed by Socrates' 
intrepid cross-examining which deflated and con-
founded so many pretenders to wisdom and virtue: 
It seems to me more and more that the philosopher, being 
necessarily a man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, 
has at all times stood, and has had to stand, in opposition to 
his today 0 • 0 • All these extraordinary furtherers of mankind 
0. 0 have hitherto found their task, their hard, unwanted, 
peremptory task - but ultimately also the greatness of 
their task- in being the bad conscience of their time. 0. 0 At 
all times they showed how much hypocrisy, indolence, 
letting oneself go and letting oneself fall, how many lies, 
were hidden under the most respected type of their current 
morality ... 
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, ppo 135-36 
To Zarathustra, the joyous wisdom is the awareness 
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that life's secret is accessible to man as soon as man 
discovers he can plumb it all alone. Nietzsche was 
convinced that nihilism, the mal de siecle, proceeded 
from the atrophy of will induced by a Christianity 
of self-mutilation and from the hypertrophy of 
reason induced by a purely theoretical empiricism. 
His un-holy crusade was launched in order to 
restore to man the freedom, self-respect, self-reli-
ance, and courage which Christianity had neutraliz-
ed and subverted. Nietzsche, however, could only 
give directions; each individual must himself liber-
ate his individuality from the sty of the herd-animal 
and purge himself of morality's decoctions. Man 
must not turn for aid either to a God who was dead 
or to a science which was based more on prejudice 
than fact. He must walk alone and hearken only to 
the voice of his own oneness among the many. 
"He who obeys," Zarathustra instructs, "does not 
listen to himself!" (Zarathustra, Hollingdale, p. 218) 
And, in joyful Wisdom, we read: 
I don't want people to do anything after me; I want every 
one to do something before himself (as a pattern to him-
self) -just as I do. 
pp. 206-7 
Regardless, however, of how much they might 
entreat their adherents to supplant their precep-
tors, it was characteristic of Whitman and Nietz-
sche to rush after the mythical catechumens they 
had just dismissed with afterthoughts and a never-
ceasing flow of additional precepts. Their solicitude 
and possessiveness is indeed touching when it is 
not comical. Both, moreover, reassure us that their 52 
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words will, in time, be scattered, like ashes and 
sparks from an unextinguished hearth, among 
mankind. They often put us in mind of Christ as 
they foretell the magic potency of their irresistible 
words: 
I teach straying from me, yet who can stray from me? 
I follow you whoever you are from the present hour, 
My words itch at your ears till you understand them. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 65 
At the same time, they cautioned new recruits to 
their banners that their road was paved with the 
pulverized rubble of shattered tablets and shrines 
and littered with the debris of pale warriors. It was 
not a road for the faint of heart and mollycoddled. 
Lovers of security, respectability, and the bovine 
bliss of ignorance never set foot on it. Those who 
tramped a perpetual journey on this road did not 
slink by or creep along like lepers, mendicants, and 
lickspittles; they strolled along like lords of the 
earth, courting society's obloquy, inviting the 
screaks of Pecksniffian grimalkins. They were the 
first to grant that the stern realities they asked 
man to confront were hardly calculated to mitigate 
anxiety. Misgivings are not set at rest upon learn-
ing that respected truths are specious rationaliza-
tions, that cherished hopes are delusive phantoms, 
that responsibility is man's alone and viability the 
law of the cosmos. 
Whitman admitted his draught was bitter but 
insisted that whoever wished to learn his lesson 
complete must be prepared to quaff his Socratic 
53 hemlock without demur: 
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I know my words are weapons full of danger, full of death, 
For I confront peace, security, and all settled laws, to 
unsettle them, 
I am more resolute because all have denied me ... 
I heed not ... cautions, majorities, nor ridicule, 
And the threat of ... hell is little or nothing to me, 
And the lure of ... heaven is little or nothing to me. 
AS I LAY WITH MY HEAD IN YOUR LAP CAMERADO, p. 229 
No less exacting, Nietzsche requires hardihood and 
self-mastery of those who would follow him. His 
roses can be plucked only at the risk of painful 
thornpricks and bleeding fingers. His companions 
are culled mainly from those constipated by herd 
prescriptives. They and they alone are worthy of 
the Promethean task of creating all the truth and 
all the values that can have any meaning for man: 
Creation - that is the great redemption from suffering, 
and life's easement. But that the creator may exist, that 
itself requires suffering and much transformation. 
Yes, there must be much bitter dying in your life, you 
creators! Thus you are advocates and justifiers of all 
transitoriness. 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, p. 111 
He lauds Socratic humility but scorns cloistered 
virtue. He echoes Blake's insight that convictions 
are prisons : 
One should not be deceived: great spirits are skeptics. 
Zarathusira is a skeptic. Strength, freedom which is born 
of the strength and overstrength of the spirit, proves 
itself by skepticism. Men of conviction are not worthy of 
the least consideration in fundamental questions of value 
and disvalue. Convictions are prisons. 
THE ANTICHRIST, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 638 54 
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The readers Nietzsche desires for himself are such 
as laugh at ostracism. They covet truths as truths 
rather than as aids to material advantage. They 
are not afraid to pose questions which jeopardize 
their security and very lives. They understand 
Nietzsche's intent is not to pour new wine but to 
destroy casks and empty bottles whose contents 
have soured and, simultaneously, to bring up rare 
vintages from cellars whose stocks have been 
forgotten or buried under ruins in the course of 
centuries. They share Nietzsche's contentions that 
prevailing piety is impious, that prevailing veracity 
is mendacious, that prevailing goodness is wicked-
ness. They appreciate Nietzsche's psychological 
insight that conformity to the law breeds cor-
ruption and depravity in the ranks of the weak and 
dependent. And they comprehend that, since 
Nietzsche's revaluation is a perspicacious scrutiny, 
reassessment, and rearrangement of existing veri-
ties, it is basically an affirmation (and not nihilism) 
even though it is arrived at only after the honest 
recognition and negation of all found to be no 
longer true, vital, and conducive to the growth of 
human greatness. It is of them that Nietzsche 
speaks when he says: 
We ourselves, we free spirits, are nothing less than a 
"revaluation of all values," an incarnate declaration of 
war and triumph over all ancient conceptions of "true" 
and "untrue." 
THE ANTICHRIST, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 579 
AMOR FATI 
Whitman's and Nietzsche's passionate embrace of 
life in its totality- in its glowing plenitude and in 
its guttering twilight, in its pleasures and in its 
pains, in its ecstatic joys and in its hideous horrors-
is enunciated frequently and eloquently in most of 
their major works. It is closely associated with 
their pagan paeans hymning man's body and senses, 
with their view of death as a phase in life's cycle 
rather than the terminus of life, with their con-
viction that man is master of his fate and can ex-
tricate himself from the quagmire of doubt and 
fear by his own unaided exertions. 
Their championing of intuition was occasioned 
partly by their personal experience regarding its 
efficacy and partly by the derision with which 
scientific rationalists dismissed it. Similarly, their 
stout defense of man's instincts and bodily passions 
was motivated partly by their indignant rejection 
of the traditional doctrine that held spirit and 
matter were separate and distinct, and partly by 
their impatience with the false prudery and blind 
stupidity that refused to acknowledge the elemen-
tary facts of life. Their deification of the senses 
and impulses was neither hedonism nor primitiv-
ism; it was principally a naturalistic repudiation of 
the division between flesh and spirit. Like Blake 
and Goethe, they held sacrosanct the impulse to 
life which pervades all animate objects. They also 
shared Blake's view that virtue and vice could be 
understood only in terms of innocence and ex-
perience, and that lamb and tiger were to be blessed 
alike since their opposition provided both the basis 56 
AMOR FATI 
of life and also the tension which advanced life. 
To them, the Edenic Myth was an embodiment of 
life's dialectic where the State of Innocence was the 
thesis, the Transgression represented the antithesis, 
and Man's Fate signified the synthesis. In addi-
tion, both Whitman and Nietzsche followed Blake's 
lead and anticipated Freud by speaking out forth-
rightly against the unnatural repression of desires. 
Both, moreover, located the forces that suppressed 
the free exercise of man's creative and procreative 
energies in the Church and in Convention. Whit-
man viewed the human body as a holy temple 
every ounce as divine as any church edifice, and 
his wrath knew no bounds when belaboring those 
who found any part of it unclean or degrading. 
He was at one with Blake in believing that the 
body is that part of the soul which we cannot see, 
and consequently felt that ascetic mortification or 
religious denigration of the body was a sin against 
life. Nietzsche contended that the Church was the 
State's ally in imposing a uniformity of mediocrity 
that was death to virtually all creative endeavor. 
And he predicted the inhuman outrages of Prus-
sianism and the Nazis by the simple logic of asking 
what was the inevitable consequence of the flagel-
lation theology of Luther which told men they were 
totally depraved by nature and then excoriated 
them for being what they inescapably were. 
As Poet of the Body and singer of man's glorious 
sentiency, Whitman joins Blake in finding the 
genitals beautiful, in extolling touch as a touchstone 
57 to eternity, in affirming all conceptions though 
maculate are holy, and in understanding most 
puritanism to be indicative of the weakness of de-
sire: 
Copulation is no more rank to me than death is. 
I believe in the flesh and the appetites. 
On women fit for conception I start bigger and nimbler 
babes. 
If any thing is sacred the human body is sacred. 
pp. 42; 57; 75 
As the chanter of Adamic songs, as the one aching 
with amorous love, as the primordial seed-bearer, 
with the potent original loins, as a super-American 
Zeus, Whitman undertakes to father the noble 
future generations of the States by impregnating 
American womanhood: 
It is I, you women, I make my way, 
I am stern, acrid, large, undissuadable, but I love you, 
I do not hurt you any more than is necessary for you, 
I pour the stuff to start sons and daughters fit for these 
States. 
A WOMAN WAITS FOR ME, p. 77 
He calls neither for promiscuity nor for bacchanalia. 
He does not minimize the ecstasy of sexual congress 
but he makes it clear that he prizes it chiefly as a 
means of perpetuating a perfectible humanity he 
fervently hopes will commence its evolution to-
wards perfection in the immediate future. Though 
an egalitarian and, like Christ, one who would not 
turn away from the lowly prostitute, Whitman 
shared Nietzsche's point of view in seeing woman's 
role as primarily that of a mother. Nietzsche's view 
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every inch as impassioned as Whitman in scourging 
the hair-shirted despisers of the body, and in de-
crying those who resort to sex as to a drug: 
Sex: for free hearts, innocent and free, the garden happi-
ness of the earth, the future's exuberant gratitude to the 
present. 
Sex: only for the wilted, a sweet poison; for the lion-
willed, however, the great invigoration of the heart and 
the reverently reserved wine of wines. 
Sex: the happiness that is the great parable of a higher 
happiness and the highest hope. 
ZARATHUSTRA, p. 300 
Nietzsche did not exclude the ascetic from his types 
of the great man which included the artist and the 
philosopher. But there seems little doubt that his 
highest commendation was reserved for the pas-
sionate being who was perfect master of his pas-
sions. Nietzsche was very Aristotelian in deeming 
both the man who acted on blind impulse and also 
the man who forcibly thwarted his desires vastly 
inferior to the man who rationally controlled his 
instincts. He admired Socrates for recognizing 
Athenian decadence was the consequence of man's 
appetites running amuck. But he deplored Socrates' 
drastic cure which called for rationality at any 
price. His attitude toward the passions, his theory 
of sublimation, and the basis for his attacks against 
Christianity are all made explicitly clear in the 
following passage from Twilight of the Idols: 
All passions have a phase when they are merely disastrous, 
when they drag down their victim with the weight of 
59 stupidity- and a later, very much later phase when they 
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wed the spirit, when they "spiritualize" themselves. 
Formerly, in view of the element of stupidity in passion, 
war was declared on passion itself, its destruction was 
plotted; all the old moral monsters are agreed on this: il 
faut tuer les passions. The most famous formula for this is 
to be found in the New Testament, in that Sermon on the 
Mount, where, incidentally, things are by no means looked 
at from a height. There it is said, for example, with 
particular reference to sexuality: "If thy eye offend thee, 
pluck it out." Fortunately, no Christian acts in accord-
ance with this precept. Destroying the passions and crav-
ings, merely as a preventive measure against thei1· stu-
pidity and the unpleasant consequences of this stupidity-
today this itself strikes us as merely another acute form of 
stupidity. We no longer admire dentists who "pluck out" 
teeth so that they will not hurt any more. 
To be fair, it should be admitted, however, that on the 
ground out of which Christianity grew, the concept of the 
"spiritualization of passion" could never have been formed. 
After all the first church, as is well known, fought against 
the "intelligent" in favor of the "poor in spirit." How 
could one expect from it an intelligent war against passion? 
The church fights passion with excision in every sense: its 
practice, its "cure," is castratism. It never asks: "How 
can one spiritualize, beautify, deify a craving?" It has at 
all times laid the stress of discipline on extirpation (of 
sensuality, of pride, of the lust to rule, of avarice, of 
vengefulness). But an attack on the roots of passion 
means an attack on the roots of life: the practice of the 
church is hostile to life. 
PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, pp. 486-87 
Nietzsche realized the sexual urge could easily de-
generate into mere concupiscence but he was cer-
tain that just as man can rise above animality so 
can man's libido be refined. He persistently pointed 
out that in Greece sex was viewed as a sign of 60 
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health and that it was only with Christianity's 
advent that it came to be seen as a bugbear: 
I know no higher symbolism than this Greek symbolism of 
the Dionysian festivals. Here the most profound instinct 
of life, that directed toward the future of life, the enternity 
of life, is experienced religiously - and the way to life, 
procreation, as the holy way. It was Christianity, with its 
ressentiment against life at the bottom of its heart, which 
first made something unclean of sexuality: it threw filth on 
the origin, on the presupposition of our life. 
TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 562 
For Nietzsche, as for Whitman, the arch foes of life 
were the dry-as-dust scholars and preachers. Both 
assailed the fallacy which conferred on reason the 
principal role in the apperception of external re-
ality. Their quarrel, of course, was not with reason 
per se but rather with the scientism which relegated 
the testimony of the senses and the intuition to the 
realm of superstition. They both hated absolute 
empiricisms and desiccated scholasticisms. 
Knowledge educed from cerebral synthesis cannot 
by itself satisfy man's burgeoning curiosity. Life's 
totality cannot be apprehended by ratiocinative 
schematizations alone. Analysis, by its very nature, 
is inimical to life; beyond a certain point, the 
breakdown of many of life's hypostatic simples may 
be attended with fatal consequences. In "When I 
Heard The Learn'd Astronomer," Whitman avers 
that truth cannot be arrived at by syllogizing; it 
must be felt like an impulse from a vernal wood. 
In "Song Of Myself," he bestows the first prize 
61 upon the scientists. At the same time, however, he 
asserts that, although their facts are useful, facts 
are not his personal lares. And, later in the same 
poem, he is appreciably less conciliatory toward 
pedagogues: 
All truths wait in all things, 
They neither hasten their own delivery nor resist it, 
They do not need the obstetric forceps of the surgeon, 
Logic and sermons never convince, 
The damp of the night drives deeper into my soul. 
p. 46 
Whitman was at one with Emerson and Nietzsche 
in believing that history, books, and book-learning 
were not to be worshipped as deities but used as 
tools. Too many books and histories are written by 
bookworms who are not original thinkers and who 
commence their writing with preconceived notions 
and with traditional as well as current prejudices. 
Hence books and dogmatic pedagogues may do 
more harm than good by stifling the individual's 
inclination for independent thought, by dulling his 
capacity for original observation, and by instilling 
in him not only false or obsolete information but 
also a predisposition to their own bias. Whitman 
echoed Emerson in asserting the active soul is an 
infinitely surer guide to wisdom than any book or 
lecturer: 
Wisdom is not finally tested in schools, 
Wisdom cannot be pass'd from one having it to another 
not having it, 
Wisdom is of the soul, is not susceptible of proof, is its 
own proof. 
AMOR FATI 
SONG OF THE OPEN ROAD, p. 110 62 
AMOR FAT! 
63 
The most a good teacher could hope or wish to do 
would be to stimulate and inspire his pupils to 
cogitate on their own. No education can be valid 
or complete, moreover, which does not offer the 
student the opportunity to test his theoretical 
learning in the open air on life's broad highway. 
Only by setting out with Whitman on a marathon 
hike can the student check out the truths he was 
taught and master the eternal verities of the earth: 
Allons! whoever you are come travel with me! 
Traveling with me you find what never tires. 
The earth never tires, 
The earth is rude, silent, incomprehensible at first, Nature 
is rude and incomprehensible at first, 
Be not discouraged, keep on, there are divine things well 
envelop'd, 
I swear to you there are divine things more beautiful than 
words can tell. 
SONG OF THE OPEN ROAD, p. 111 
One impulse from his own heart or that of his teach-
er could teach the student more of man, of moral 
evil and of good, than all the sages. Whitman con-
curred with Blake that "Demonstration is only by 
bodily Senses" : 
(I and mine do not convince by arguments, similes, 
rhymes, 
We convince by our presence.) 
SONG OF THE OPEN ROAD, p. 112 
Oxen that rattle the yoke and chain or halt in the leafy 
shade, what is that you express in your eyes? 
It seems to me more than all the print I have read in 
my life. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 33 
Nietzsche's thinking adheres closely to Whitman's 
on this subject. He, too, proclaimed the "inno-
cence of the senses" (Zarathustra, p. 166); he, too, 
remarked that "in the end, one experiences only 
oneself" (Zarathustra, p. 264). Nietzsche, too, 
voiced grave doubts in regard to scholastic panjan-
drums: 
Beware of the scholars! They hate you, for they are 
sterile. . .. Such men boast they do not lie: but the ina-
bility to lie is far from the love of truth. 
ZARATHUSTRA, p. 402 
The German philosopher had nothing but contempt 
for those who with the baedekers of astigmatic 
pedants clutched tightly in their hands peered at 
life through scientific blinders. He had not read 
Blake and \Vhitman but he recalled Goethe's senti-
ments that it is the judgment, and not the senses, 
which is usually at fault in human errors of per-
ception: 
The senses ... do not lie at all. What we make of their 
testimony, that alone introduces lies. . .. "Reason" is the 
cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses. 
TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, pp. 480-81 
As already indicated, both Whitman and Nietzsche 
belligerently defended the senses and the body 
against the perennial grumbling of the excessively 
modest. Whitman is the rhapsodist of the body as 
much as he is the rhapsodist of the soul. He main-
tains that the two are, in fact, one and indivisible; 






Strange and hard the paradox true I give, 
Objects gross and the unseen soul are one. 
A SONG FOR OCCUPATIONS, p. 158 
Clear and sweet is my soul, and clear and sweet is all that 
is not my soul. 
Lack one lacks both, and the unseen is proved by the seen, 
Till that becomes unseen and receives proof in its turn. 
I believe in you my soul, the other I am must not abase 
itself to you, 
And you must not be abased to the other. 
SONG OF MYSELF, pp. 26; 27 
COME, SAID MY SOUL, 
SUCH VERSES FOR MY BODY LET US WRITE, (FOR WE ARE 
ONE.) 
motto for LEAVES OF GRASS, p. 3 
Elsewhere, however, he appears to adhere to the 
orthodox notion that the soul is the immortal 
portion of man and the body is the mortal portion 
subject to decay and decomposition - even though 
the dead body is admirable fertilizer and hence 
breeds of new life and enjoys a kind of phoenix-
like eternity: 
I depart as air, I shake my white locks at the runaway sun, 
I effuse my flesh in eddies, and drift it in lacy jags. 
I bequeath myself to the dirt to grow from the grass I love, 
If you want me again look for me under your boot-soles. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 68 
Behold this compost! behold it well! 
Perhaps every mite has once form'd part of a sick person-
yet behold! 
The grass of spring covers the prairies, 
The summer growth is ilnnocent and disdainful above all 
those strata of sour dead. 
AUTUMN RIVULETS, p. 261 
And I have dream'd that the purpose and essence of the 
known life, the transient, 
Is to form and decide identity for the unknown life, the 
permanent. 
If all came but to ashes of dung, 
If maggots and rats ended us, then Alarum! for we are 
betray'd, 
Then indeed suspicion of death. 
TO THINK OF TIME, p. 307 
Actually, there is no contradiction since Whitman 
was quite Platonic (indirectly through Emerson 
and Carlyle) in believing that ultimate reality was 
spiritual. He held that every evanescent, material 
object had its permanent, spiritual counterpart 
which he generally referred to as its eidolon. All 
objects, in other words, were palpable models, 
visible replicas, tangible manifestations, tellurian 
configurations of their corresponding archetypes. 
Nothing is lost in the universe. All objects, after a 
spell of mortality, enjioy everlasting life. But mor-
tality is not thereby less estimable. The mortal 
shell, which is shed at death, is, during life, in-
extricably linked to its immortal part. What is 
more, \iVhitman's orientation was too sensorial and 
his leaning toward philosophical sensationalism too 
pronounced to admit of his prizing the reality after 
the grave more than the reality of his beloved grass. 
His huzzas are apportioned equally among Pauma-
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I will make the poems of materials, for I think they are to 
be the most spiritual poems, 
And I will make the poems of my body and of mortality, 
For I think I shall then supply myself with the poems of 
my soul and of immortality. 
Was somebody asking to see the soul? 
See, your own shape and countenance, persons, substances, 
beasts, the trees, the running rivers, the rocks and 
sands. 
All hold spiritual joys and afterwards loosen them; 
How can the real body ever die and be buried? 
Of your real body and any man's or woman's real body, 
Item for item it will elude the hands of the corpse-cleaners 
and pass to fitting spheres, 
Carrying what has accrued to it from the moment of birth 
to the moment of death. 
Behold, the body includes and is the meaning, the main 
concern, and includes and is the soul; 
Whoever you are, how superb and how divine is your 
body, or any part of it! 
STARTING FROM PAUMANOK, pp. 17; 20-21 
I believe of all those men and women that fill'd the un-
named lands, every one exists this hour here or else-
where, invisible to us, 
In exact proportion to what he or she grew from in life, 
and out of what he or she did, felt, became, loved, 
sinn'd, in life. 
I suspect their results curiously await in the yet unseen 
world, counterparts of what accrued to them in the 
seen world. 
UNNAMED LANDS, p. 264 
Nietzsche wholeheartedly agreed with Whitman 
that the duality of impulse (passion) and reason 
(spirit) was utter nonsense: 
The pure spirit is the pure lie. 
The "pure spirit" is a pure stupidity: if we subtract the 
nervous system and the senses - the "mortal shroud" -
then we miscalculate -that is all! 
THE ANTICHRIST, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, pp. 575; 581 
But Nietzsche, of course, was wholly naturalistic. 
He disbelieved all speculations relating to an after-
life. He never glimpsed any transcendent destiny 
hovering in the wings poised to bring salvation to 
man, the poor player strutting and fretting his 
brief hour upon life's stage. Identity beyond the 
grave was to Nietzsche a preposterous absurdity 
and concepts such as Platonic Ideas and an im-
mortal soul he regarded as perversely asinine. For 
Nietzsche, moreover,. the real was what was de-
monstrably existent. What he found detestable in 
Christianity was its atrocious misrepresentations of 
actuality, its distempered fabrications, and its 
ingrained dissimulation. In Christianity, Nietzsche 
discovered not only the irrationality of the insane 
but also the decadence of a hireling society and the 
nihilism of craven cowardice: 
In Christianity neither morality nor religion has even a 
single point of contact with reality. . .. This world of pure 
fiction is vastly inferior to the world of dreams insofar as 
the latter mirrors reality, whereas the former falsifies, 
devalues, and negates reality. Once the concept of 
"nature" had been invented as the opposite of "God," 
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this whole world of fiction is rooted in hatred of the 
natural (of reality!); it is the expression of a profound 
vexation at the sight of reality. 
THE ANTICHRIST, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, pp. 581-582 
Nietzsche shared Whitman's distrust of theoreti-
cians whose ponderous tomes replete with involved 
abstractions were totally divorced from the voca-
tion of living and consequently hostile to life itself. 
But, cheek by jowl, with Whitman, the anti-
metaphysician, we find Whitman, the supreme 
metaphysician; whereas, in Nietzsche, the obstinate 
refusal of all supernatural consolation assumes the 
proportions of zealotry. Whitman was as existential 
as Nietzsche in prizing the growth of the human 
personality above everything else, but, like the 
Tennyson of In 1Wemoriam, he felt "earth is dark-
ness at the core and dust and ashes all that is" if 
one cannot believe in personal immortality. Nietz-
sche, on the other hand, although he, too, eventually 
embraced a semi-mystical concept, that of the 
eternal recurrence, devoted much of his writing to 
finding the means of avoiding futilitarian despair 
while learning to live without God, the hope of 
heaven, and the promise of salvation. It is also 
important to note that, although Whitman would 
qualify for inclusion in a list of anti-rationalists 
that would include Emerson, Blake, and D. H. 
Lawrence, Nietzsche would not. In Whitman, the 
basic urge is creative (which subsumes the sexual 
urge); hence, for Whitman, the passions enjoy as 
much prestige as the rational faculties. What is 
69 more, since Whitman agrees with Emerson that 
human impulses are divinely-inspired, it is obvious 
that such impulses have little if any need of reason's 
husbandry. Nietzsche's position is by no means 
identical. He is not a rationalist since he does not 
concede that reason is the principal motive power 
in man. But neither is he an anti-rationalist. In 
Nietzsche, the basic urge is the will-to-power; and 
the rational faculty and the passions are both 
expressions in different guises of this urge. Further-
more, as already indicated, the man most highly 
esteemed by Nietzsche is the man who overcomes 
himself, who achieves a rational mastery over his 
passions. 
Yet, insofar as priests enjoined the excision 
rather than rarefaction of the instincts, Nietzsche 
was even more ready than Whitman to pillory 
them. At times, both displayed tolerance and 
sympathy. With his characteristic aplomb, Whit-
man, in Song of Myself, expansively assures priests 
he does not particularly detest them: "I do not 
despise you priests, all time, the world over" (p. 60). 
And Zarathustra confides to his pupils that he is 
"moved by compassion for these priests" (Zara-
thustra, p. 203). It was not, however, in either of 
their natures to refrain for long from twitting the 
dispensers of supernal caudle and the hawkers of 
quack catholicons. Inasmuch as priests are leagued 
with Urizens in belittling the senses, in necrosing 
life, in weaving webs of sin, Whitman feels it is 
time to end their reign. Whatever useful functions 
they may have performed in the past can now be 
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Allons! from all formules! 
From your formules, 0 bat-eyed and materialistic priests. 
There will shortly be no more priests, I say their work is 
done. 
SONG OF THE OPE:-! ROAD, p. 112; BY BLUE ONTARIO'S 
SHORE, p. 248 
"The mumbling and screaming priest" is "soon 
deserted" (Thoughts, p. 333) and is succeeded by 
the poet singing the organic unity of all being, 
praising the body as the privileged place of joy, 
arousing each individual to partake of the delicious 
plenitude of earth's bounty. Nietzsche's epithets 
are equally pungent and graphic. His verbal ar-
tillery barrage against the tonsured servants of the 
church rakes them for inveighing against the atti-
tude of here or nowhere, for disvaluing reason to 
enshrine faith, and for sowing the seeds of an 
invidious ressentiment. To Nietzsche, the priest is 
the deformed Thersites, mocking what he has not 
the courage or capacity to enjoy, maliciously 
maligning, because he envies, whatever is strong, 
healthy, and vitally beautiful: 
As long as the priest was considered the supreme type, 
every valuable kind of human being was devaluated. The 
time will come, I promise, when the priest will be con-
sidered the lowest type, our Chandala, the most men-
dacious, the most indecent kind of human being. 
TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 550 
Nietzsche was nettled also by the theologians' ni-
hilism which found the human body to be a cess-
71 pool of corruption, which disclaimed human efforts 
towards betterment, and which disdained all truths 
except the dogmata of the church: 
As long as the priest is considered a higher type of man-
this professional negator, slanderer, and poisoner of life-
there is no answer to the question: what is truth? For 
truth has been stood on its head when the conscious 
advocate of nothingnesE; and negation is accepted as the 
representative of "truth." 
THE ANTICHRIST, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 575 
But what Nietzsche found most hateful of all was 
that the priests' untruths and myths were employ-
ed to serve personal ambition, to enable them to 
become masters over a cowed and insecure congre-
gation: 
All the concepts of the church have been recognized for 
what they are, the most malignant counterfeits that exist, 
the aim of which is to devalue nature and natural values; 
the priest himself has been recognized for what he is, the 
most dangerous kind of parasite, the real poison-spider 
of life. 
THE ANTICHRIST, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 611 
Whitman anticipated many of Nietzsche's stric-
tures against religion, but, although he carried 
many of these further than Emerson would have 
dared, he generally stopped short of Nietzsche's 
relentless and often hysterical conclusions. In ad-
dition, Whitman's omnivorousness led him many 
times to entertain two or more opposed notions 
simultaneously. A Quaker by birth and strongly 
mindful of Emerson's thought, Whitman deemed 
man perfectly capable of understanding God and 




He believed a new religion was both inevitable and 
desirable. He predicted that the priest would be 
replaced by the bard whose function would be to 
arouse the individual's awareness of the divine 
afflatus in himself, in others, and in all nature. 
Thus \Vhitman, like Nietzsche, was a severe critic 
of orthodox Christianity and its products. But 
Whitman's criticism lacks Nietzsche's frenziedmor-
dacity. However much Whitman might regret that 
Christian doctrine was mostly a hideous travesty of 
Christ's teachings, however much his hatred might 
be quickened against the ruthless profiteering which 
was Christian piety and at the vicious exploitation 
which was Christian love, he, nevertheless, does not 
dispense with divinity and the divine principle. 
The supernatural might not be of more moment 
than the natural, but Whitman did not, therefore, 
reject the former. If man was as divine as anything, 
it was because he carried divinity within him, be-
cause he shared with all creation a portion of the 
divine cosmic substance that was both the source 
and the destination of all life. But Whitman does 
approach Nietzsche's position that, since gods are 
man's creations, man should worship only himself. 
After nonchalantly reciting the roll call of past 
deities, \Vhitman elbows them aside as circumspect 
vendors of metaphysical palliatives. He grants 
their historical existence but is not overawed by 
them. He acknowledges they served their times 
and aided man in his tender infancy. Now, how-
ever, that man has matured, he should sing in his 
73 own voice and fly with his own pinions. The old 
gods were forerunners, not the ultimate deities. 
Whitman studies them only to surpass them, only 
in order to become himself a superior creator. The 
truths vouchsafed by special revelations may do 
well; but the truths disclosed by one's self do 
equally well if not better: 
Magnifying and applying come 1, 
Outbidding at the start the old cautious hucksters, 
Taking myself the exact dimensions of Jehovah, 
Lithographing Kronos, Zeus his son, and Hercules his 
grandson, 
Buying drafts of Osiris, Isis, Belus, Brahma, Buddha, 
Taking them all for what they are and not a cent more, 
Admitting they were alive and did the work of their days, 
(They bore mites as for unfledg'd birds who have now to 
rise and fly and sing for themselves.) 
Not objecting to special revelations, considering a curl of 
smoke or a hair on the back of my hand just as 
curious as any revelation, 
The supernatural of no account, myself waiting my time 
to be one of the supremes, ... 
By my life-lumps! becoming already a creator. 
SONG OF MYSELF, pp. SR-59 
Nietzsche picks up the argument where Whitman 
leaves off. He hammers away at the imperative 
need for subordinating man's creations to man. He 
warns against adoring that which enjoys sanctity 
solely by man's permission. He cautions that the 
nature of illusion is not to recognize itself as such, 
but to consider itself true: the clay figure shaped 
by frolicking children may, in time, its origins long 




attribute to it qualities it never had. Nietzsche 
might have admired the daring and drive of 
Conrad's Kurtz; but the natives' idolatry of his 
person to which Kurtz cynically consented would 
have revolted the German philosopher who sired 
the Superman. Probably more congenial to Nietz-
sche would be the custom followed in the utopian 
realm Aldous Huxley describes in his novel, Island. 
In Pala, the island utopia, scarecrows are dolls made 
to resemble gods in order "to make the children 
understand that all gods are homemade, and that 
it's we who pull their strings and so give them the 
power to pull us" (p. 234). Zarathustra never 
leaves off preaching that superterrestrial felicities 
are the poppy and mandragora of human vampires 
and leeches whose inveterate distrust of life pre-
cludes clear sight and realistic thought. Gods he 
considers the hectic hallucinations of psychotic 
fantasts whose longing for another and better life 
testifies to their maladjustment. On one occasion, 
he summons the faithful, like a muezzin from a 
minaret, to hear his confession: he, too, was once 
an arrant afterworldsman who thought the world 
and its inhabitants the work of a suffering and 
unhappy God. Very soon, however, he came to his 
senses: 
Once Zarathustra too cast his deluded fancy beyond man-
kind, like all afterworldsmen. Then the world seemed to 
me the work of a suffering and tormented God. 
Ah, brothers, this God which I created was human work 
75 and human madness, like all gods! 
He was human, and only a poor piece of man and Ego; 
this phantom came to me from my own fire and ashes, 
that is the truth! It did not come to me from the 'beyond'! 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingclale, pp. 58-59 
And possibly with a backward glance at Kierke-
gaard Zarathustra concludes: 
\Veariness, which wants to reach the ultimate with a 
single leap, with a death-leap, a poor ignorant weariness, 
which no longer wants even to want: that created all gods 
and afterworlds. 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, p. 59 
This belief, that creation was a human prerogative, 
also figures in Nietzsche's interpretation of art and 
Greek tragedy. According to Nietzsche, art served 
the Greeks as morality (ethics) served Socrates and 
Christianity: it was the means by which horrid 
reality was converted into pleasure, the means by 
which life triumphed over death, the means by 
which man gained a victory over the intolerable 
pain of existence. Whereas Christianity led its fol-
lowers to flee and hate life, art enabled the Greek 
to view life as an enjoyable game. Nietzsche attri-
buted to the Greeks the knowledge that life can 
best be understood and justified as an aesthetic 
phenomenon. He held that Attic tragedy was the 
result of a happy marriage between Apollonian 
art and Dionysian art. Apollonian art taught the 
Greeks to incorporate into plastic representations 
the whole of phenomenal reality including its 
grisliest horrors; by translating the ghastliest of 
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life, beyond pain, free of contingency and mutabili-
ty - Apollonian art bestowed upon them just that 
shade of unreality which permitted the beholder to 
gaze upon them without being turned to stone. In 
this way, the Greeks could enjoy as spectacle 
the beauty of the most forbidding abominations. 
Dionysian art taught the Greeks how to transcend 
reality through an ecstatic rapture which made 
them one with the primal, creative urge of the 
cosmos; Dionysian art enabled them to lose and 
rediscover their individual selves in the universal 
identity of all things. Attic tragedy taught the 
Athenian the identity of spectacle and spectator; 
man is at once creator, actor, and spectator for he 
not only engenders the suffering he endures, but, 
by virtue of being able to contemplate it, he is also 
able to justify it and life as well. In other words, 
once he is made aware of his identity with all things, 
man finds the beauty of life's drama adequate 
compensation for the suffering he endures as an 
actor of the representation. The controlled tension 
achieved by Attic tragedy in harmoniously fusing 
rational and irrational, intelligence and passion, 
knowledge and instinct, form and content, was 
highly admired by Nietzsche. We have seen that 
he esteemed the man who was able to overcome 
himself, who was able to mold his inchoate creative 
energies into constructive, coherent thought or 
literature, who was able to sublimate his instinctual 
drives into art or spirituality, who was able to 
blend compatibly the Apollonian and Dionysian. 
77 This is the man whom Nietzsche variously desig-
nated as the knower, the creator, the Superman. 
He is above all the man who is aware of himself as 
the one and only creator: 
Prometheus had first to fancy that he had stolen the light, 
and that he did penance for the theft, - in order finally to 
discover that he had created the light, in that he had 
longed for the light, and that not only man, but also God, 
had been the work of Ms hands and the clay in his hands. 
All mere creations of the Creator! 
JOYFUL WISDOM, p. 234 
It was precisely such an awareness, Nietzsche was 
convinced, that made it possible for the Greek, with 
his superabundant vitality and his art, not only to 
confront a world ruied by Chance and Maya, but 
also to affirm with gladness a life which a less vital 
race would have cursed for its cruelty and injustice. 
It was precisely this awareness which deterred the 
Greek from despairing at life's absurdity and stimu-
lated him to reject the odium fati of passive nihilism 
and accept the amm' fati of active nihilism. And, 
of course, it was precisely this awareness which was 
at the bottom of the whole of Nietzsche's philos-
ophy. 
The feeling of identity with all things in the 
universe, which Nietzsche held was experienced at 
the height of Dionysian rapture, was experienced 
by Whitman daily. We have shown that Whitman 
still adhered to the concepts of the soul's immor-
tality and of God's existence. At the same time, 
Whitman remembered that at the end of Nature, 
Emerson had spoken of the self's capacity for 
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Oversoul, Emerson had said that "the simplest 
person who in his integrity worships God, becomes 
God." Whitman, therefore, was not at all reluctant 
to promulge that "nothing, not God, is greater than 
one's self is" (Song of Myself, p. 66); and that no 
"gods can exceed these that clasp me by the hand" 
(Crossing Brooklyn Ferry, p. 119). Whitman would 
in all likelihood have refused to preach with Zara-
thustra that "precisely this is godlike that there 
are gods, but no God!" (Zarathustra, Hollingdale, 
p. 220). He may even have strongly resented 
Zarathustra's statement to his followers that only 
since God "has lain in the grave have you again 
been resurrected" (Zarathustra, Hollingdale, p. 297). 
But it is very probable he would have assented to 
Zarathustra's words when the sage said: 
My Ego taught me a new pride, I teach it to men: No 
longer to bury the head in the sand of heavenly things, 
but to carry it freely, an earthly head which creates 
meaning for the earth! 1 teach mankind a new will: to 
desire this path that men have followed blindly, and to 
call it good and no more to creep aside from it, like the 
sick and dying! 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, p. 60 
Another key idea that confirmed Whitman and 
Nietzsche in their unconditional acceptance of 
existence was their recognition that death did not 
nullify and demean this world and this life, that 
death did not render this mortal and limited world 
less preferable than another. \Vhitman and Nietz-
sche opposed those slanderers of life who contended 
79 death validated their slander. They did not see 
death as an omnipotent sadist who frustrated man's 
hopes, mocked man's achievements, and disturbed 
man's sleep. Far from underscoring life's absurdity 
Whitman and Nietzsche believed death gave full 
meaning to life. They asked man to perceive and 
love death as an expression of life itself. It seemed 
to them that death's inevitability made life's joys 
doubly joyful; death's unfailing punctuality made 
explicit values that otherwise might have remained 
implicit only. Awareness of its periodic arrest in its 
biotic cycle, induces life to muster and deploy its 
forces with rare skill, and, by being thus roused to 
total self-awareness, to proclaim that it is the only 
value. Death stands somewhat in the same relation 
to life that knowledge does. Distrust of knowledge 
springs from the consciousness that knowledge is 
life's antithesis since knowledge dispels the chimera 
needed for life's preservation. Yet, at the same 
time, knowledge protects and promotes life since it 
compels man to refurbish the old, or devise new 
chimeras. Whitman and Nietzsche held that, in 
similar fashion, although death ostensibly negates 
life by calling attention to mortality, it can also be 
said to foster and reaffirm life. Death generates 
hopes and fears such as those taught by Christiani-
ty. Invariably, Hyperboreans, like Nietzsche, rebel 
against such hopes and fears. And, invariably, 
such rebellion, which has the courage for that which 
can really be known, eventuates in a renewed dedi-
cation to life and in the choice of Ithaca over 
Ogygia. Thus, Timor Mortis Conturbat Me is trans-
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happen more beautiful than death" (Starting From 
Paumanok, p. 21). Whitman and Nietzsche chroni-
cled death not in ululant threnodies but in valedic-
tions forbidding mourning. 
As long as there is the minutest spark of life, 
Whitman contends, death's conquests prove spuri-
ous. Every lover's morrow laughs to scorn death's 
vaunted dominion. Every act of creation triumphs 
over death everlastingly. Every germination di-
minishes death. Every birth is a victory over death: 
The smallest sprout shows there is really no death, 
And if ever there was it led forward life, and does not 
wait at the end to arrest it, 
And ceas'd the moment life appear'd. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 29 
It is worth noting that Whitman once planned a 
series of poems which, like Passage to India, would 
celebrate the life after death, and thus would serve 
both as complement and counterpart to Leaves of 
Grass. That he never did does not signify he 
entertained doubts about invisible reality. Several 
poems suggest the contrary. What it does indicate 
is that the poet realized his emphasis was on the 
visible and knowable and that he was content to 
let it remain so. It also explains why, as often as 
not, death is treated within the context of this 
world rather than the context of the other world. 
As remarked hereinbefore, Whitman shared Nietz-
sche's opinion that what man required was a 
philosophy of living, not a philosophy of salvation. 
For such a philosophy, death-in-life is more im-
81 portant than life-in-death. From what Thoreau 
had been able to tell him and from what he had 
read about Oriental writings, Whitman compre-
hended that one must learn to love death before he 
can hope to metamorphose his desire for life 
(instinct for survival) into a love of life (uncondi-
tional approbation of life's totality). To hate death 
is to hate whatever in life leads to life's decease. 
But what in life does not contribute to life's ces-
sation? Life is the cause of death. One begins 
dying from the moment of birth. Man's solid and 
sullied flesh melts and thaws daily in the quick as 
well as the dead. Life and death interpenetrate. 
Life retrieves, in the form of new life, the plunder 
with which death had absconded; but death, in 
turn, renews its depredations and the drama is 
rehearsed ad infinitum. Whitman, therefore, will 
sing death's chants with accents as tender as those 
with which he sang the chants of life and love. For 
"what indeed is finally beautiful except death and 
love?" (Scented Herbage of my Breast, p. 84). 
Whether writing from a profound personal ex-
perience or from an aesthetic feeling for the love-
death motif, Whitman develops this notion in an 
unusually poignant fashion. In the second poem 
in the Calamus cluster, we have a thanatopsis 
recalling Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking and 
looking forward to When Lilacs Last in the Door-
yard Bloom' d. What was to become the "lilac 
blooming perennial" is here, by turns, the leaves of 
the sweet flag and the blades of grass growing atop 
the poet's tomb and, by extension, the leaves which 
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Leaves from you I glean, I write, to be perused best 
afterwards, 
Tomb-leaves, body-leaves growing up above me above 
death, 
Perennial roots, tall leaves, 0 the winter shall not freeze 
you delicate leaves, 
Every year shall you bloom again, out from where you 
retired you shall emerge again. 
0 I do not know whether many passing by will discover 
you or inhale your faint odor, but I believe a few will. 
SCENTED HERBAGE OF MY BREAST, p. 84 
There is no he-bird from Alabama to lament the 
loss of his mate nor hermit thrush to sing a carol of 
death. Therefore, the poet will permit the leaves to 
disclose in their own way what is in his heart. But 
the leaves no longer convey to him a sense of well-
being. On the contrary, they are more bitter than 
he can bear and they burn and sting him. At the 
same time, however, they put him in mind of death, 
which would ordinarily disconcert one engaged in 
composing chants of lovers. To Whitman, however, 
death is beautiful. He finds nothing incongruous in 
offering his love lyrics to death. In fact, he is 
inclined to believe the high soul of lovers welcomes 
death most. Does not death guarantee the per-
manence of plighted troth? Is not death a prelude 
to the realization of Whitman's ideal of many-in-
one, the spiritual utopia whose material counter-
part the poet predicted would rise in America? 
And does not death exempt one from "the weari-
ness, the fever, and the fret" which were as well 
known to Whitman as to Keats? Suddenly, a new 
83 insight is granted the poet: he perceives that love 
and death are intimately linked, that they consti-
tute the real reality, and that, although presently 
interspersed throughout life, it may well be that 
only they will remain when the world of appearances 
dissolves quite away. Henceforth, therefore, the 
poet will say the words which can render death 
exhilira ting : 
0 I think it is not for life I am chanting here my chant of 
lovers, I think it must be for death, 
For how calm, how solemn it grows to ascend to the 
atmosphere of lovers, 
Death or life I am then indifferent, my soul declines to 
prefer, 
(I am not sure but the high soul of lovers welcomes death 
most,) 
Indeed 0 death, I think now these leaves mean precisely 
the same as you mean, 
Through me shall the words be said to make death ex-
hilira ting. 
Give me your tone the1refore 0 death, that I may accord 
with it, 
Give me yourself, for I see that you belong to me now 
above all, and are folded inseparably together, you 
love and death are, 
Nor will I allow you to balk me any more with what 
I was calling life, 
For now it is convey'd to me that you are the purports 
essential, 
That you hide in these shifting forms of life, for reasons, 
and that they are mainly for you, 
That you beyond them come forth to remain, the real 
reality. 
SCENTED HERBAGE OF MY BREAST, p. 85 





questioned the actuality of external reality. Even 
more important, it is one of the infrequent occasions 
when a cry of anguish escapes the essentially 
stoical Whitman. Generally, we do not expect the 
Bard of Democracy and the hardy, swarthy viator 
of the open road to fall upon the thorns of life and 
bleed; nor do we expect the great affirmer and 
lover to be troubled by the impermanence of 
earthly love. Whitman was always completely in 
love with "easeful Death," but never, as here, at 
the expense of life. Whitman partially recovers his 
equilibrium before the Calamus cluster of poems is 
finished, and, when he again writes of death, it is to 
write Lincoln's elegy, where death, as of old, is an 
adjunct and not an adjudicator of life. When Lilacs 
Last in the Dooryard Bloom' d harks back to Out of 
the Cradle Endlessly Rocking. In the latter poem 
(p. 184), death was wooed as "the word final, 
superior to all," as "the low and delicious word," 
as "the word of the sweetest song and all songs," 
and as "that strong and delicious word." In the 
former poem (p. 237), Thanatos is of feminine 
gender and is courted as "lovely and soothing," 
"delicate," "cool-enfolding," "dark mother," 
"strong deliveress," and "loving floating ocean." 
And, although Nietzsche abominated the Wagnerian 
swoon of death, he joined Whitman in saying that 
death was a part of life and not apart from it. In 
joyful Wisdom, he declared: "Let us be on our 
guard against saying that death is contrary to life" 
(p. 153). And, in Z arathustra, he wrote: 
Everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls 
the wheel of being. Everything dies, everything blossoms 
again; eternally the ring of being remains faithful to itself. 
In every Now, being begins; round every Here rolls the 
sphere There. 
pp. 329-30 
For Nietzsche, nevertheless, death could never 
assume the importance it did for Whitman who 
believed in a life after death. The only future 
existence Nietzsche could envision was an identical 
reproduction of the earthly existence he had known. 
Nietzsche, for example, would not have found any 
sense in the following statement by Whitman: 
0 I see now that life cannot exhibit all to me, as the day 
cannot, 
I see that I am to wait for what will be exhibited by death. 
NIGHT ON THE PRAIRIES, p. 315 
Nor would he have subscribed to Whitman's as-
severation that death is "the entrance upon by far 
the greatest part of existence, and something that 
Life is at least as much for, as it is for itself" 
(Preface, 1876, p. 434). 
The same distinction obtains in their notions of 
evolution and eternal perpetuity of human identity. 
Eclectic as always, Whitman made his selection 
from Emerson, Darwin, and Hegel. The resultant 
melange enabled him to express a belief in a con-
tinually motile universe progressively evolving 
toward perfection. Though he had his share of 
doubts and misgivings regarding the existence of 
God and the belief in. immortality, not to mention. 
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and professional theologians, Whitman maintained 
to the end that everyone and everything had 
eternal life. In moments of depression and times of 
discouragement, he questioned the reality of the 
physical world and, "half in love with easeful 
Death," yearned "to cease upon the midnight with 
no pain." For the most part, however, his earlier 
works voice his joie de vivre and affirm natural 
passion and the material world, whereas his later 
works voice his idealism and affirm spiritual values 
and the immaterial world. The overlap in both 
directions, of course, was appreciable, and Whit-
man, to his dying day, insisted on the importance 
of "physiology from top to toe," and never neglect-
ed to render dulia to "Life immense in passion, 
pulse, and power" (One's-self I Sing, p. 5). Whit-
man came close to Nietzsche when he held that 
God was incarnated in every human being, but his 
pantheism also led him to assign purpose to life and 
to insist that the cosmos is God and God is the 
cosmos -two notions that Nietzsche never harbor-
ed. In some of his hazy formulations of Buddhistic 
doctrines, such as pre-existence and the unity of 
past and present, however, Whitman almost an-
ticipated Nietzsche's eternal return. 
Whitman knew the tormenting hopelessness of 
the misunderstood artist and lover as well as the 
frightful mien of vice and the monstrous visage of 
evil. But he never suffered the nausea and the fear 
and trembling that racked Nietzsche. The emo-
tional attrition and the mental anguish which 
87 Nietzsche endured in his frantic efforts to find the 
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means of living without God and without the 
morality that dies with God were quite foreign to 
\Vhitman. Nietzsche's recusancy drove him to a 
nihilistic impasse and to the very edge of the abyss. 
Before he could formulate an exultant affirmation, 
before he could bridge the abyss, Nietzsche first 
had to shape his doctrines of the Superman and the 
Eternal H.eturn. Nietzsche's intellectual honesty 
compelled him to pursue to the bitter end the 
logical consequences of his premises; his yea-saying 
is uttered in the very face of life's absurdity, 
fortuitism, and naturalism. Whitman, on the other 
hand, either through naivete or through intuitive 
wisdom, assumed that life had meaning and meant 
good. He devoted his life to proving his assump-
tion. Toward this end, he equably ignored what-
ever doctrines did not accord with his cherished 
convictions, modified some doctrines so that they 
did accord, or simply allowed two contradictory 
doctrines to stand side by side, confident his ca-
pacious mansion could accomodate one and all. 
In Whitman's En-JJ{asse, nothing was de trap. 
Personal tragedy, national tragedy, and ill health 
and age inevitably elicited from the poet cries of 
grief and sorrow, but Whitman's disenchantments 
were always of brief duration and his recovery in 
each instance was well-nigh miraculous. The fol-
lowing quotations indicate that Whitman's ideas 
regarding the perfection of creation underwent very 
little change through the years: 
The universe is duly in order, every thing is in its place, 88 
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What has arrived is in its place and what waits shall be in 
its place. 
THE SLEEPERS, p. 302, 1855 
For I do not see one imperfection in the universe, 
And I do not see one cause or result lamentable at last in 
the universe. 
SONG AT SU~SET, p. 344, 1860 
In this broad earth of ours, 
Amid the measureless grossness and the slag, 
Enclosed and safe within its central heart, 
Nestles the seed perfection. 
SONG OF THE UNIVERSAL, p. 166, 1874 
Life, life an endless march, an endless army, (no halt, but 
it is duly over,) 
The world, the race, the soul - in space and time the 
universes, 
All bound as is befitting each- all surely going somewhere. 
GOING SOMEWHERE, p. 362, 1887 
\Vhile I cannot understand it or argue it out, I fully 
believe in a clue and purpose inN ature, entire and several; 
and that invisible spiritual results, just as real and definite 
as the visible, eventuate all concrete life and all material-
ism, through Time. 
A BACKWARD GLANCE, p. 453, 1888 
Of course, to assess Whitman's thought by reading 
his poems in a strictly chronological order is to 
disobey the poet's final wishes, and, what is worse, 
to incur the danger of misconstruing his final po-
sition. Unless one is prepared to argue that Whit-
man's thirty years' labor in emending and rear-
ranging was undertaken with no regard to the 
etiology of his ideas and was prompted by vainglo-
ry, fatuity, senility, or reticence, it might be 
prudent to adhere to the order of the ninth (1891-
92) edition. Actually, however, no caution is neces-
sary since differences in Whitman's ideas are very 
frequently more apparent than real, since they are 
differences resulting from a shift in rhetorical em-
phasis, from the bias of special pleading, from 
poetic hyperbole, from a current enthusiasm, or 
from a transient emotional perturbation. In the 
above series of quotations, for example, there is 
only one discrepancy between the chronological 
order and the order in the ninth edition; and it 
makes no difference whatsoever. There is nothing 
which warrants calling Whitman a systematic 
thinker, but then there are not many literary artists 
who can lay claim to such a title. Whitman's 
cosmogony and cosmography may have no scientific 
validity, yet they are scarcely less plausible than 
those of other literary cosmonauts such as Milton 
and Blake. 
\Vhitman believed in an infinite universe con-
tinually expanding: 
All goes onward and outward, nothing collapses. 
I open my scuttle at night and see the far-sprinkled 
systems, 
And all I see multiplied as high as I can cipher edge but 
the rim of the farther systems. 
Wider and wider they spread, expanding, always ex-
panding, 
Outward and outward and forever outward. 
SONG OF MYSELF, pp. 29; 63, 1855 





I believe materialism is true and spiritualism is true, I 
reject no part. 
WITH ANTECEDENTS, p. 176, 1860 
The total amount of matter and spirit is constant: 
Nothing is ever really lost, or can be lost, 
No birth, identity, form- no object of the world. 
CONTINUITIES, p. 361, 1888 
Both matter and spirit are eternal: 
Nothing ever is or can be lost, nor ever die, nor soul, nor 
matter. 
DEMOCRATIC VISTAS, p. 497, 1871 
Time and Space are in endless supply: 
See ever so far, there is limitless space outside of that, 
Count ever so much, there is limitless time around that. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 63, 1855 
These views were held and maintained by Whitman 
to the very end. What is more, he never abandoned 
his belief in the body and insisted on according it 
the same honors accorded the soul. But, tempera-
mentally, especially with the advancing years when 
the flames that were wont to "quiver" him to a new 
identity were banked and the prods of "libidinous 
prongs" had abated, Whitman was too affined to 
pantheism, platonism, and transcendentalism not 
to lean toward the spiritual. Thus we find him 
repeatedly finding a spiritual reality underlying 
material appearances: 
Not this the world, 
Nor these the universes, they the universes, 
Purport and end, ever the permanent life of life, 
Eidolons, eidolons. 
And thee my soul, 
Joys, ceaseless exercises, exaltations, 
Thy yearning amply fed at last, prepared to meet, 
Thy mates, eidolons. 
Thy body permanent, 
The body lurking there within thy body, 
The only purport of the form thou art, the real I myself, 
An image, an eidolon. 
EIDOLONS, p. 9, 1876 
A form of Wordsworthian pantheism is evident in 
many poems (Song of Myself, p. 66, 1855; On the 
Beach at Night Alone, p. 189, 1856; Chanting the 
Square Deific, p. 309,1865; You Tides with Ceaseless 
Swell, p. 355, 1885; A Voice from Death, p. 380, 
1891) as is the Emersonian notion that all in time 
returns to the divine source from which it came: 
Allah is all, all, all- is immanent in every life and object, 
May-be at many and many-a-more removes- yet Allah, 
Allah, Allah is there. 
Would you know the dissatisfaction? the urge and spur of 
every life; 
The something never still' d - never entirely gone? the 
invisible need of every seed? 
It is the central urge in every atom, 
(Often unconscious, often evil, downfallen,) 
To return to its divine source and origin, however distant, 
Latent the same in subject and in object, without one 
exception. 




This "central urge" was, in addition, the property 
that gave direction to cosmic creation and was 
apparently capable of recapitulating the entire 
evolutionary process at will: 
There is no stoppage and never can be stoppage, 
If I, you, and the worlds, and all beneath or upon their 
surfaces, were this moment reduced back to a pallid 
float, it would not avail in the long run, 
We should surely bring up again where we now stand, 
And surely go as much farther, and then farther and 
farther. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 63, 1855 
By one of his unique weddings of Darwin and 
Buddha, Whitman saw each individual as an evo-
lutionary product whose inherited memory con-
tained the experiences of the ancestors from whom 
he was descended. Insofar as many of man's 
instincts were unconscious memories of instincts of 
old, each man could be considered a composite of 
millions of lives. In each individual, an entire popula-
tion was summed up and found expression through 
the expression of the individual. Similarly, inas-
much as each individual transmitted the ancestral 
and racial memory to future generations, he prefi-
gured future generations' expression of his thoughts 
by his own expression of them in his time: 
I am an acme of things accomplish' d. and I am an encloser 
of things to be. 
Rise after rise bow the phantoms behind me, 
Afar down I see the huge first Nothing, I know I was even 
93 there, 
I waited unseen and always, and slept through the lethar-
gic mist, 
And took my time, and took no hurt from the fetid carbon. 
Long I was hugg'd close- long and long. 
Immense have been the preparations for me, 
Faithful and friendly the arms that have help'd me. 
Cycles ferried my cradle, rowing and rowing like cheerful 
boatmen, 
For room to me stars kept aside in their own rings, 
They sent influences to look after what was to hold me. 
Before I was born out of my mother generations guided me, 
My embryo has never been torpid, nothing could over-
lay it. 
For it the nebula cohered to an orb, 
The long slow strata piled to rest it on, 
Vast vegetables gave it sustenance, 
Monstrous sauroids transported it in their mouths and 
deposited it with care. 
All forces have been steadily employ'd to complete and 
delight me, 
Now on this spot I stand with my robust soul! 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 62, 1855 
Not only the evolution of life on the planet earth 
but even the evolution of our solar system evidently 
cooperated in the conception, gestation, and gener-
ation of Walt Whitman, the New Adam, in whom 
the Old Adam is dormant and the Future Adam 
nascent. To accord with such a magnificently 
august notion of nativity one naturally anticipates 
an equally superb conception of decease. And 
Whitman, of course, is more than equal to the 





immortality, in personal immortality, and in the 
immortality of identity both as a distinct entity 
and also as part of the great All. In addition, he 
believes in some form of reincarnation or return 
which, at times, sounds very like Nietzsche's eter-
nal return. Both early and late in life Whitman 
adhered to the orthodox Christian notion of a life 
after death. His expression reminds us of Tennyson 
and Dickinson: 
My rendezvous is appointed, it is certain, 
The Lord will be there and wait till I come on perfect 
terms, 
The great Camerado, the lover true for whom I pine will be 
there. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 63, 1855 
Simultaneously he developed the twin notions of 
the soul's supernatural immortality and the body's 
natural immortality: 
For not life's joys alone I sing, repeating - the joy of 
death! 
The beautiful touch of Death, soothing and benumbing a 
few moments, for reasons, 
Myself discharging my excrementitious body to be burn'd, 
or render'd to powder, or buried, 
My real body doubtless left to me for other spheres, 
My voided body nothing more to me, returning to the 
purifications, further offices, eternal uses of the earth. 
A SONG OF JOYS, p. 133, 1860 
And, ever and anon, he tentatively toyed with 
either a Pythagorean, Platonic, or Buddhistic 
theory of reincarnation: 
(No doubt I have died myself ten thousand times before.) 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 67, 1855 
I feel like one who has done work for the day to retire 
awhile, 
I receive now again of my many translations, from my 
avataras, ascending, while others doubtless await me, 
An unknown sphere more real than I dream'd, more direct, 
darts awakening rays about me, So long! 
Remember my words, I may again return, 
I love you, I depart from materials, 
I am as one disembodied, triumphant, dead. 
SO LONG!, p. 350, 1860 
Gliding o'er all, through all, 
Through Nature, Time, and Space, 
As a ship on the waters advancing, 
The voyage of the soul - not life alone, 
Death, many deaths I'll sing. 
GLIDING O'ER ALL, p. 199, 1871 
He is closest to Nietzsche when he conceives of the 
cycle endlessly recyded as consisting of a beginning, 
a purposive progression, a climax comprised of the 
attainment of a prefigured end, and a denouement 
presaging the recommencement of the drama: 
Ever the dim beginning, 
Ever the growth, the rounding of the circle, 
Ever the summit and the merge at last, (to surely start 
again.) 
EIDOLONS, p. 8, 1876 
There is nothing to indicate that Whitman had a 
change of mind as he grew older, but it is true that 
one finds less and less mention of a return in his 
very last works. Towards the end of his life, 




forever on, rather than returning. It may be that, 
like Yeats, he preferred to sail to Byzantium and 
leave "that country" for good. But in his earlier 
passion for the "curling grass" he proclaimed with 
Nietzschean fervor his desire to return and re-ex-
perience again and again the madness and joy, the 
delirious ecstasies of earth, sea, air, and sun: 
Ages and ages returning at intervals, 
Undestroy'd, wandering immortal, 
Lusty, phallic, with the potent original loins, perfectly 
sweet, 
I, chanter of Adamic songs. 
AGES AND AGES RETURNING AT INTERVALS, p. 80, 1860 
0 living always, always dying! 
0 the burials of me past and present, 
0 me while I stride ahead, material, visible, imperious as 
ever. 
0 LIVING ALWAYS, ALWAYS DYING, p. 314, 1860 
By positing an infinitude of time together with 
conditions conducive to the recurring evolvement 
of determinate permutations indigenous or affini-
tive to our ascertained cosmic configurations, it is 
reasonable to assume that identical beings and 
events will reappear and repeat indefinitely. Nietz-
sche made just such an assumption and by so doing 
arrived at his doctrine of the eternal recurrence. In 
Nietzsche, no less than in Whitman, the desire for 
integrity within an eternal context was as com-
pulsive as in any religionist. But, since Nietzsche 
would not hear of any supernatural constructs or 
solutions, his task was more formidable than 
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Nietzsche's mind, however, was more than equal to 
the challenge. By elevating Man-God to the vacat-
ed throne of God-Man, by restoring to the European 
pantheon Dionysus and the Eleusinian mysteries 
while supervising the removal of Jesus and ersatz 
thaumaturges, and by refurbishing in purely natu-
ralistic attire Christianity's best-selling merchan-
dise, immortality, Nietzsche was well on his way to 
bridging the abyss Kierkegaard had said could be 
negotiated, if at all, only by a death-defying leap. 
Eternal recurrence stressed the moment's inesti-
mable value just as the Vbermensch demonstrated 
the individual's infinite worth. God's death had 
shattered man's confidence in himself and in life: 
without a Divine Will, there can be no Divine Law; 
without a Divine Law, there can be no right and 
wrong and no supernatural sanctions for moral 
precepts; without right and wrong, nothing is true, 
all is permitted, and chaos holds absolute sway. 
Deprive life of purpose, meaning, and finality, and 
it indeed becomes the incoherent bellowing and 
manic frenzy of the lunatic. But the eternal re-
currence miraculously severs the Gordian knot of 
life's absurdity: life's horrors, injustice, transience, 
and finiteness are redeemed as soon as man consents 
to their eternal return; self-control and order are 
instituted anew as soon as man begins to live as he 
would wish to live again and again; true freedom, 
as understood by Nietzsche, becomes for the first 
time possible when man accepts willingly his 
inevitable destiny, the only divinity is found to 
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to the world, man becomes not only a yea-sayer 
and blesser but a creator. In the whole realm of 
human thought, no idea could have served to 
express more emphatically the supra-historical out-
look and to voice more lyrically the maenadic 
ecstasy in all that has been, is, and will be, than 
the idea of the unconditional and infinitely repeat-
ed circumrotation of all things. Since, moreover, 
all things do not recur within the interval of re-
corded history, Nietzsche even manages to salvage 
a modicum of purpose and self-determination for 
man's merely natural and fortuitous empirical self: 
by overcoming himself, man will serve as a step-
pingstone to the Superman, and could thus con-
ceivably alter not only his own present destiny but 
the future of his species as well. Insofar, therefore, 
as divinizing the earth, the present, and the 
individual, and insofar as giving assurances of a 
form of immortality and of the breeding of superior 
human specimens are concerned, Nietzsche appears 
to enjoy even more success than Whitman. The 
eternity he finds in his moment is unobscured by 
any mystic mists, and the perfection of every mo-
ment derives from being's circle which has neither 
beginning nor end. A rapprochement between being 
and becoming is effected by recognizing that all 
things are co-present in being and that man's state 
of being is more important than his purpose or 
destination. Yet, although Nietzsche's exposition 
of these ideas discloses a splendid engagement and 
impassioned rapture, easily vying with Whitman 
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his ill health hardly permit him to derive any hope 
from his hope-purveying works. On the contrary, 
he feels, to employ his own metaphor, like a dis-
penser of sunlight upon whom no sun shines. He 
is reminded of the lines of Byron he translated as a 
youth: "The tree of knowledge is not that of life." 
To the sister who will later exact a terrible price 
for her morsel of sympathy, he confesses his 
solitary existence is a Gethsemane and his know-
ledge a dead albatross about his neck. Confusing 
solitude with freedom, except for the temporary 
relief from excruciating physical pain, the only 
other happiness he knew was that of the star flung 
into the "lone chill'' and dark stillness of cosmic 
space. 
At the outset, therefore, it is understandable 
that Zarathustra-Nietzsche fears to admit the idea 
of recurrence even to himself. He can scarcely 
contain his revulsion at the mere thought of 
meaninglessness eternalized. How can one calmly 
contemplate the perpetual rehearsal of obscene 
depravities, of diabolic perfidies, of fiendish depre-
dations, of intolerable holocausts? From the recep-
tion accorded his previous doctrines, he doubts that 
man has the courage and strength and honesty to 
heed one who tells him he must relive eternally 
the torments he would fain forget. How can one 
remain undismayed at the realization that one 
returns "not to a new life or a better life or a 
similar life," but rather "to this identical and self-
same life, in the greatest things and the smallest?" 
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In the second section of Zarathustra, in the chap-
ter, "Of Great Events," when his disciples relate 
that Zarathustra's shadow was seen hurtling 
through the air and shouting, "It is time! It is 
high time!" Zarathustra pretends not to under-
stand. In the next chapter, "The Prophet," where 
his disciples, turned oneirocritics, elucidate one of 
their master's strange dreams, Zarathustra is again 
inscrutably silent. And, in the chapter following 
this, "On Redemption," Zarathustra suddenly 
breaks off his discourse lest, in speaking of re-
deeming chance and the past by affirming the 
present, he reveal all: 
To redeem the past and to transform every 'It was' into an 
'I wanted it thus!'- that alone do I call redemption! The 
will cannot will backwards; and it cannot break time and 
time's desire- that is the will's most lonely affliction. 
The will that is the will to power must will something 
higher than any reconciliation - but how shall that 
happen? vVho has taught it to will backwards, too? 
But at this point of his discourse, Zarathustra suddenly 
broke off and looked exactly like a man seized by ex-
tremest terror. 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 161, 163 
But, in this section's last chapter, in a purple patch 
whose poetic beauty· survives even translation, 
Zarathustra's Athene, the daimonion he calls "my 
stt:llest hour," materializes in a dream-vision and 
chides him for behaving like a stiff-necked Moses. 
And, although she cannot persuade him to embark 
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that, in time, he will recognize his destiny is to be 
the teacher of the eternal recurrence: 
Something said to me voicelessly: 'You know, Zarathustra, 
but you do not speak!' 
And I answered at last defiantly: 'Yes I know, but I will 
not speak!' ... 'Alas, I want to, but how can I? Release 
me from this alone! It is beyond my strength!' ... 'My 
words have as yet moved no mountains and what I have 
spoken has not reached men.' ... 'They mocked me when 
I found and walked my own way; and in truth my feet 
trembled then.' 
Then again something said to me voicelessly: 'Of what 
consequence is their mockery? You are one who has 
unlearned how to obey: now you shall command!' 
And I answered: 'I lack the lion's voice for command.' 
Then again something said to me in a whisper: 'It is the 
stillest words which bring the storm. Thoughts that come 
on doves' feet guide the world.' 
And I considered long and trembled. At last, however, I 
said what I had said at first: 'I will not.' 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 167-69 
Whereupon Zarath ustra-Nietzsche, discouraged like 
the Whitman of 1860 who was "baffled, balk' d, 
bent to the very earth" (As I Ebb' d with the Ocean 
of Life, p. 185), leaves his friends and once more 
retires to his forest fastness. 
For this reason, the first full account of the 
secret doctrine is reserved for the second chapter of 
the book's third section. But, even here, much 
remains obscure. Hence, the subject is reviewed in 
the concluding chapters of the section. Zarathustra-
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nausea. He still cannot bear to think that the 
loathsome afflictions man and his universe are heir 
to will continue to occur forever and ever. So, 
actually, it is Zarathustra's animals who tell him 
what he has not the fortitude to tell them (Zara-
thustra, significantly perhaps, is pictured as an-
other St. Francis befriended by the wildlife of the 
woods, including a lion, an eagle, and a serpent): 
'0 Zarathustra,' said the animals then, 'all things them-
selves dance for such as think as we: they come and offer 
their hand and laugh and flee - and return. 
'Everything goes, everything returns; the wheel of ex-
istence rolls for ever. Everything dies, everything blos-
soms anew; the year of existence runs on for ever. 
'Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; the same 
house of existence builds itself for ever. Everything de-
parts, everything meets again; the ring of existence is 
true to itself for ever. 
• Existence begins in every instant; the ball There rolls 
around every Here. The middle is everywhere. The path 
of eternity is crooked.' 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, p. 234 
Overcome with emotion, the master expresses his 
gratitude to his menagerie. He confides that his 
bitter, oppressive knowledge would have seen the 
light of day sooner had he been able to reconcile 
himself to the eternal return of the canaille. But 
Zarathustra is still convalescing and, although his 
animals seek to raise his spirits by reciting to him 
a lecture such as he might deliver on the eternal 
return, he merely closes his eyes and continues to 
commune with his soul. Finally, however, Zara-
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brates both his rejuvenation and his doctrine in the 
most dithyrambic verse and saltant prose he ever 
wrote. Nowhere is the philosopher turned literary 
artist seen to better advantage than here. It was 
these chapters that were consulted by Mahler for 
his Third Symphony and by Delius for his Mass of 
Life. Serene, confident, and triumphant, Zarathus-
tra-Nietzsche is here at one and the same time the 
Risen Christ, the reborn Dionysus, Life's Paramour, 
and the Eternal Walt summoning all of mankind 
to life's sumptuous feast. He feels at peace with 
the world and in harmony with all that lives and 
dies and returns to live again. Now, he is only too 
eager to impart his wisdom to his friends. He 
wishes to share the joy and reassurance which the 
eternal return has afforded him. He wishes to sing, 
to dance, and to father upon Eternity a child -
himself: 
If ever my anger broke graves open, moved boundary-
stones, and rolled old shattered law-tables into deep 
chasms: 
if ever my mockery blew away mouldered words, and 
if I came like a broom to the Cross-spiders and as a 
scouring wind to old sepulchres: 
if ever I sat rejoicing where old gods lay buried, 
world-blessing, world-loving, beside the monuments of old 
world -slanderers: 
for I love even churches and the graves of gods, if 
only heaven is looking, pure-eyed, through their shattered 
roofs; I like to sit like grass and red poppies on shattered 
churches: 
Oh how should I not lust for eternity and for the 
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Never yet did I find the woman by whom I wanted 
children, unless it be this woman, whom I love: for I love 
you, 0 Eternity! 
For I love you, 0 Eternity! 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, p. 245 
Whitman and Nietzsche loved the earth in all its 
perfect imperfection and in all its imperfect per-
fection. They affirmed life not only because of 
their sheer animal faith in life. They hoped their 
affirmation would encourage a renewal of life and 
inspire man to progress by the only valid means: by 
admitting the truths about himself and his destiny. 
They saw no contradiction between their multilater-
al love of life and their multiple objection to the 
vapid, regimentalized existence led by their con-
temporaries. Man must distinguish between truths 
intellectually known and truths actually lived; 
man's scientism cannot afford to dispense with 
human wisdom. It behooves man to become 
actually what he is potentially: a human being who 
recognizes within himself the reflection of the di-
vine wisdom. Man resembles the brute when he 
accepts life without authentic choices. To their 
way of thinking, life was disesteemed by the 
mishmash of otiose laws and taboos mandated by 
pusillanimous marplots. They called for man's 
reeducation. Man must be taught to live as he was 
intended to: devoting his service to "comforts of 
the sun" rather than to putrescent charnel houses. 
The divorce of thought and life must cease. Man 
must accept the earth as all of Gehenna and Xanadu 
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This is in part what Whitman says when he ex-
plains the nature of his lifelong quest: 
I was looking a long while for Intentions, 
For a clew to the history of the past for myself, and for 
these chants - and now I have found it, 
It is not in those paged fables in the libraries, (them I 
neither accept nor reject,) 
It is no more in the legends than in all else, 
It is in the present -it is this earth to-day. 
I WAS LOOKING A LO~G WHILE, p. 273 
This is no more facile optimism or irresponsible 
puerility than Pippa's song is a compendium of 
Browning's philosophy. Whitman knew even bet-
ter than Pope did that whatever is, should, more 
often than not, be anything but what it is. He was 
no more unmindful of the world's materialistic and 
spiritual evils than William Blake. When Whitman 
says this is the best of all possible worlds, he does 
not do so with the impervious conceit and cocksure 
optimism of a Pang1oss or with the harebrained 
chauvinism of a Grildrig; he does so knowing full 
well that man conquers his fate by the very simple 
expedient of loving it at the same time that he 
admits its inevitability; that man prevails over all 
the ills he creates for his affliction simply by re-
cognizing they are the counters and forfeits without 
which life- if life were at all possible without them-
would be a flaccid insipidity, a paradise where ripe 
fruit never falls. That is why Nietzsche, like Whit-
man, appreciates that his works are not for all 
readers: 
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born posthumously. . . . Reverence for oneself; love of 
oneself; unconditional freedom before oneself .... Such men 
alone are my readers, my right readers, my predestined 
readers: what matter the rest? 
THE ANTICHRIST, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, pp. 568-69 
Whitman and Nietzsche hated whatever depressed 
and debased life. They would have nothing to do 
with a twilight or lotus existence. Like Odysseus, 
they had to hear the Sirens' song. They had to 
immerse in the destructive element. Theirs was the 
"heavenly fellowship of men that perish and of 
summer morn." Like Thoreau, they felt the need 
to front life without civilization's accouterments. 
They wanted to know if man could live as one who 
loved life without stirring up the blood-lust of 
human jackals and cormorants. In their esurience 
for experiencing all that human bioplasm can ex-
perience, in their insistence on coming to grips with 
life free of self-defeating fear and self-deluding hope, 
they are like Kazantzakis' Odysseus, who sought 
out all forms of life, beyond the limits of rules and 
regulations, always mindful of death as a stimulant, 
not in order to heighten sensation, but in order to 
expend all of himself and to leave to death little, if 
any, plunder. 
The condition of the patients, man and society, 
Whitman and Nietzsche agreed, called for an ex-
tensive debridement. But, once recovered, the 
patients would look back upon their ordeal as well 
worth the temporary inconvenience of invalidism. 
Theirs would be a higher wisdom than that of 
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of men chanting "in orgy on a summer morn I Their 
boisterous devotion to the sun, f Not as a god, but 
as a god might be, I Naked among them, like a 
savage source." In "A Song of Joys," Whitman 
exposes his eagerness to plunge deep into life's pool 
and carelessly roil its waters. Like an Achilles 
aching to launch himself into the middle of the 
fray, like an impassioned lover burning to quench 
his ardor's flames, Whitman wants to hurl and 
spend himself on life's ample breast: 
0 while I live to be the ruler of life, not a slave, 
To meet life as a powerful conqueror, 
No fumes, no ennui, no more complaints or scornful 
criticisms, 
To these proud of the air, the water and the ground, 
proving my interior soul impregnable, 
And nothing exterior shall ever take command of me. 
0 to struggle against great odds, to meet enemies un-
daunted' 
To be entirely alone with them, to find how much one can 
stand! 
To look strife, torture, prison, popular odium, face to face! 
To mount the scaffold, to advance to the muzzles of guns 
with perfect nonchalance! 
To be indeed a God! 
A SONG OF JOYS, p. 133 
And, in a remarkably parallel passage, Nietzsche 
writes: 
To be blessed with a strong, bold, and daring soul; to go 
through life with a quiet eye and a firm step, ever ready 
for the worst as for a festival, and full of longing for 
undiscovered worlds and seas, men and Gods; to listen to 
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and seafarers, took a brief repose and enjoyment, and in 
the profoundest pleasure of the moment were overcome 
with tears and the whole purple melancholy of happiness: 
who would not like all this to be his possession, his con-
dition! It was the happiness of Homer! The condition of 
him who invented the Gods for the Greeks, - nay, who 
invented his Gods for himself! 
JOYOUS WISDOM, p. 236 
In omnia paratus, "ever ready for the worst as for 
a festival,"- that is the only way to sally forth to 
encounter life for the thousandth time. That is the 
way the Greek, whose attitude toward death 
Nietzsche admired, sallied forth. The Greeks knew 
how to die because they never feared to live. 
Wherever one looks, in their epic poetry, in their 
drama, in their philosophy, or in their history, one 
is struck by the positive reverence for life their 
every posture toward death discloses. Death was 
never absent from the daily thought and business 
of the Athenian market-place. It was never 
omitted from the roll call of festival occasions and 
national holidays. Significantly, the Greeks had no 
symbol for death; the cross is of later origin. The 
Greeks, moreover, never associated death with 
shame. Generally, death was pictured not as the 
antithesis of love but as love's handmaid; Pluto, it 
should be remembered, was an exemplary lover. 
The notion of visiting deprivations upon themselves 
to assure themselves of rewards beyond the grave 
would have struck them as base and foolhardy. 
The Greeks did not brood over death's other king-
109 dam because they did not inhabit a world of hen-
bane and etherized patients; their last measure of 
devotion was extended not to cenotaphs but to the 
human form divine. The only life they were 
prepared to die for was the life on earth. To return 
to earth even as a serf, the shade of the haughty 
Achilles was prepared to give up all. This is the 
understanding of life and death Zarathustra-
.Nietzsche wishes to impress upon his friends: they 
must love the earth more than life itself, but they 
must also acquire the stoicism to say No when 
there is no longer time for Yes. They should go to 
their deaths serenely and triumphantly like 
Socrates, not cowering in terror before the gibbering 
palaver of a saffron-robed archimage. They must 
go to their deaths still blessing life but without any 
regrets: 
Everyone treats death as an important matter: but as yet 
death is not a festival. As yet, men have not learned to 
consecrate the fairest festivals. 
The man consummating his life dies his death triumph-
antly, surrounded by men filled with hope and making 
solemn vows. 
To die thus is the best death; but the second best is: to 
die in battle and to squander a great soul. 
But equally hateful to the fighter as to the victor is your 
grinning death, which comes creeping up like a thief- and 
yet comes as master. 
1 commend to you my sort of death, voluntary death that 
comes to me because I wish it. 
That your death may not be a blasphemy against man 
and the earth, my friends: that is what I beg from the 
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Thus I want to die myself, that you friends may love the 
earth more for my sake; and I want to become earth 
again, that I may have peace in her who bore me. 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingda]e, pp. 97, 99 
Except that Whitman invariably mentioned a life 
after death, these sentiments will be recognized to 
be very much the same as his own. Whitman, too, 
admired the Greeks for "suggesting death in the 
form of a beautiful and perfect young man, with 
closed eyes, leaning on an inverted torch- emblem 
of rest and aspiration after action - of crown and 
point which all lives and poems should steadily 
have reference to, namely, the justified and noble 
termination of our identity, this grade of it, and 
outlet-preparation to another grade" (footnote in 
Preface, 1876, p. 435). And Whitman, moreover, 
appears to have died the kind of death Nietzsche 
proposed to his disciples was the best kind of death: 
in the midst of his dearest admirers, such as Horace 
Traubel, Dr. Bucke, and Colonel Ingersoll, Whit-
man, with Olympian serenity, majesty, and endur-
ance, set sail, on March 26, 1892, toward the 
promontory where the Great Camerado stood ready 
to greet and initiate him into the Mystic Order of 
Adhesiveness. As early as 1871, Whitman had 
come to view life as the tillage and death as the 
harvest (As I Watch'd the Ploughman Ploughing, 
p. 316). And in the last year of his life, he respect-
fully begged to differ with George Inness's gloomy, 
funereal portrayal of death in the picture, "The 
Valley of the Shadow of Death." Whitman claims 
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that death need not be torturous nor hideous. For 
his setting, Whitman chooses not the "dank tarn of 
Auber" and the "ghoul-haunted woodland of Weir," 
but a Chaucerian meadow filled with the aroma of 
grass and flowers, sunlight glistening from surfaces 
recently drenched in sweet April showers: 
I make a scene, a song (not fear of thee, 
Nor gloom's ravines, nor bleak, nor dark - for I do not 
fear thee, 
Nor celebrate the struggle, or contortion, or hard-tied 
knot,) 
Of the broad blessed light and perfect air, with meadows, 
rippling tides, and trees and flowers and grass, 
And the low hum of living breeze- and in the midst God's 
beautiful eternal right hand, 
Thee, holiest minister of Heaven- thee, envoy, usherer, 
guide at last of all, 
E.ich, florid, loosener of the stricture-knot call'd life, 
Sweet, peaceful, welcm11e Death. 
DEATH'S VALLEY, p. 3R9 
Nietzsche, we have seen, shared every last ounce 
of Whitman's adoration of effulgent vitality. He, 
too, believed man's maturity was achieved when 
he was able to regain the seriousness he had as a 
child at play. He, too, construed Socrates' 'Know 
Thyself' and Emerson's 'Trust Thyself' as injunc-
tions to discover oneself by sloughing off the ac-
cretions of purblind moralizing and scraping off the 
encrustations of obsolescent tradition. For him, 
as for Whitman, the free spirit par excellence was 
the spirit that intuited that there is no increate, 
and that viewed the inventing of deities as prelusory 
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man's self. It was the spirit that delimited its own 
liberty by creating its own laws and values in order 
that it might avoid the suicidal anarchy of Kara-
mazov's "all is permitted." It was the spirit that 
would "sooner murder an infant than nurse unacted 
desires." It was the spirit that recognized no reve-
lation, no rational axiom bids man do what he 
ought to do. It was the spirit that, by plunging 
man into nothingness, sought to create for him the 
vastness of space, that, by showing him a fathom-
less world, sought to help him grasp the ground he 
sprang from. It was the spirit that served the 
meaning of the earth. It was the spirit that spoke 
of life as a well of joy and rejoiced in earth's 
treasures albeit aware of life's pestilences. It was 
the spirit that said "the earth is like the breasts of 
a woman: useful as well as pleasing" (Zarathustra, 
p. 319). It was the spirit that bade adieu to life as 
Odysseus bade adieu to Nausicaa- with a blessing. 
It was the spirit Zarathustra-Nietzsche sought to 
instill into his followers when he told them: 
Stay loyal to the earth, my brothers, with the power of 
your virtue! ... Do not let it fly away from the things of 
earth and beat with its wings against the eternal walls! ... 
May your spirit and your virtue serve the meaning of the 
earth, my brothers: and may the value of all things be 
fixed anew by you. To that end you should be fighters! 
To that end you should be creators! ... You solitaries of 
today, you who have seceded from society, you shall one 
day be a people: from you, who have chosen out your-
selves, shall a chosen people spring- and from this chosen 
people, the Superman .... Now I bid you lose me and 
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will I return to you. . .. I will be with you a third time, 
that I may celebrate the great noontide with you .... And 
this is the great noontide: it is when man stands at the 
middle of his course between animal and Superman and 
celebrates his journey to the evening as his highest hope: 
for it is the journey to a new morning. 
ZARATHUSTRA, Ho!lingdale, pp. 102, 103, 104 
Often this spirit is expressed in the works of Whit-
man and Nietzsche through the metaphors of the 
dance and laughter. Dancing, laughing, singing 
("I am satisfied- I see, dance, laugh, sing." Song 
of Myself, p. 27) Whitman and Nietzsche seemed 
to be agreed, best captured life's spumescent 
ebullience. Whitman and Nietzsche saw them as the 
oldest and yet the most eloquent means of denoting 
man's cheerful acceptance of life. Song is the systo-
le of life, laughter its diastole, and the dance its 
diapason. The dance incorporates what is most 
autochthonous in life, as D. H. Lawrence sensed in 
watching the snake dance of the Hopi Indians, and 
as Nikos Kazantzakis suggests through the inspired 
leaps and pirouettes of Macedonian Zorba. The 
dance is man's instinctual response to the Dionysian 
spirit. It puts to precipitate flight the spirit of 
gravity, and renders hors de combat the piddling 
foes of life with their ratiocinative pother. In The 
Sleepers, Whitman writes: 
I am a dance- play up there! the fit is whirling me fast! 
I am the ever-laughing- it is new moon and twilight. 
(It seems to me that every thing in the light and air ought 
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Whoever is not in his coffin and the dark grave let him 
know he has enough.) 
pp. 298-99 
And Zarathustra, it hardly needs saying, is an 
aficionado of the dance and is always picturing 
himself as a dancer and a sooth-laugher: 
And although there are swamps and thick afflictions on 
earth, he who has light feet runs even across mud and 
dances as upon swept ice. 
Lift up your hearts, my brothers, high, higher! And do 
not forget your legs! Lift up your legs, too, you fine 
dancers: and better still, stand on your heads! 
You Higher Men, the worst about you is: none of you has 
learned to dance as a man ought to dance - to dance 
beyond yourselves! What does it matter that you are 
failures! How much is still possible! So learn to laugh 
beyond yourselves! Lift up your hearts, you fine dancers, 
high! higher! and do not forget to laugh well! 
This laughter's crown, this rose-wreath crown: to you, my 
brothers, do I throw this crown! I have canonized laugh-
ter; you Higher Men, learn- to laugh! 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 304, 305, 306 
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If one insists on accepting life without reserve or 
constraint, one must be prepared to justify every 
last item in Pandora's box. The iconoclast knows 
well that iconoclasm invites - if not always the 
chain, the crag, and the vulture - always revile-
ment, persecution, and a crown of thorns. If one 
intends to "beat the gong of revolt, and stop with 
fugitives and them that plot and conspire," (Song 
of Myself, p. 41) he must indeed be possessed of 
"the faith that never balks" (Song of Myself, p. 40). 
Agonies are one of the rebel's changes of garments 
and the dramatic fare at the Grand Guignol is the 
very dough from which the rebel's daily bread is 
kneaded. "The sworn poet of every dauntless rebel 
the world over" (To a Foil' d European Revolu-
tionaire, p. 262) knows "That he who never peril'd 
his life, but retains it to old age in riches and ease, 
has probably achiev'd nothing for himself worth 
mentioning" (Song of Prudence, p. 266). The af-
firmer of life welcomes every challenge since every 
challenge enables him to solidify his position by 
precept and example. Just as the sans-culotte 
prizes every resistance, token or massive, which 
augments the tidal wave that will expunge what is 
rotten at the core and will usher in a spring-like 
renovation, so life's greatest lovers view every ob-
stacle that stays them from their beloved's bower 
as fillips to their ardor. It is the traducer of life, 
the Shaitan for whom earth and earthlings are bitter 
reminders of long-lost felicities, who is most apt to 
seize upon life's flaws as major failings and proofs 
of life's essentiallabefaction and corruption. The 116 
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affirmer of life does not emulate the ostrich when 
danger threatens; he is too honest to resort to 
evasive action since his very affirmation is largely 
grounded on his unflinching confrontation of actu-
ality. Instead of refusing to acknowledge life's ills 
or taking particular pains to emphasize them, he 
sees them as that strangeness in the proportion 
which adds materially to the overall beauty. He 
shows what is deemed detrimental to life is, in the 
first place, a contradiction in terms (insofar as 
what is a part of the whole cannot be designated 
inimical to the whole as long as the whole continues 
to proliferate) and, in the second place, represents a 
half-truth which belies the complete truth (insofar 
as what is deemed detrimental to life, at the same 
time, nonetheless, stimulates life by generating 
forces of preservation and renewal). 
These were the principal grounds upon which 
Whitman and Nietzsche found opposition necessary 
and conducive to life. Whitman arrived at his 
conclusion largely through his instinctive empathy 
and sympathy for all. As a measure of his prodig-
ious compassion, he excludes nothing from his all-
inclusive, all-approving, benign benediction. Whit-
man is so confident in the ultimate or basic rightness 
of almost all things that in the very act of gazing 
upon earth's suppurating cankers he blesses them 
unaware. It is not that he regards his nation's 
ailments as pistareen but that he has learned his 
lesson complete and knows the wisdom of yielding 
himself to the perfect whole. Nothing bespeaks 
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his sublime imperturbability before the shuddering 
spectacle of swarming evils. While all about him 
dash helter-skelter recommending radical reforms 
and proposing extremist measures, Whitman sim-
ply remarks all with Jovian insouciance and pro-
tracts his yoga-like repose: 
I sit and look out upon all the sorrows of the world, and 
upon all oppression and shame, 
I see the workings of battle, pestilence, tyranny, I see 
martyrs and prisoners, 
All these - all the meanness and agony without end I 
sitting look out upon, 
See, hear, and am silent. 
I SIT AND LOOK OUT, p. 197 
At one time, Whitman ferrets out every fetor and 
every furuncle both in order to test himself and his 
resolve and also in order to demonstrate the inter-
changeability of worst and best: 
I do not know what you are for, (I do not know what lam 
for myself, nor what any thing is for,) 
But I will search carefully for it even in being foil'd, 
In defeat, poverty, misconception, imprisonment - for 
they too are great. 
TO A FOIL'D EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONAIRE, p. 262 
And, at all times, as the "extoller of hate and 
conciliation," (Song of 1v1yself, p. 40) he flaunts his 
non-fastidiousness before the horrified countenances 
of milquetoasts and celebrates whatever is because 
it is and because it has always been and will always 
be. Whitman seldom approximates Frost's con- 118 
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cision and prec1s10n, but he formulated many of 
Frost's favorite notions before Frost did. Frost's 
Evil Tendencies Cancel summarizes well one of the 
key ideas in Whitman's philosophy of opposition: 
Will the blight end the chesnut? 
The farmers rather guess not. 
It keeps smoldering at the roots 
And sending up new shoots 
Till another parasite 
Shall come to end the blight. 
As has been noted, Whitman often simply denies 
the existence of the pernicious and pestiferous: 
And I will show that there is no imperfection in the pres-
ent, and can be none in the future, 
And I will show that whatever happens to anybody it 
may be turned to beautiful results. 
STARTING FROM PAUMANOK, p. 20, 1860 
But this is generally Whitman in the first flush not 
of callow optimism but of a superabundant, eu-
phoric vitality that found it difficult, if not im-
possible, to imagine anything irremediably bad. 
A sadder, wiser, and less vibrant Whitman, ac-
quainted with the murk of internecine civil war, 
was more philosophical than jubilant though he 
continued undaunted. What he says of the sea in 
With Husky-Haughty Lips, 0 Seal he also applied 
to himself and his country: 
(Naught but the greatest struggles, wrongs, defeats, could 
make thee greatest- no less could make thee.) 
119 p. 358, 1884 
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His final conclusion (and/or rationalization) was 
that hardships strengthen resolve, obstacles call 
forth superior effort, and setbacks whet the appetite 
for conquest. "Success is counted sweetest f By 
those who ne'er succeed." Hubristic hunger for 
experience infinite pulsed through Whitman's arte-
ries with Odyssean imperiousness. And, although 
the travels of Paumanok's "weary, way-worn wan-
derer" were, of course, largely mental, they sufficed 
to teach him that suffering defines happiness, 
disease engenders the antibodies that insure health, 
adversity summons noble fortitude, and depression 
rebels against itself that life may not cease. In 
Wandering at Morn, he compared the Union's 
successful survival of its intestine ordeal to the 
thrush which converts the repulsive worms it en-
gorges into melic symphonies of unpremeditated 
art: 
If worms, snakes, loathsome grubs, may to sweet spiritual 
songs be turn'd, 
If vermin so transposed, so used and bless'd may be, 
Then may I trust in you, your fortunes, days, my country; 
Who knows but these may be lessons fit for you? 
From these your future songs may rise with joyous trills, 
Destin'd to fill the world. 
p. 281, 1873 
Nietzsche reached similar conclusions through his 
studies of Greek tragedy which evaluates the pro-
tagonist on the basis of the courage and self-
integrity he displays in meeting defeat or doom at 
the hands of the antagonist or fate. Greek tragedy 
impressed upon Nietzsche that the most crucial 120 
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question of existence was how to react to adversity 
and death. By rejecting impassive passivity and 
accepting a dynamic ethos, Nietzsche had his an-
swer: to love life is to love all life. Originally, he 
had sought, like so many others, to find a justifi-
cation for life: and had been forced to the conclusion 
that life could be justified only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon. But, by the time he was ready to 
present Zarathustra to the world, his understanding 
of the matter had altered: he now was positive the 
proper study of mankind was to love the world 
rather than to vindicate it. Hereafter, because he 
regarded every moment as the embodiment of a 
whole eternity, he taught reverence for the now; 
and because he regarded Faust's yearning for 
supernal perfection as unrealistic and nihilistic 
(very like Edgar A. Poe's quest for the ideal ad-
mittedly was), he taught man to perceive that 
assent to any one thing in life entailed assent to all 
things. Like Whitman, he believed that, since each 
being is involved in Being, the rejection of any 
portion of Being is the rejection of one's own being. 
One who truly loves life, is not content merely to 
endure or even to prevail; the true lover insists on 
an unceasing number of identical repetitions of all 
that he has ever experienced: 
Did you ever say Yes to one joy? 0 my friends, then you 
said Yes to all woe as well. All things are chained and 
entwined together, all things are in love; 
if ever you wanted one moment twice, if ever you said: 
'You please me, happiness, instant, moment!' then you 
121 wanted everything to return! 
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you wanted everything anew, everything eternal, every-
thing in love, 0 that is how you loved the world, 
you everlasting men, loved it eternally and for all time: 
and you say even to woe: 'Go, but return!' For all joy 
wants - eternity! 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 331-32 
To love life is to know that even what opposes it 
insures its continuance. By imperiling life, life's 
adversaries inspire a posture of defense, security 
measures, and retaliation which assure life's future. 
Diseases are exigent in their exactions and defeats 
rankle terribly. Once weathered, however, they are 
the best guarantee that all will yet be well and that 
the forts of folly may indeed soon fall. Further-
more, since Nietzsche was inclined to see life as a 
circle rather than a straight line of infinite length, 
he came to see eye to eye with Whitman: nothing 
found in life can be said to be permanently fatal to 
life since life has been exposed to identical condi-
tions an innumerable number of times without 
suffering serious impairment or curtailment. The 
ascetic, Spartan, and stoic traits that led Whitman 
to practise frugality, self-denial, and self-discipline, 
led Nietzsche to extract from a life-long ordeal of 
sickness, neglect, and loneliness, a philosophy of 
life much closer to that of I~obert Browning than to 
that of Arthur Schopenhauer. In his theory of the 
superior man, he made clear he expected the Over-
man to overcome his theroid instincts, to subjugate 
his unruly desires, to sublimate the impulses of the 
id, and to direct his will-to-power to the enlighten-
ment rather +ban enslavement of man. In other 122 
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words, the principal cluetothenatureofNietzsche's 
Overman was self-conquest. Just as the fiercer the 
forge flame, the finer the temper of the Toledo 
blade, so, Nietzsche believed, the harsher the af-
flictions and privations overcome, the more hardy, 
sturdy, ennobled, and magnificent the character of 
those who overcame them: 
The highest type of free men should be sought where the 
highest resistance is constantly overcome: five steps from 
tyranny, close to the threshold of the danger of servitude . 
. . . Danger alone acquaints us with our own resources, our 
virtues, our armor and weapons, our spirit, and forces us to 
be strong- otherwise one will never become strong. 
TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 542 
Whitman and Nietzsche were at great pains to make 
known to their would-be disciples that the regimen 
they would impose would be rigorous to the point 
of hardship. Only those who welcomed rebuffs, 
who were renewed by defeats, who knew fear 
but conquered fear, who saw the abyss yet remain-
ed undismayed- only such could hope to pass the 
entrance examinations set for admission to the open 
air academies of Whitman and Nietzsche. Whit-
man tells those who would follow him they must be 
prepared to give up all and must stand ready to 
withstand all manner of privation. Unless they are 
willing to save themselves by exposing themselves 
to all that is mortal and unsure, it were better that 
they stayed at home to reap the plenteous harvest 
which is the hire of self-denying conformity: 
The way is suspicious, the result uncertain, perhaps de-
structive, 
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You would have to give up all else, I alone would expect 
to be your sole and exclusive standard, 
Your novitiate would even then be long and exhausting, 
The whole past theory of your life and all conformity to 
the lives around you would have to be abandon'd. 
WHOEVER YOU ARE HOLDING ME NOW IN HAND, p. 86 
He going with me must go well arm'd, 
He going with me goes often with spare diet, poverty, 
angry enemies, desertions. 
SONG OF THE OPEN ROAD, p. 115 
Nietzsche sternly states that he will have nothing 
to do with sunshine rebels or with shilly-shallying 
casuists. In existentialist vein, Nietzsche asks his 
students to drink deep or taste not the Sisyphean 
Spring. Since every triumph presupposes an ob-
stacle, a hurdle that has to be hurdled, Nietzsche 
wishes for his pupils an obstacle course dotted with 
traps and ambuscades. He wishes for them the 
encounter with the most dread of all foes- nihilism. 
He wishes for them the travail of those who intuit 
for the first time that life has no meaning other than 
the meaning freely imposed by them themselves. 
He wishes for them the self-mortification that shall 
lead not to a pessimistic and passive acquiescence 
in the purposelessness of existence but to the emer-
gence of a higher type of man: 
Type of my disciples. To those human beings in whom I 
have a stake I wish suffering, being forsaken, sickness, 
maltreatment, humiliation - I wish that that profound 
self-contempt, the torture of mistrust of oneself, and the 
misery of him who is overcome, not remain unknown to 
them: I have no pity for them because I wish them the 124 
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only thing which can prove today whether one has worth 
or not -that one holds out. 
NOTES, 1887, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 456 
Just as necessity is the mother of all invention, and 
obstruction the proving ground of all hardiness, 
so, Whitman believed, success is the prelude to new 
exertions; success is the synthesis, so to speak, soon 
to become thesis and soon to be challenged in turn: 
Now understand me well - it is provided in the essence of 
things that from any fruition of success, no matter what, 
shall come forth something to make a greater struggle 
necessary. 
SONG OF THE OPEN ROAD, p. 115 
It is of this self-same "greater struggle," which 
safeguards and nourishes the vital instinct, that 
Nietzsche is thinking when he writes: 
Ask yourselves whether a tree which is to grow proudly 
heavenward can dispense with bad weather and tempests: 
whether disfavor and opposition from without, whether 
every kind of hatred, jealousy, stubbornness, distrust, 
severity, greed, and violence do not belong to the favoring 
circumstances without which a great growth even in virtue 
is hardly possible? 
JOYFUL WISDOM, p. 56 
Whitman and Nietzsche agreed that man's ability 
to cope with whatever posed a threat to his indi-
viduality had to be cultivated continually. Both 
would have said that man could do much worse 
than emulate Faulkner's Old Ben, "an old bear, 
fierce and ruthless, not merely just to stay alive, 
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proud enough of that liberty and freedom to see it 
threatened without fear or even alarm; nay, who at 
times even seemed deliberately to put that freedom 
and liberty in jeopardy in order to savor them, to 
remind his old strong bones and flesh to keep 
supple and quick to defend and preserve them." 
Whitman shouts at the top of his lungs that he 
instigates warlike rebellion, that he incites men to 
riotous resistance, that he harbors hunted outcasts, 
that he urges daring defiance of accepted norms, 
that he mistrusts luxury and overrefinement: 
My call is the call of ba,ttle, I nourish active rebellion. 
SONG OF THE OPEN ROAD, p. 115 
I am he who tauntingly compels men, women, nations, 
Crying, Leap from your seats and contend for your lives! 
Fear grace, elegance, civilization, delicatesse, 
Beware what precedes the decay of the ruggedness of 
states and men. 
BY BLUE ONTARIO'S SHORE, p. 242 
To these sentiments, Nietzsche subscribed whole-
heartedly: 
Illness may even act as a powerful stimulus to life, to an 
abundance of life. It i.s thus that I now regard my long 
period of illness : it seemed then as if I had discovered life 
afresh, my own self included. I tasted all good and even 
trifling things in a way in which others could not very 
well taste them - out of my Will to Health and to Life I 
made my philosophy ..... For I wish this to be understood; 
it was during those years of most lowered vitality that I 
ceased from being a pessimist: the instinct of self-recovery 
forbade a philosophy of poverty and desperation. 
ECCE HOMO, MODERN LIBRARY, p. 820 126 
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Nietzsche agreed with Whitman that what does 
not kill man makes him stronger. He, too, believed 
all strong natures require resistance to attain full 
fruition and to fulfill themselves completely. 
"Everything decisive arises as the result of oppo-
sition." (Ecce Homo, 1vfodern Library, p. 894). 
Suffering is frequently one of the principal roads to 
perfection. Nietzsche and Whitman knew the se-
cret of Homer's Greeks, knew how to rejoice in the 
midst of tragedy. To retain his grip on reality man 
requires external stimuli. Sensory deprivation or 
overstimulation leads to personality disintegration 
which may eventuate in madness or death. To 
stress the need for equable orientation almost to 
the exclusion of the need for sensory excitation, as 
Whitman and Nietzsche felt religious and societal 
conventions did, was to gamble rashly with the 
health of the human organism. 
As one might expect, Whitman and Nietzsche 
found physical illness a stimulant rather than a 
depressant to their cosmic eulogizing. Viewed from 
atop the Magic Mountain, life irradiates a preter-
naturally luminiscent lambency. Plot alone does 
not suffice to explain why the warm, youthful 
passion of Porphyro and Madeline is consummated 
against the backdrops of cold, death, and old age. 
The interest in, and insistence on a sensuous apper-
ception of external reality (common to Keats, 
Whitman, Nietzsche, D. H. Lawrence, and Heming-
way, among others) connotes a passionate love of 
life, a yearning to conquer the Conqueror Worm. 
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anorexia of his senescent days enables him to ap-
preciate all the more the joyful paeans he endited 
when he was in better health: 
I occupy myself, arranging these pages for publication, ... 
under the physical affliction of a tedious attack of paraly-
sis, obstinately lingering and keeping its hold upon me, 
and quite suspending all bodily activity and comfort. I 
see now, much clearer than ever - how much my former 
poems, the bulk of them, are indeed the expression of 
health and strength, the sanest, joyfullest life. 
Footnote in PREFACE OF 1876, p. 435 
And Nietzsche, in a characteristically brilliant in-
sight, says the suffering his precarious health peri-
odically subjected him to is responsible for the 
tenor of his philosophy: 
As my inmost nature teaches me, whatever is necessary 
- as seen from the heights and in the sense of a great 
economy- is also the useful par excellence: one should not 
only bear it, one should love it. Amor fati: that is my 
inmost nature. And as for my long sickness, do I not owe 
it indescribably more than I owe my health? I owe it a 
higher health - one which is made stronger by whatever 
does not kill it. I also owe my philosophy to it. 
NIETZSCHE CONTRA WAGNER, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 680 
According to the Gospel by Dostoievski, happiness 
can be attained only through suffering; according 
to the Gospel by Whitman and Nietzsche, suffering 
is a form of happiness. If, on the Emersonian lintel 
the motto was 'Whim,' on the Whitman-Nietzsche 
lintel, the motto read: 'What destroys me not, 
strengthens me.' 
To both writers, eudaemonism was a bHe noire. 128 
OPPOSITION PROMOTES HEALT AND GROWTH 
Cold Pastorals are in the repertoire of neither 
Whitman nor Nietzsche. Their songs sing of boughs 
that bid the Spring adieu with cheerful optimism 
rather than bleak despair, of brimming beakers of 
sangaree that set at naught both mistral and siroc-
co. To Whitman and Nietzsche, unheard melodies 
are sweet, but heard melodies are sweeter still. And 
the sweetest of all are the ones sung fortissimo, the 
ones danced to Terpsichore's wildest measures. In 
the place of the fusty fulminations of pandits and 
pundits, Whitman and Nietzsche recommend re-
ality's caves of ice and sunless seas. In their total 
assent to total life, they find the ululations of 
woman wailing for her demon lover as sweet as the 
tunes of Attic pipes and timbrels, as lovely as the 
strains plucked from dulcimers by Abyssinian maids. 
Life, whatever its golgothas, must not be despised; 
the challenge of Polyphemous must be answered. 
The great noon, eternal spring are blackest mid-
night's and Boreas' first-born. It is out of such 
knowledge that the Future, which shall belong to 
the undaunted Camerado and the intrepid Over-
man, will be born. Failure defines success; disap-
pointed ambition furnishes the formula for con-
quest; rank injustice extirpates the pernicious 
craving for justice; torture teaches the scorn of 
pain; woes infinite yield to joys ineffable: 
Whatever we do not attain, we at any rate attain the 
experiences of the fight, the hardening of the strong 
campaign, and throb with currents of attempt at least. 
Time is ample. Let the victors come after us. . .. There is 
129 an immortal courage and prophecy in every sane soul that 
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cannot, must not, under any circumstances, capitulate. 
Vive, the attack - the perennial assault! Vive, the un-
popular cause - the spirit that audaciously aims - the 
never-abandon'd efforts, pursued the same amid opposing 
proofs and precedents. 
DEMOCRATIC VISTAS, p. 472 
Nietzsche stresses the fact that noble souls disdain 
the easy conquest. He points out that the successes 
of your enemy become your successes when you 
have the honesty to admit you were wrong. He 
explains that, although earthquakes visit havoc 
upon humanity, they at the same time elicit hu-
manity's best, the subtle brotherhood of men often 
established by an open boat ordeal. He offers the 
reassurance that despair itself is often the initial 
stage to a position of strength where one refuses to 
delude himself with Iies: 
If something great has failed you, does it follow that you 
yourselves are failures? And if you yourselves are failures, 
does it follow that man ils a failure? ... The higher its type, 
the more rarely a thing succeeds. . .. Have you not all 
failed? Be of good cheer .... How much is still possible! 
Midnight too is noon; pain too is a joy; curses too are a 
blessing; night too is a sun. 
ZARATHUSTRA, pp. 404; 435 
It was in this light that Walt Whitman, as we have 
suggested, came to view and justify (at least to 
himself) the Civil War. Amonghisstirringreveilles, 
impressionistic verse vignettes of battles and sol-
diers, and recitatives detailing his experiences in 
the hospitals among the wounded, the poet finds 
time to see the War of the States as a proving 130 
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ground; as the momentary descent to A vern us 
indispensable to the attainment of the Newest 
Atlantis; as the arduous contest from which the 
agonistes emerges crowned with laurel: 
Long, too long America, 
Traveling roads all even and peaceful you learn'd from 
joys and prosperity only, 
But now, ah now, to learn from crises of anguish, advanc-
ing, grappling with direst fate and recoiling not. 
LONG, TOO LONG AMERICA, pp. 222-23 
Whitman, clearly, was not one of those parlor sol-
diers whom Emerson berated for shunning the 
rugged battle of fate. The above lines, from Drum-
Taps, 1865, practically paraphrase Emerson's entry 
in his journal for November, 1862: 
\Vell, this is the task before us, to accept the benefit of the 
\Var; it has not created our false relations, they have 
created it. It simply demonstrates the rottenness it found. 
\Ve watch its course as we did the cholera, which goes 
where predisposition already existed, took only the sus-
ceptible, set its seal on every putrid spot, and on none 
other; followed the limestone, and left the granite. So 
the War. 
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Much of what Whitman and Nietzsche had to say 
regarding good and evil has been anticipated in 
considering their attitudes towards contradiction 
and opposition. Aggressive vitalists that they were, 
they naturally inclined strongly to the view that 
good consisted of life's allies and evil of life's 
enemies. At the same time, as we have observed, 
they were prepared to defend, and anxious to 
proclaim their belief that life's enemies were as 
necessary as life's allies for life's continuance. In 
addition, their personalism once more led them to 
Emerson's door. The latter's sentiments in Self-
Reliance clearly anticipate the conviction held in 
common by Whitman and Nietzsche that, what is 
inimical to self, is evil, and that, what is partial to 
self, is good : 
No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good 
and bad are but names very readily transferable to that 
or this; the only right is what is after my constitution; the 
only wrong what is agamst it. 
Finally, it was to be expected that, since they were 
life's apologists, they should accept, and even love 
all aspects and conditions of life, including what 
was customarily designated evil. Contradiction, of 
course, would not have disturbed them. But, actu-
ally, they saw no contradiction in embracing evil 
even if it were defined as inimical to their selves, 
for it will be recalled that, what opposed the self, 
was deemed salutary to the self by both writers. 
Both construed morality almost exclusively in 
terms of vitality. Their distance from Hemingway 132 
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in this regard is more apparent than real. Life itself 
absorbed their attention more than life's earnest-
ness or life's meaning. Life's spectacle engrossed 
them. But they wanted to be actors in that specta-
cle just as much as they wanted to contemplate and 
analyze its drama. All their thinking predicated 
that man and existence are desirable, worthwhile, 
and wonderful; and that the strife of direct oppo-
sites is a condition of life. Believing in life's forked 
flame, they believed that nothing was retrogressive 
that helped guard against the flame's extinction. 
They shared Blake's convictions that everything 
that lives is sacred, that Contraries are necessary 
to human existence, and that energy is eternal 
delight. Nietzsche put it as follows: 
If I have proof that error and illusion can serve the devel-
opment of life, I shall say 'yes' to error and illusion; if it 
has been demonstrated to me that the instincts styled 
evil by the morality of the present,- for example, hardness, 
cruelty, ruse, daring audacity, combative temperament 
are likely to increase man's vitality, I shall say 'yes' to 
evil and sin. 
THE ANTICHRIST, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 637 
The experiencing of an ecstatic joy from an apper-
ception conditioned by a spectator relationship to 
existence is a matter of temperament- just as its 
opposite, say in the case of Schopenhauer's pessi-
mism, is. Given such a temperament- a philosophy 
of life which views the vital instinct as the most 
precious of all things - one can anticipate much of 
what will be adduced to vindicate such a tempera-
133 ment's faith. No arguments perhaps have been as 
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frequently rehearsed as those called forth by one 
whose commitment to the vital instinct is total. 
For the latter type of individual, personalism is as 
much the organon as ratiocination was for the 
A ufkliirung and its subsequent reincarnations. Ra-
tionalism and anti-rationalism are at one in their 
humanism and humanitarianism: they share alike 
the belief in man's essential goodness and in human 
nature's infinite perfectibility. They also agree 
that, this being the case, man's abortive endeavors 
at self-expression and the confluence of factors 
denying the fulfillment of his birthrights are wholly 
society's fault, and hence contingent and remedi-
able. Both of these attitudes towards life, more-
over, are not only strongly optimistic concerning 
man's fate, but also disclose, by this very optimism, 
their tender solicitude for man and their incurable 
idealism. Both attitudes desire the instantaneous 
rearing of paradise on earth and both are confident 
the feat may be accomplished purely through hu-
man agency. They are realists in recognizing sweep-
ing changes must be made and much of the old 
must be discarded; yet they are blithedalers in 
thinking the improving of society will improve man. 
Where they differ is in the means they believe 
best calculated to effect most quickly their longed-
for improvements. Obviously, the regnant idols of 
the partisans of logic are science and induction, 
whereas the ruling penates of the devotees of 
instinct are art and intuition. One's sanctum sanc-
torum is knowledge; the other's is the life force. 
The rationalists follow Socrates in saying the ration- 134 
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al principle should enjoy the governance of the 
passionate principle. The anti-rationalists protest 
against this arbitrary suzerainty which they con-
tend is nocuous to the integral personality; they 
accuse the rationalists of foolhardiness in trying to 
shape man into what he cannot be and into what he 
was never intended to be. The rationalists are 
partial to the Apollonian: their religious thought, 
regardless of how much or how little of miracle and 
revelation it admits, is generally arrived at through 
logic- whether it be Moses' Torah, Socrates' theism, 
Aquinas' Roman Catholicism, Leibnitz's deism, or 
Kant's natural religion. The anti-rationalists favor 
the Dionysian - whether it be the wisdom of the 
Prophets, the sacrarium of Isis, the mysticism of 
Swedenborg, the pantheism of Rousseau, the Chris-
tianity of Berdyaev and Kierkegaard, or the ex-
istentialism of Camus. 
Their most strenuous efforts by far are exerted in 
justifying man and man's life. Toward this end, 
both schools of thought address themselves with 
all the ingenuity at their command. For, although, 
deep down in their unconscious, there is perhaps 
the inadmissible knowledge that one cannot justify 
the unjustifiable, neither school dares confess what 
would indeed prove life to be the meaningless tale 
of an idiot. Neither doubts that life will cease the 
moment it cannot be justified. Consequently, both 
agree that the problem of evil has to be disposed of 
if all proofs in defense of life are not to be in-
validated. 
As everyone knows, however, any concerted at-
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tack against evil or any undue concern with it 
arouses suspicion. People wonder whether one may 
not be protesting too much. Freudian self-con-
sciousness has permeated all to such a degree that 
diffidence by itself can no longer be taken as the 
sole cause of the grave misgivings aroused by any 
ardent plea. The sceptic cannot refrain from in-
quiring why the affirmers of life's splendors so 
often speak in accents which, although not those of 
despair, are, more often than not, couched in terms 
of euphoric megalomania. Is not the obsession to 
demonstrate that life is not absurd a measure of the 
fear with which purposeless existence is contem-
plated? Did Camus succeed in persuading himself 
in The M.yth of Sisyphus? Is not the Bosom Ser-
pent gnawing inside all who pen testaments of life, 
all who, like Billy Budd, react more paroxysmally 
in affirming cosmic justice precisely because they 
were initially nonpluscd by the world's evil- is not 
this hateful reptile fear? 
Such obstinate questionings do not have to be the 
nugae of a fldneur or the disaffirmances of a nihilist. 
What is more, they can be ignored only at the risk 
of distortion. Fortunately, however, as we shall 
see, Whitman and Nietzsche themselves dispose of 
most of them. And those not disposed of thus can 
be dismissed by pointing out that, when disil-
lusionment is made accountable for Swift's satire 
and fear of death explains Hemingway's novels, 
nothing is really explained except the limitations 
of the would-be explicator. The charge of rela-
tivism, moreover, is false when one levels it against 136 
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a man who says that a context can be contrived 
for anything to prove it is whatever one wishes it to 
be. Whitman and Nietzsche make this very point. 
In addition, where Whitman and Nietzsche are 
concerned, there is merit not only in the fact of 
utterance but also in the felicity and cogency of the 
utterance. Last, it should be recognized that one 
cannot affirm life without first judging it; and that 
it is impossible, most of the time, to judge without 
being led to condemn. Nevertheless, as Whitman 
and Nietzsche teach us, since man is able to write 
both of the affirmation and the condemnation, he 
can master life. And, as long as man can do that, 
he has done all: he has given purpose to life - to 
the same extent that the work of an artist has 
purpose, to the same extent that the artist imposes 
purpose upon his creation. 
This is the awareness at the core of Whitman's 
and Nietzsche's notions of good and evil. Both 
were personalists. What they approved of was 
called good. What promoted the welfare of the 
vital instinct was called good. What tended to 
teach and encourage individualism was called good. 
Good was love of man through love of self. Good 
was the worship of man's creations. Good was 
everything that loved life. Good was birth, growth, 
and death. By the same tokens, evil was whatever 
they disapproved of. Evil was whatever was 
hypocritical, contumelious, sinistrous, circumspect, 
abjectly conformist, over-solicitous of tradition, 
fearful of innovation, predisposed to inertia, meanly 
137 pragmatic, egregiously authoritarian. Self-doubt, 
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self-denial, and self-betrayal were cardinal sins in 
the eyes of both Whitman and Nietzsche. 
Total assent and acceptance of all life was 
Whitman's credo. Indifference to life, one possible 
definition of nihilism, was, where Whitman was 
concerned, the worst form of treason and blasphemy. 
Likewise, passivity was as hateful to Whitman as 
to Blake. His all-enveloping sympathy included in 
the sunshine of its affection lamb and tiger, inno-
cence and experience, woman and man, good and 
evil. He found positive values in existence and 
positive values in society. Therefore, he had no 
hesitation in setting down life's curses alongside 
life's blessings; he recorded society's shameful 
doings as well as society's noble doings. Whitman 
was closer to Hawthorne than to Emerson in per-
ceiving how dangerous it was to deny human 
imperfection; he did not foolishly demand a monis-
tic ethos in the face of cosmic pluralism. Although 
his diction inclines towards absolutes and extremes, 
Whitman subscribed to the principle of reasonable 
culpability. Paumanok's child was always the 
rebel rallying free souls under the banner of non-
conformity. He stood neither above men nor apart 
from them. The faith which found "perfect and 
clean the genitals previously jetting" (The Sleepers, 
p. 302) refused to be balked by any room or dweller 
in life's mansion: 
(Shall I make my list of things in the house and skip the 
house that supports them?) 
I am not the poet of goodness only, l do not decline to be 
the poet of wickedness also. 138 
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What blurt is this about virtue and about vice? 
Evil propels me and reform of evil propels me, I stand 
indifferent, 
My gait is no fault-finder's or rejector's gait, 
I moisten the roots of all that has grown. 
I find one side a balance and the antipodal side a balance. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 40 
Like the Christ who compassionated Magdalene and 
the adulteress, Whitman plead the case of the 
insulted and injured. He believed empathy was the 
only morality. Hence every pariah and derelict 
was dear to him. He blessed them all in full 
awareness. \Vere they any the less individuals for 
being outcasts? Had they yielded up integrity of 
self any more than had the eminent men who had 
suborned and groveled in order to rise to a great 
place? Every man's humiliation, every man's de-
gradation, every man's imprisonment, every man's 
self-apostasy, diminished Whitman. He, too, was 
one well acquainted with the night. Therefore, he 
sought not to know for whom the tocsin clanged; 
he knew it clanged for him: 
Lusts and wickedness are acceptable to me, 
I walk with delinquents with passionate love, 
I feel I am one of them - I belong to those convicts and 
prostitutes myself, 
And henceforth I will not deny them - for how can I deny 
myself? 
YOU FELONS ON TRIAL IN COURTS, p. 272 
He felt the staid, safe virtues of the mollycoddled 
and sanctimonious had to be superseded by the 
139 impulses of the self if life's springs were not to run 
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dry. From the rejected he demanded the strength 
born of rejection. Man's power, he taught, derives 
from the knowledge of his fallibility. To his fol-
lowers, he recommended the less traveled roads, 
the most difficult paths, because it is only by 
overcoming opposition that man becomes aware of 
his full potential: 
Negative qualities, even deficiencies, would be a relief. 
Provision for a little healthy rudeness, savage virtue, 
justification of what one has in one's self, whatever it is, 
is demanded. 
DEMOCRATIC VISTAS, p. 478 
By this logic, Whitman was able to approve even 
what is generally designated as forbidden. For, 
although he believed in heaven, he emphatically 
rejected the notions of hell and purgatory. All, he 
was certain, would ultimately be redeemed. Conse-
quently, he was not alarmed by the fact that good 
and evil appeared inseparable. He refused to toler-
ate any twaddle about reprobation and original sin. 
He looked upon religion's tools for salvation as super-
erogatory albeit adiaphorous. He believed the only 
true redemption was self-redemption, which was 
achieved not by obeying abstract moral command-
ments but by giving ear to one's own individuum. 
Man is lost the moment he begins to look for rules 
and regulations to direct his thoughts and actions. 
For morality's codes all too often aim at reducing the 
freedom of choice to the minimum, which is usually 
no choice at all. Whitman believed in moral re-
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GOOD AND EVIL 
delimit the individual's range of free choices. To 
Whitman, human wickedness was to be ascribed 
to sickness, mental aberration, or society's ma-
terialism and unnatural restrictions rather than to 
innate depravity. Man's value was ascertained not 
by his goals or even by his achievement; it was 
determined by his effort, by how he weathered 
defeat and frustration, by how much he loved man. 
At Whitman's festive board are invited all and 
sundry because all and sundry are involved in 
mankind and because all and sundry have thought 
evil if they have not actually perpetrated evil: 
With music strong I come, with my cornets and my 
drums, 
I play not marches for accepted victors only, I play 
marches for conquer'd and slain persons. 
This is the meal equally set, this the meat for natural 
hunger, 
It is for the wicked just the same as the righteous, I make 
appointments with all, 
I will not have a single person slighted or left away, 
The kept-woman, sponger, thief, are hereby invited, 
The heavy-lipp'd slave is invited, the venerealee is invited; 
There shall be no difference between them and the rest. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 37 
All too frequently those who deny the freedom of 
the will evince an instinctive aversion to the evil 
deed and the evildoer to the same degree that their 
opponents, the believers in free will, do. But 
Whitman, accused by many of a lack of intellectual 
sophistication, was above such sophistry. He un-
141 derstood Christ better than many erudite theologi-
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ans when he envisioned the Great Camerado for-
giving all, without a single exception, on Judgment 
Day. In the superb future whose coruscating 
brilliance he seemed to glimpse as a distant star, 
Whitman foresaw the harmonious blend and merge 
of all into a wonderful, perfect unity. In the 
meantime, however, he was more than ready to 
accept life's antimonies in all their irreducible 
polarity. Although he believed in a hereafter and 
was convinced that life displayed abundant signs 
of meaning, purpose, and progression, he still clung 
to the idea that the enlightened individual pos-
sessed total freedom and total responsibility. Al-
though his affirmation of life was as resounding as 
the last movement of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, 
he seldom lost sight of the evil and suffering all 
about him. And, although he was positive Blake's 
Jerusalem would be rebuilt upon earth, he did not 
hesitate to urge his followers to follow Tannhauser's 
example - to reject paradise and return to the 
world of men: 
The difference betwee'~ sin and goodness is no delusion, 
The earth is not an echo, man and his life and all the 
things of his life are well-consider'd, 
You are not thrown to the winds, you gather certainly and 
safely around yourself, 
Yourself! yourself! yourself, for ever and ever! 
How beautiful and perfect are the animals! 
How perfect the earth, and the minutest thing upon it! 
What is called good is perfect, and what is called bad is 
just as perfect. 
TO THINK OF TIME, pp. 306; 308 142 
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Complete and exalted allegiance to the earth must 
become man's faith since it already is his fate. 
Only he who has seen through man's illusions and 
simultaneously has recognized man's need for il-
lusion is truly enlightened, free, realistic, and re-
sponsible. Everyone, whether he wills it or not, is 
a collaborator in cosmic destiny. It behooves man 
to immerse himself in the destructive element, to 
see life's evil steadily and to see it whole. To refuse 
to do so is to repudiate the testimony of the senses. 
To refuse to do so is to deny the real life and say yes 
to an imaginary one. To refuse to do so is to fail to 
see that reality lies not beyond appearances but 
within them. Even though answers may not be 
ready at hand, man must not curb his questing 
spirit, must never cease seeking and striving. 
Though there may be abundant reasons to doubt it, 
life has meaning and means good: 
I know now why the earth is gross, tantalizing, wicked, it 
is for my sake, 
I take you specially to be mine, you terrible, rude forms. 
(Mother, bend down, bend close to me your face, 
I know not what these plots and wars and deferments 
are for, 
I know not fruition's success, but I know that through 
war and crime your work goes on, and must yet go on.) 
BY BLUE ONTARIO'S SHORE, p. 251 
One may be influenced to say yes to life either 
because he believes or does not believe in a creation 
by design and/or with design. Nietzsche, para-
doxically, had to affirm all because he repudiated 
143 all: that is to say, although his affirmation was not 
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based upon nihilism, nihilism was its starting point. 
Nietzsche's love of life is predicated upon, and is 
fomented by cosmic fortuitousness. Nietzsche 
angrily poured an avalanche of scorn on the notion 
that man's life was given him as a gift to serve a 
purpose lying outside of himself. The only order 
and meaning Nietzsche could discover in the uni-
verse was the order and meaning men attributed to 
it or imposed upon it. He did not believe that life 
acquired meaning because it served an impersonal 
external purpose. N:ietzsche found life's meaning in 
the fact of life itself. Whitman's love of life, on the 
other hand, - and here we have a major point of 
difference- proceeded from his belief in an educat-
ed and sane purpose behind creation: 
\Vhile I cannot understand it or argue it out, I fully 
believe in a clue and purpose inN ature, entire and several; 
and that invisible spiritual results, just: as real and definite 
as the visible, eventuate all concrete life and all material-
ism, through Time. 
A BACKWARD GLANCE o'ER TRAVEL'D ROADS, p. 453 
One can never say yes to life, however, if he does 
not have confidence in man's willingness and 
ability to recognize himself as the master and 
creator of his own good and evil. Faith in man 
makes it possible for one to say yes to evil and no 
to evils since it both presupposes and defers the 
radical melioration of human nature. One cannot 
help but note that the unforced cheerfulness of 
Whitman and Nietzsche stems from the certainty, 
to which both tenaciously adhere, that man can will 
and will will to follow their directions for a halcyon 144 
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future. Clearly, although one can live without hope 
for himself, one can scarcely live without hope for 
the race. Nietzsche's affirmation hinges on man's 
being able to summon the resolve necessary to 
pursue constructive goals in the face of cosmic 
nullity; man's potency lies in his ability to confront 
his impotency. \Vhitman's affirmation rests on the 
trust he places in man's inveterate determination 
to countervail the ills his humanity subjects him to: 
Judging from the main portions of the history of the 
world, so far, justice is always in jeopardy, peace walks 
amid hourly pitfalls, and of slavery, misery, meanness, the 
craft of tyrants and the credulity of the populace, in some 
of the protean forms, no voice can at any time say: "They 
are not." The clouds break a little, and the sun shines 
out - but soon and certain the lowering darkness falls 
again, as if to last forever. Yet is there an immortal 
courage and prophecy in every sane soul that cannot, 
must not, under any circumstances, capitulate? Vive, the 
attack- the perennial assault! Vive, the unpopular cause 
- the spirit that audaciously aims - the never-abandon'd 
efforts, pursued the same amid opposing proofs and pre-
cedents. 
DEMOCRATIC VISTAS, p. 472 
Hope is endemic to the majority of humankind. 
Even more than life itself, man desires reasons for 
living. That is why Whitman and Nietzsche feel at 
ease in their adoration of what exists; they know 
such adoration cannot be deemed preposterous so 
long as it does not abrogate their right to call for 
certain reforms and changes. One justifies not only 
his own existence but life itself when one refuses to 
145 be either the accomplice or the silent witness of 
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evil. By the same token, one can do no greater 
harm to life than to order one's existence according 
to some lost paradise or future heaven. All too 
often, when man surrenders to illusion, magic, and 
the miraculous, he ceases to struggle. All too often, 
when man loses his way in a fictitious fog of ideals, 
he is unable to think clearly, and he is apt to forget 
that he himself created those ideals to serve his own 
ends. All too often, when man permits society to 
fit him with spectacles which show things to be 
arbitrarily all white or all black, his perception of 
reality is dulled and he may scarcely discern evil 
though it stare him in the face. Culturally in-
herited orientations screen man from reality and 
thus deprive him of the most tried and proved 
weapon against evil - truth. 
Whitman would have found little to quarrel with 
in Nietzsche's conviction that man can know good 
and combat evil only if his words, thoughts, acts, 
and wishes are his own, only if his volition remains 
unencumbered by anything extrinsic to itself. Like 
Nietzsche, Whitman's notions of good and evil 
were shaped, consciously and unconsciously, by 
Christ's teachings. But, of course, both writers 
interpreted Christ's message in their own manner. 
Occasionally, Whitman would rant against vice 
and sinners in the manner of an Old Testament 
prophet. For the most part, however, he was no 
more uneasy about evil than he was about God and 
immortality. Instead of fretting over it, arguing 
about it, seeking to define it, attempting to separate 
it from the good, Whitman was of the opinion that 146 
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man should triumph over it by living fearlessly and 
confidently. The man who owns only himself mas-
ter gladly embraces what is inevitable, gladly con-
sents to all that is problematic and strange in the 
double wisdom that whatever is is necessary and 
exists only by life's permissiveness. To love the 
inevitable and the unalterable is the highest wis-
dom and freedom within man's finite power. When 
man concedes the ineluctable evil and injustice 
that are in him, in others, and in the world, he 
defines a dialect of confrontation. Then and only 
then is he ready to commence a new quest for 
clarity, truth, justice, and bortherhood. Whitman 
would undoubtedly have endorsed Hawthorne's 
observation in The Marble Faun: "While there is a 
single guilty person in the universe, each innocent 
one must feel his innocence tortured by that guilt." 
Whitman was aware twenty centuries had not 
lessened the sum total of evil in the world. He 
knew that pure virtue was no more compatible 
with life as he knew or could conceive it than un-
alloyed cynicism was. He knew that man was 
neither completely innocent nor entirely depraved. 
He knew that even after man reformed himself and 
society within the realm of possible reform, utopia 
would still be a dream. At the same time, however, 
Whitman knew that to abstain from warfare against 
evils because of nihilistic despair constituted arrant 
infidelity to the human condition. He knew that 
the individual achieves perfection not by self-denial 
and by imitation of tradition but by self-expression 
147 and self-realization. He knew the worst evil was to 
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ignore evil, to minimize its threat, or to endure it 
passively. He knew that when one forgets the 
present for the future, he no longer loves life. The 
key issue in Goethe's epic drama is not whether 
Faust will or will not be saved. The real question 
is whether Mephistopheles will or will not induce 
Faust to deny the significance of life and the pur-
posefulness of Faust's own being. Whitman knew 
that the flesh is weak, that the majority of men are 
like Faust: that they can love Gretchen and Helen 
-humanity and art- for a spell but are unable to 
live without the 'lies' of the socially conditioned 
perception they have become addicted to. That is 
why he was insistent that man must learn to 
penetrate beneath and through society's decep-
tions. He knew that the real provision for the 
future consisted in giving all to the present. But 
one must never forget that Whitman's present was a 
present discovered by the Whitmanian vision rather 
than by the astucious astigmatism of society: 
I have heard what the talkers were talking, the talk of the 
beginning and the end, 
But I do not talk of the beginning or the end. 
There was never any more inception than there is now, 
Nor any more youth or age than there is now, 
And will never be any more perfection than there is now, 
Nor any more heaven or hell than there is now. 
Showing the best and dividing it from the worst age 
vexes agel 
Knowing the perfect fitness and equanimity of things, 
while they discuss I am silent, and go bathe and 
admire myself. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 26 148 
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The moment contained all the promise and reward 
that mortal and compassionate man could legiti-
mately wish and covet. The means and the end of 
life, as well as the reciprocal justification of the one 
by the other, were all carried within the pregnant 
womb of the present. The plenum of proof for 
inscrutable destiny's sentience, and the banner 
under which mankind might be well advised to 
learn to live and to die resides paradoxically in 
non-human creation: 
I think I could turn and live with animals, they're so 
placid and self-contain'd, 
I stand and look at them long and long. 
They do not sweat and whine about their condition, 
They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins, 
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God, 
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania 
of owning things, 
Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived 
thousands of years ago, 
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 47 
Whitman can feel for the discouraged, the defeated, 
and the disappointed because he, too, has known 
adversity, because he, too, has been smitten hip 
and thigh by that serpentine albino cetacean, be-
cause he, too, has experienced the Gehenna of 
desolation and utter loneliness. He, too, searched 
for meaning in meaninglessness; he, too, sought for 
pause amid vortiginous mutability; he, too, hun-
gered for love's certainty on a darkling plain. 
149 Every man carries within him his own desert places. 
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But duty to self as well as to neighbor demands 
that he fight these arid wastes in himself as well as 
in his fellow man. The mere wish for immortality 
testifies to life's meaning and to life's meaning 
good. Man must never cease fighting against that 
in himself of which he is afraid. The Future is what 
the Past will change into, and the Present is the 
changing - which is the human race's being, the 
moment of truth. Man's ever-renewed and ever-
defeated effort is not in vain; it is his happiness 
and triumph if he will but recognize it as such: 
Be at peace bloody flukes of doubters and sullen mopers, 
I take my place among you as much as among any, 
The past is the push of you, me, all, precisely the same, 
And what is yet untried and afterward is for you, me, all 
precisely the same, 
I do not know vvhat is untried and afterward. 
But I know it will in its turn prove sufficient, and cannot 
fail. 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 61 
Nietzsche scorned all forms of transcendence, 
whether moral or divine, because, to his way of 
thinking, transcendence leads to slander of this 
world and this life. Nietzsche argued that only the 
discontented took refuge in an imaginary, fictitious 
other world; only the vulturine priests, prompted 
by neuroticism or cupidity, sought to weaken and 
stunt man's delight in living by telling him that to 
obtain the true life he must deny the real life. 
Whitman, however, regarded transcendence as the 
greatest testimonial of life's value. Transcendence 
was vVhitman's means of making this mortal and 150 
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limited world preferable to any other. It was his 
means of saying yes and no to life simultaneously: 
yes to its growth and no to its tabescence. The 
only esclandre for \Vhitman was the renunciation 
of human complicity. He never approved of mere 
lip service to life's demands; he felt they had to be 
lived and acted upon. For Whitman the praise-
worthy individual was he who asserted his identity 
without lapsing into egocentricity, whose thoughts 
and acts issued from out of his own being, whose 
life's task was to cultivate his creative self. Whit-
man would have agreed with Hawthorne that the 
only unpardonable sin was the sin of Ethan Brand; 
his individualism was neither a narcissitic pre-
occupation with his own ego nor the hoity-toity 
refusal on the part of an exhibitionist to be one of 
hoi polloi. Nietzsche gagged at the mere thought 
of pity and D. H. Lawrence was disgusted with 
Whitman's preachments on sympathy. Be that as 
it may, Whitman's ideas on the magnetic chain of 
humanity are not essentially different from those 
found in such diverse works as The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner, Moby Dick, The Marble Faun, 
Crime and Punishment, and Victory. 
For Whitman, life's horrors were not death and 
despair but doubt and tyranny. He did not feel 
that to love life and man was to approve centuries 
of injustice and murders. To consent to what must 
be was to be sensible, realistic, and courageous. To 
pledge allegiance to the eternal present was to dis-
card illusory hopes and hopeless illusions. Despite 
151 his idealism and mystical pantheism, of which he 
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availed himself or not as the whim of a particular 
day dictated, Whitman was practical enough to 
realize that what never had real existence in this 
life and never could was scarcely calculated to 
prove a boon to mankind. Though he might oppugn 
death's dominion with the orotund accents of Dylan 
Thomas and serenade life's orange and green with 
the verbal magic of Wallace Stevens, it became 
more and more apparent to Whitman that the 
greatest labor of his life was to reconcile man to the 
ash heaps and stony images that outraged one's 
eyes wherever he turned. Daily he witnessed tra-
dition's failure to light the way; daily he heard "the 
Chimney sweeper's cry," "the hapless Soldier's 
sigh," and "the youthful Harlot's curse." Daily he 
beheld the comic yet tragic spectacle of the pro-
fessors at the Academy of Lagado energetically 
plying their trade and completely unmindful of the 
fact that reason can offer man no reason to live. 
Whitman's humane sentiments together with his 
passion for truth and his trying personal experi-
ences would not permit him to dismiss the problem 
of evil lightly. Those who contend he lacked the 
vision of evil have read him superficially or not at 
all. The existence of evil troubled Whitman almost 
as much as the fact of death. But his affirmative 
outlook soon persuaded him that there was really 
nothing to fret about. Evil was part of the ensem-
ble that Whitman loved so passionately. Hence, 
like death, it was to be celebrated rather than 
deprecated. Moreover, in time, the evolutionary 
process would dispose of it altogether: 152 
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For it the mystic evolution, 
Not the right only justified, what we call evil also justified. 
Out of the bulk, the morbid and the shallow, 
Out of the bad majority, the varied countless frauds of 
men and states, 
Electric, antiseptic yet, cleaving, suffusing all, 
Only the good is universal. 
From imperfection's murkiest cloud, 
Darts always forth one ray of perfect light. 
SONG OF THE UNIVERSAL, pp. 166-67 
We thus see that it is not out of indifference or 
insensitivity that Whitman is able to catalogue the 
ills of life with Buddhistic impassiveness. Rather 
it is because he believes that ultimately evil shall 
have no dominion. After reading Hegel, he carne to 
understand evil as being part of the antithesis 
which would engender the utopian synthesis: 
Roaming in thought over the Universe, I saw the little 
that is Good steadily hastening towards immortality, 
And the vast all that is call'd Evil I saw hastening to 
merge itself and become lost and dead. 
ROAMING IN THOUGHT, p. 198 
Nietzsche does not have substanially more to add. 
His doctrine of beyond good and evil is not a license 
for licentiousness and libertinisrn. He is not advo-
cating Ivan Karamazov's 'Everything is permitted.' 
Nietzsche was not so naive or depraved that he 
failed to appreciate the necessity for new values 
and laws to replace those which God's death had 
invalidated. Although he did wage a vigorous 
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hibitions, against placebos of the hereafter variety, 
and against all creators and values not directly of 
human issue, anarchy was no more Nietzsche's aim 
than it was Whitman's. Both were always mindful 
of the dangers and pitfalls that could easily attend 
the rule of conscienceless individuals and men-
Gods. Both displayed a diathesis for the superman, 
but never for a moment lost sight of the fact that 
one of its manifestations is the subhuman. Whit-
man anticipated Nie1zschein warning that, without 
Law and Conscience, none of his reforms could be 
implemented and bJrought to fruition. Whitman 
did say that the prime task of Democracy was to 
vindicate Individualism and the Individual, but he 
does not say that the best government is no govern-
ment: 
The purpose of democracy - supplanting old belief in the 
necessary absoluteness of establish'd dynastic rulership, 
temporal, ecclesiastical, and scholastic, as furnishing the 
only security against chaos, crime, and ignorance - is 
through many transmigrations and amid endless ridicules, 
arguments, and ostensible failures, to illustrate, at all 
hazards, this doctrine or theory that man, properly train'd 
in sanest, highest freedom, may and must become a law, 
and series of laws, unto himself, surrounding and pro'ciding 
for, not only his own personal control, but all his relations 
to other individuals, and the States; and that, ·while other 
theories, as in the past histories of nations, have proved 
wise enough, and indispensable perhaps for their con-
ditions, this, as matters now stand in our civilized world, 
is the only scheme worth working from, as warranting 
results like those of Nature's laws, reliable, when once 
establish'd to carry on themselves. 
Democracy too is a law, and of the strictest, amplest kind. 154 
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Many suppose (and often in its own ranks the error), that 
it means a throwing aside of law, of running riot. But, 
briefly, it is the superior law, not alone that of physical 
force, the body, which, adding to, it supersedes with that 
of the spirit. Law is the unshakable order of the universe 
forever; and the law over all, and law of laws, is the law of 
successions; that of the superior law, in time, gradually 
supplanting and overwhelming the inferior one. 
DEMOCRATIC VISTAS, pp. 464-65; 469 
Nietzsche distrusted the state more than Whitman 
did, but he would not have found very much to 
quarrel with in the above passage. Nietzsche des-
ignated good whatever was creative instead of 
traditional, whatever danced with wild abandon-
ment to the intangible and ineffable tarantella of 
life, whatever accepted proudly the burden of 
incertitude and inevitability, whatever was self-
seeking and self-assertive rather than self-demean-
ing and self-denying. His keen appraisal of human 
nature proved to him that what the Superman-
(who, it cannot be repeated too often, was closer to 
Emerson's 'individualist' than Carlyle's 'hero') -
willed was good. Nietzsche believed that he who 
possessed vitality and genius and who was un-
hampered by a deity's commandments, by cate-
gorical imperatives, or by a superego (shaped by 
social customs and herd prescriptions) not only 
exemplified goodness but also virtually defined 
what was good by whatever he did or did not do. 
Nietzsche called good not the man without consci-
ence but the man whose conscience was instinctual 
and fashioned by his own observations. Bad consci-
155 ence was explained by Nietzsche as the curse visited 
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upon all originality voiced in a society enslaved by 
the despotic heel of tradition. Evil is whatever 
depresses life's volant volatility, whatever debases 
life's splendent sublimity. Evil is the hatred of the 
this-worldly, the traducing of the passion for utter 
truth and honesty. Evil is whatever is insentient, 
illusory, or nihilistic. Moreover, since the condi-
tions which engender, incubate, harbor, and pro-
mote being vary and can never be thought of as 
absolutes, good and evil are at best expedient labels 
of nomenclature useful when, at any specified 
confluence in time and space, conditions both bene-
ficial and detrimental to life may be differentiated. 
It is self-evident that "good and evil that are not 
transitory, do not exist" (Zarathustra, Portable 
Nietzsche, p. 228). The free man (who, in Nietzsche, 
it must be resaid, is the enlightened man, not the 
criminal) recognizes the herd's arbitrary hair-
splitting as spurious. He rejects it with the same 
instinctive aversion he rejects the illusion on which 
it is erected - the promised justice and reward 
outside of time. For, by virtue of their ineluctable 
relativeness, good and evil obviate their legitimacy 
as value criteria within the eternal flux: 
All things have been baptized in the well of eternity and 
are beyond good and evil; and good and evil themselves are 
but intervening shadows and damp depressions and drift-
ing clouds. 
ZARATHUSTRA, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, pp. 277-78 
As previously observed in another connection, 
Nietzsche always opposed what appeared to him 
as the false distinction between this world, identi- 156 
GOOD AND EVIL 
fied with merely phenomenal reality, and the world 
beyond, identified with transcendent reality which 
was presumably truly eternal and really real. 
Nietzsche argued that it was all too easy to lose 
sight of the sacredness and innate nobility of life 
if one sustained himself solely on the hope that the 
world beyond would compensate him for the losses 
and failures he endured in this world. In his up-
goings and downgoings, Zarathustra, like Gulliver, 
learned that the title of Nardac, the highest honor 
Lilliput could bestow, was an empty honor in 
Brobdingnag or in England. One man's meat may 
be another man's poison; lilies that fester smell far 
worse than weeds. Nietzsche contended that the 
truly enlightened individual warred against the 
notion of ideals just as he warred against sickness. 
The Superman, totally liberated in himself, does 
not continue locked in time and history; he does 
not inhibit and imprison himself by the belief that 
he will reach perfection only if he directs himself to 
higher goals. Nietzsche believed man must arrive 
at a sense of identity independent of social struc-
ture and in contradiction to it. For man to discover 
his true self, which was inaccessible to socially 
conditioned perception, man must, like Zarathustra, 
first alienate himself from society and thus see 
through society's self-deception and orientative il-
lusions. The myth of eternal verities is just that -
a myth! There is only verity- and verity, whether 
one chooses to call it vice or virtue, good or evil, is 
purely the product of temporal, geographical, eth-
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~1uch that was good to one people was scorn and infamy 
to another: thus I found it. Much I found called evil here, 
and decked out with purple honors there. 
ZARATHUSTRA, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 170 
This was the logic on which Nietzsche based his 
prediction that, one day, good would cease to be 
done for moral reasons. 
As Whitman did before him, Nietzsche saw much 
which was unspeakc.bly ugly and loathsome in the 
world, but this did not diminish his love of life one 
iota more than it did Whitman's. As in Whitman's 
case, his love and faith were strengthened rather 
than undermined by the spectacle of the lex talionis. 
For him, as for \Vhitman, evolution was not an 
illustration of a death struggle for survival, but a 
triumphal pageant of life's irreparable serendipity 
and irrepressible proliferation: 
In nature the state of distress does not prevail, but super-
fluity, even prodigality to the extent of folly. The struggle 
for existence is only an exception, a temporary restriction 
of the will to live; the struggle, be it great or small, turns 
everywhere on predominance, on increase and expansion, 
on power, in conformity to the will to power, which is just 
the will to live. 
JOYFUL WISDOM, p. 290 
D. H. Lawrence's worship of the sun (and the life 
quickened by its briefly illuminating but unbeara-
bly brilliant rays) was shared alike by Whitman 
and Nietzsche. Both would have agreed with 
Wallace Stevens that "After the final no there 
comes a yes I And on that yes the future world 
depends. I No was the night. Yes is this present 158 
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sun" (The Well Dressed Man with a Beard). Whit-
man and Nietzsche perceived, as Lawrence did 
after them, that it was man's fear of death that 
made him recoil with horror from the more violent 
and passionate proofs of vitality. Although they 
did not falsify life by equating it too readily with 
intensity of physical sensation, for them, the 
seething cauldron of life was great beyond all gods. 
Zarathustra feels that the evocation of the grotes-
que and sinister affirms life as much as the cele-
bration of life's gemmy splendors. To Zarathustra, 
primeval chaos, dumb, unassuageable grief, a cica-
tricose world thrashing about with the torment of 
some inscrutable fatality, also conveyed an over-
whelming sense of life: 
I am delighted to see the wonders hatched by a hot sun: 
tigers and palms and rattlesnakes. Among men too a hot 
sun hatches a beautiful breed. And there are many won-
derful things in those who are evil. 
There is much filth in the world; that much is true. But 
that does not make the wodd itself a filthy monster. 
ZARATHUSTRA, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, pp. 255; 317 
Which is not to say Whitman and Nietzsche em-
braced evil as their good, or indulged in the roman-
tic paralogism of glorifying crime and childishly 
defying some unconscious (or, in the parlance of the 
pathetic fallacy, malignant) Almighty Ogre. The 
one important respect in which neither can be 
identified with the Romantic Rebel, the Great 
Defier, or located in the camp of the Satanists, is 
that, instead of bitterly resenting man's lot, each is 
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have the play reperformed endlessly; each shouts 
bravissimo and not only to the play but also to the 
players. Whitman and Nietzsche sought no Faustian 
pacts and found little to admire in the hero-villains 
of Vigny and Lermontov. They deemed themselves 
above worship of the chimerical and regarded 
Comstockery and the blasphemy of what exists as 
the despicable avocation of the flaneur or the petty 
petulence and malice of the impotent and demented. 
Their answer to the unhappiness in the world was 
not to augment it; their answer to the evil in the 
world, to the millions caught and exposed in Eich-
mann glass cages, to the millions foundering in 
Kafkian nightmares, to the millions suffering the 
agonies of Tennessee Williams' characters, was 
good deeds. Whitman (to the great annoyance of 
D. H. Lawrence) opined that "whoever walks a 
furlong without sympathy walks to his own funeral 
drest in his shroud" (Song of Myself, p. 66); and 
Nietzsche, though he theoretically scoffed at hu-
manitarianism for the same reasons he deplored 
traditional Christianity, proved, with his last lucid 
act of embracing a noble Houyhnhnm (a gesture 
Swift would surely have appreciated) that he 
actually was all compact of the milk of human 
kindness. Like the Matthew Arnold of Dover Beach, 
Whitman and Nietzsche were not unduly alarmed 
at the prospect of Christianity's death because they 
knew that the salient truth Christianity symbolized, 
the triumphant suffering of man, would live on and 
help mould man into one whom fate could never 
surprise nor death ever dismay. 160 
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Of course, any power ethic that exalts vitality 
with Spartan ruthlessness invites an inhuman, or, 
at the least, a non-human rationale which is irra-
tional in the very exorbitancy of its rationalism. 
Nietzsche's perfervid infatuation with lucidity 
eventuated not only in his own alienation but to a 
collective European insanity that has left the world, 
as it did Freud, baffled to the point of suicidal 
despair. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to agree 
with Albert Camus that, to the credit of his philo-
sophical integrity, Nietzsche faced up to the logical 
consequences of his reasoning without flinching. In 
contrast to Whitman who, in one passage, calls to 
his banner only the healthiest of the healthy, and, 
(faithfully adhering to his love of contradiction) in 
the following passage, summons to his colors all 
and sundry, including the degenerate and the 
debilitated, Nietzsche has no qualms in consigning 
to extermination those who would jeopardize the 
evolution of overman. Mindful that George B. 
Shaw was equally adamant where the Life Force 
was concerned, and bearing in mind that in Nietz-
sche's psychological construct pity always loomed 
as the greatest temptation (Zarathustra, Portable 
Nietzsche, p. 439), one may understand, even if one 
cannot agree with Nietzsche when he writes: 
What is good? Everything that heightens feeling of power 
in man, the will to power, power itself. 
What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness. 
What is happiness? The feeling that power is growing, 
that resistance is overcome. 
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not virtue but fitness (Renaissance virtue, virtu, virtue 
that is moraline-free). 
The weak and the failures shall perish: first principle of 
our love of man. And they shall even be given every 
possible assistance. 
THE ANTICHRIST, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 570 
By 'war' Nietzsche, of course, means intellectual 
not physical conflict. Nor should it be forgotten 
that he, too, loved contradiction. In one place, for 
example, he was able to say (and thereby play into 
the hands of the Rosen bergs of the world): "When 
the ends are great, humanity employs other stan-
dards and no longer judges crime as such even if it 
resorts to the most frightful means." (Quoted by 
Albert Camus in Tht~ Rebel, Alfred A. Knopf, New 
York, 1956, p. 77). Yet, almost in the same para-
graph, he could confess: "It is easy to talk about 
all sorts of immoral acts; but would one have the 
courage to carry them through? For example, I 
could not bear to break my word or to kill; I should 
languish, and eventually, I should die as a result 
~that would be my fate" (Ibid., p. 77). 
In general, the animus behind most of Nietzsche's 
reflections on good and evil is the ethic of person-
alism rather than the ethic of the power elite. 
From first to last, Nietzsche never stops reiterating 
that man must overcome himself: must, that is, 
liberate himself from the trammels and the shackles 
of the herd; must achieve the conquest of fear, 
which demeans life, and the conquest of humility, 
which insults life. Every prospective candidate for 
matriculation in the service of Zarathustra is sub- 162 
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jected to the scrutiny of the same question: "Can 
you give yourself your own evil and your own good 
and hang your own will over yourself as a law?" 
(Zarathustra, Portable Nietzsche, p. 175). Man's duty 
is to challenge and reassess everything anew; his 
highest calling is to be an energumen of life. So 
long as man fails to shoulder the onus of his own 
good and evil, mankind is left without a goal. So 
long as man abstains from grasping the reins of 
creation; so long as he does not comprehend that 
they are even now in his hands, waiting on his will, 
he remains a slave. So long as he chooses the 
cloudy palm of Olympus instead of the April green 
of Ithaca, he continues the dupe of superstition, 
the ally of illusion, and the traitor of life: 
\Vhat is good and evil no one knows yet, unless it be he 
who creates. He, however, creates man's goal and gives 
the earth its meaning and its future. That anything at all 
is good and evil - that is his creation. 
ZARATHUSTRA, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 308 
Until man breaks the old tablets, he is mired in the 
past, fails to adjudicate the present, and abdicates 
from his responsibility to the future. One becomes 
the creator of good and evil only by first destroying 
all values. Falsehoods regarding man's biological 
nature, and rationalizations for man's infirmities 
must be seen clearly for what they are. Truth in all 
her ragged harshness must be pursued and wooed 
assiduously and without constraint. All moral 
values based on misty idealism and not grounded 
on concrete reality must be scourged from life's 
163 temple. The virtue which proceeds from ignoring 
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or denying nature is no virtue at all; it is the worst 
of vices. The only evil is that which conceals and 
distorts truth, that which by imposing an imaginary 
meaning on life, prevents the discovery of its real 
meaning: 
Everything that the good call evil must come together so 
that one truth may be born. 0 my brothers, are you evil 
enough for this truth? The audacious daring, the long 
mistrust, the cruel No, the disgust, the cutting into the 
living- how rarely does all this come together. But from 
such seed is truth begotten. 
ZARATHUSTRA, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, p. 312 
The consideration which directs Zarathustra to 
teach that "Man must become better and more 
evil," (Zarathustra, Portable Nietzsche, p. 400) is the 
same consideration which influences Odysseus to 
identify himself and to taunt the tormented Poly-
phemous- thereby jeopardizing an escape well-nigh 
accomplished. 
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The peculiar intensity of emphasis many pretend to 
discover in the staunch advocacy of male friends in 
Whitman and Nietzsche can be shown- where it is 
not an undigested gob of pruriency in the pretend-
ers -to be entirely logical and quite normal. After 
all, an Ancient Mariner will always reserve a special 
room in his heart's mansion for that wedding guest 
who gratifyingly listens without benefit of mes-
meric coercion. Christ at Gethsemane has consoled 
many poets and philosophers, among others, who 
failed of a receptive hearing in their own day. The 
touching devotion of his pupils and friends con-
tributes immensely to the ritualistic solemnity of 
Socrates' trial and death, which contain all the 
terrible beauty of a classical Greek tragedy. 
Few passages in Whitman and Nietzsche are 
more moving than those which disclose their op-
pressive sense of loneliness. Like the mental flights 
of Blake, the mecca to Walden Pond by Thoreau, 
the voyages to the South Seas by Melville, the 
erethistic peregrinations of D. H. Lawrence, Whit-
man's and Nietzsche's imaginary journeys - which 
they are continually tramping, always, like the 
prophets of old, carrying a staff - emphasize their 
need for a friendly hearing as well as their state of 
solitariness. Whitman's raucous appetency for gre-
gariousness bespeaks his gnawing sense of aloneness. 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra invariably interrupts his 
enforced santon-like existence to return to the city 
and once more sharply attack the mindless somno-
lence of doltish man. Each found and failed to find 
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which Hawthorne, another one-time resident at 
Solitude Hostelry, found through Sophia Peabody. 
Whitman's threnody on Lincoln (wherein the mel-
ancholy of bereavement is attenuated by the lyric 
articulation of amor fati) voices a preternatural 
sense of sundering as do Nietzsche's reflections on 
his break with Wagner. In both instances, the fact 
that the emotion is authentic yet disproportionately 
magnified, calls attention to the unsatisfied desire 
for companionship, and helps explain the extreme 
lengths (surrogate objects, fictive creations, ethnic 
and universal identifications) each vainly employed 
to fulfill his exigency for an understanding friend. 
Anxious for an audience, and convinced, with the 
cocksureness of genius, of their right to an audience, 
nay, of the world's danger should it fail to grant 
them an audience, it is understandable that Whit-
man and Nietzsche should, when refused the ears 
of the many, seek, if only in reverie, for the select 
few who might appreciate them. Like Christ, 
Whitman and Nietzsche construed brotherhood 
literally as man's love for man. More than likely, it 
was asceticism rather than inversion that led them 
to believe the love of man for man, unmotivated 
(or so it seemed to them) by vanity, convention, or 
connubial and concupiscent notions, could be more 
noble and altruistic than love of man for woman. 
Furthermore, all precedents directed that disciples 
be of male gender; history and male chauvinism 
enjoined that the shapers and men-gods of the 
future, though woman-born, be men. It is naive to 
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of Western Civilization \vhich antedates Christiani-
ty by several centuries. In addition, it may be 
pointed out (although Mrs. Anne Gilchrist and the 
female devotees and votaries of D. H. Lawrence 
might be cited in the way of refutation) that the 
athletic programs and outdoors regimens of Whit-
man and Nietzsche (aside from being vague and 
visionary rather than pragmatic and practicable) 
were scarcely geared to my lady's tastes and talents. 
The conditions and environs under which Whitman 
and Nietzsche would have felt most at ease and 
would have been able to breathe most freely, would 
not have seemed particularly felicific to most cats, 
women, and wives. Though he may give himself 
over entirely to the effort, one is sure to experience 
difficulty in attempting to visualize a maenadic 
German Countess swirling through a czardas with 
Zarathustra. Nor is it easier to picture an Emily 
Dickinson, without reserve or constraint, strolling 
with eurythmy on Broadway, Whitman's left hand 
hooking her round the waist, his right hand point-
ing to landscapes, while she chants an antiphonic 
accompaniment to his mostly spry, occasionally 
torpid measures. Shaw's New Woman not yet 
having been evolved Whitman and Nietzsche pru-
dently, albeit with many a backward glance, sought 
out Siegfrieds only, in the certain knowledge that, 
wherever Siegfried went, Briinnehilde would be sure 
to follow. 
Scabrous succubi, soi-disant literary analysts, 
have, like insolent Catilines, abused our patience 
167 long enough. When they tell us Whitman's cele-
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bration of the friend is anything more or anything 
less than a protest against the cruelty, hypocrisy, 
deceit, and callousness inhering in the relations 
between man and his fellow, they speak less than 
truth. Such cozeners were rebuked (although, alas, 
not for once and for all) by Whitman himself: 
The special meaning of the "Calamus" cluster of Leaves of 
Grass ... mainly resides in its Political significance. In my 
opinion, it is by a f~rvent, accepted development of 
Comradeship, the beautiful and sane affection of man for 
man, latent in all the young fellows, North and South, 
East and West - it is by this, I say, and by what goes 
directly and indirectly along with it, that the United 
States of the future ... are to be most effectually welded 
together, intercalated, anneal'd into a Living Union. 
Footnote in PREFACE, 1876, p. 438 
\Vhitman's verse bears out this prose pronounce-
ment in every particular. Love, respect, and rever-
ence of the friend was to ·whitman and Nietzsche 
love, respect, and reverence of the self and the self 
in the friend. To Whitman, as to Nietzsche, love 
was more than the procreative urge; to both, it was 
the kelson of creation, the leaven from which would 
spring the breed of sun-delighting gods the whence 
of whose past and the whither of whose future 
would be testified to only by the dew upon their 
feet: 
I will sing the song of companionship, 
I will write the evangel-poem of comrades and of love, 
For who but I should understand love with all its sorrows 
and joy? 
And who but I should be the poet of comrades? 
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Ultimately, we return to the myth of Prometheus. 
For was it not love of man that inspired the first 
rebel's rebellion? And was it not this same love 
that innured humanity's staunch champion to 
undeserved torture, that strengthened the energy 
of his resolve to continue his defiance of Zeus, that 
ennobled his agonies, that taught man the most 
"godlike crime was to be kind"? Among people of 
great intelligence and sensitivity, the inclination 
towards vagabondage, fostered by a distaste for a 
society dependent for its existence on orientative 
illusions, continually conflicts with the inclination 
towards gregariousness, fostered by the deeply 
tragic insight into man's fallibilities and man's 
dubious gift to be able to be at once the subject and 
object of his meditations. Like Pascal, Swift, and 
Stevenson, among others, Whitman and Nietzsche 
saw quite lucidly man's degeneracy as well as man's 
nobility. Though they assailed many of man's 
vices, his supererogatory twaddle of categorical 
imperatives, and his topsy-turvy constructs of just 
and unjust, their faith in man's essential worthiness 
and in his ability to become better remained as 
firm as the Rock of Gibraltar. They loved man for 
himself, not only because they were human them-
selves. At the same time, they recognized that 
man's fate would increasingly depend on his main-
taining harmonious, considerate, compassionate 
relations with other men. For, despite all his sym-
bols, and tokens, and organizations, and relation-
ships, suggesting companionability, sociability, and 
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desperately "alone, alone, all, all alone." That is 
one reason why the notions of love and friendship 
figure so conspicuously in their work. 
The cartoons of his day did Whitman scant 
justice in depicting him as a roly-poly Falstaff or 
as one of the Cheeryble brothers. More introspec-
tive than extroverted, more tender than robust, 
more compassionate than erotic, more pathetic 
than insolent, more profound than naive, more 
delicate than agrestic, more sensitive than lusty, he 
was more the man of sorrows than he was Panta-
gruel. A savior in search of salvation, a messiah in 
search of a people, 1Nhitman devoted so many of 
his omnivorous lines to love because the fear of 
loneliness is often more terrifying than the fear of 
death. Throughout his work, he consistently and 
most appropriately uses the metaphor of Cupid's 
life-affirming handiwork to give expression to his 
Personalism, to make clear his belief that, until 
man learns to see his fellow man as a distinct 
identity, different from, but not subordinate to his 
own identity, he gropes in a Minoan maze, the 
wandering outlaw of his own dark mind. Whitman 
held that love unified all existence. Participation 
in the act of love he viewed as the symbol of a 
deeper participation, of participation in cosmic 
unity and human unison. The man-hating, life-
despising, no-saying Minotaur, Nihilism, daily de-
vours him who has not attained self-trust and self-
mastery, who has not acquired the courage to love 
his fellow man. In Whitman's eyes, Blake's Satanic 
Mills and Lawrence's accursed machines were not 170 
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irreparably, if at all, Satanic and accursed. Whit-
man's religion did not exclude the industrial phase 
of life. He believed industrialism could be both 
beneficial and beautiful. (Whitman anticipates 
Hart Crane, Carl Sandburg, T. S. Eliot, and Stephen 
Spender, among others, in finding the industrial 
scene a fit subject for poetry.) But he insisted that 
human relations be exempt from commercial con-
siderations; that man's relation to man always take 
precedence over man's relation to the machine. If 
he were remembered for anything, Whitman ;vished 
to be remembered for his all-embracing love. For 
is not the measure of the intensity of love, measure, 
also, of earth's verve? 
J{ecorders ages hence, 
Come, I will take you down underneath this impassive 
exterior, I will tell you what to say of me, 
Publish my name and hang up my picture as that of the 
tenderest lover, 
The friend the lover's portrait, of whom his friend his 
lover was fondest, 
Who was not proud of his songs, but of the measureless 
ocean of love within him, and freely pour'd it forth, 
Who often walk'd lonesome walks thinking of his dear 
friends, his lovers, 
\Vhose happiest days were far away through fields, in 
woods, on hills, he and another wandering hand in 
hand, they twain apart from other men. 
RECORDERS AGES HENCE, pp. 89-90 
Whitman and Nietzsche were astute enough to see 
that man is unworthy of the creator's godhead 
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concomitant impulse, the impulse to destroy. Un-
less man wills otherwise, man's creations, not to 
mention himself, are doomed. Civilization cannot 
be saved solely by institutions, solely by the cre-
ations of the creators. It can only be saved by 
those strong enough to aspire to no more for them-
selves than for their coevals. Only love and respect 
for man, not fear and worship of man's inventions, 
can preserve life. Of such was the kingdom of 
Whitman: 
I hear it was charged against me that I sought to destroy 
institutions, 
But really I am neither for nor against institutions, 
Only I will establish in the Mannahatta and in every city 
of these States inland and seaboard, 
Without edifices or rules or trustees or any argument, 
The institution of the clear love of comrades. 
I HEAR IT WAS CHARGED AGAINST ME, p. 94 
Those that go their own gait, erect, stepping with freedom 
and command, leading not following, 
Those with a never-quell'd audacity, those with sweet and 
lusty flesh clear of taint, 
Those that look carelessly in the faces of Presidents and 
governors, as to say Who are you? 
Those of earth-born passion, simple, never constrain'd, 
never obedient. 
THE PRAIRIE-GRASS DIVIDING, p. 94 
Here, indeed, are Whitman's "frailest leaves," 
which, nonetheless, are his "strongest lasting" since 
they reveal no murky intent of the unconscious but 
the all too painfully conscious reflection that men 172 
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must love one another or die (Here the Frailest 
Leaves of Me, p. 95). And, in a lighter vein, remi-
niscent of Marlowe's dictum, and anticipatory of 
Nietzsche's theorizing on sublimation, Whitman 
writes: 
Now I think there is no unreturn'd love, the pay is certain 
one way or another, 
(I loved a certain person ardently and my love was not 
return'd, 
Yet out of that I have written these songs.) 
SOMETIMES WITH ONE I LOVE, p. 97 
Commonplace the thought and experience, - true. 
But not quite so commonplace the conscious, un-
embarrassed admission of it. Of a kind with the 
parade of the bleeding heart, endemic to Werthers 
and Manfreds, yet with a difference. The typical 
Weltschmerz- coupled, however, with a philosophi-
cal resignation unknown to the intemperate passion 
of a Lara. Indissolubly intertwined with the 
unashamed confessional aspect, we discern the 
profounder awareness that life is sweet even in its 
bitterness, that love is the beginning of life and the 
ending of life, the be-ali and end-all of existence. 
The thought also faintly echoes Emerson's notion 
of compensation and brings to mind the section, 
"The Dance Song," from the second part of Zara-
thustra where the philosopher describes his two 
great loves, the maidens, Love and Wisdom, and 
declares for the former. Perhaps Nietzsche's per-
sonal experience was not as shattering as biogra-
phers Schyberg and Asselineau assure us Whitman's 
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truth that to live was to love and to love was to 
lose: 
There is bitterness in the cup of even the best love: thus 
it arouses longing for the Superman, thus it arouses thirst 
in you, the creator! 
From the heart of me I love only Life - and in truth, 
I love her most of all when I hate her! 
But that I am fond oi Wisdom, and often too fond, is 
because she very much reminds me of Life! 
ZARATHUST~A, Hollingdale, pp. 96; 132 
Whitman and Nietzsche knew disappointment and 
despair not intermittently, or on one or two isolated 
occasions, but almost constantly. But their love 
of "infinite, teeming, mocking life" (Broadway, 
Leaves of Grass, p. 360) always saw them through 
their darkest hours and gravest doubts. At sixty-
nine, despite his "wreck'd, old, poor and paralyzed" 
body, Whitman was still carolling "the undimin-
ish'd faith- the groups of loving friends" (A Carol 
Closing Sixty-nine, Leaves of Grass, p. 352). 
Like Whitman, Nietzsche's first demand upon 
would-be companions is that they be daring and 
predisposed to honor the master because they 
honor themselves. They must be able to share his 
gladness in the ostracism visited upon the uncon-
ventional. Likewise, they must love life beyond all 
reason, beyond all vestige of the simulacrum of true 
love- pity. They must be one with him in finding 
the goal and meaning of life in creation, in recog-
nizing that only where there are graves are there 
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ant-swarm inanity, in remaining true to the earth. 
They must turn away from those herdsmen who 
revile the temporal and hold up for a worthy prize 
the eternal, perfect life. Zarathustra detests such 
herdsmen because they not only breed a contempt 
for the real life but because, by insinuating that 
only the weak and the suffering can attain a higher 
life, they, in effect, suggest that the aim of life is to 
afflict oneself with as much misery and pain as 
one can: 
A light has dawned for me: I need companions, living 
ones .... I need living companions who follow me because 
they want to follow themselves - and who want to go 
where I want to go. . .. Zarathustra shall not be herdsman 
and dog to the herd! To lure many away from the herd-
that is why I have come. The people and the herd shall 
be angry with me: the herdsmen shall call Zarathustra a 
robber. 
I say herdsmen, but they call themselves the good and the 
just. I say herdsmen: but they call themselves the faithful 
of the true faith. 
Behold the good and the just! Whom do they hate most? 
Him who smashes their tables of values, the breaker, the 
lawbreaker -but he is the creator. 
Behold the faithful of all faiths! Whom do they hate the 
most? Him who smashes their tables of values, the break-
er, the law-breaker- but he is the creator. 
The creator seeks companions, not corpses or herds or 
believers. 
The creator seeks fellow-creators, those who inscribe new 
values on new tables. 
The creator seeks companions and fellow-harvesters: for 
with him everything is ripe for harvesting .... 
The creator seeks companions and such as know how to 
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despisers of good and evil. But they are harvesters and 
rejoicers. . .. I will make company with creators, with 
harvesters, with rejoicers: I will show them the rainbow 
and the stairway to the Superman. 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 51-52 
Nietzsche interpreted salvation by faith to mean 
that the heart alone, not knowledge, could bring 
man happiness. Similarly, to Nietzsche, the incar-
nation of God signified that man should not seek 
his salvation in infinity but should found his heaven 
on earth. It was not Zarathustra's way to teach 
his followers a reassuring faith or meticulously 
chart their course; like Whitman, he preferred to 
hurl the novice into the brine and abandon him to 
his own devices. For the Superman, Nietzsche 
wished the sapient, candid self-searching that 
would drive him into a cul-de-sac out of which he 
would be able to emerge only by finding a means of 
affirming life without negating this world, the 
world which for man is the only real one. 
Nietzsche's thoughts on friendship may be under-
stood in terms of his doctrine of self-perfection. In 
a paradox hardly original, he tells us our best 
friends may actually be found in the ranks of our 
worst enemies. And, somewhat more originally, he 
argues that, if you seek a friend, you must be 
prepared to fight in his behalf; and, in order to be 
able to fight, you must be capable of becoming a 
formidable adversary, a pestering gadfly. Friend-
ship must not preclude obeying or commanding. 
Friendship is counterfeit and futile if you become 
enslaved by the one whom you befriend. Nor is 176 
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friendship fruitful when you choose for a friend 
someone who is unsure of himself, someone who 
lacks conviction, someone who requires of you 
mainly pity. The true friend is he who faithfully 
mirrors you to yourself. He whose masquerade of 
friendship is just that - a transparent disguise for 
parasitism - does not deserve your consideration. 
Would the sun be happy without those for whom 
it shines? And, conversely, where would man be, if 
anywhere, without the sun? Friendship should be 
altruistic: giving should afford more joy than re-
ceiving. Nietzsche believed, as Whitman did, that 
friendship was to play a crucial role in evolving 
Superman. For both, friendship was a means of 
challenging oneself to renewed and more vigorous 
effort in realizing the new dawn: 
Alas, for all hermits there are too many depths. That is 
why they long so much for a friend and for his heights. 
In your friend you should possess your best enemy. Your 
heart should feel closest to him when you oppose him. 
You cannot adorn yourself too well for your friend: for 
you should be to him an arrow and a longing for the 
Superman. Have you ever watched your friend asleep -
to discover what he looked like? Yet your friend's face is 
something else beside. It is your own face, in a rough and 
imperfect mirror. 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 82-83 
Because one's neighbor is not always one's equal, 
and, consequently, is more likely to call forth pity 
instead of a desire to emulate and surpass, Zara-
177 thustra teaches not "the neighbour but the friend" 
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(Zarathustra, Hollingdale, p. 87). Because love of 
one's neighbor is an abortive if not invidious escape 
from hatred of oneself, Zarathustra will befriend 
only those who are "free from the happiness of 
serfs, redeemed from gods and worship, fearless and 
fearful, great and solitary" (Zarath~tstra, Rolling-
dale, p. 127). Only those who have become summer 
entirely and summer-noonday merit the honor of 
being companions to Zarathustra: 
Are you a slave? If so, you cannot be a friend. Are you a 
tyrant? If so, you cannot have friends. 
In woman, a slave and a tyrant have all too long been 
concealed. For that reason, woman is not yet capable of 
friendship: she knows only love. 
'You should always be the first and outrival all others: 
your jealous soul should love no one, except your friend'-
this precept made the soul of a Greek tremble: in following 
it he followed his path to greatness. 
ZARATHUSTRA, HolJingdale, pp. 83; 85 
The friend must not conceal one who puts his faith 
in others only because of an incapacity to have 
faith in himself. Man must not think to lose or find 
himself in the friend. Solitude is only a prison to 
those who do not love themselves sufficiently. In 
the first place, the friend should be a diligent pupil 
of Zarathustra's teachings; in the second place, he 
should be desirous of surpassing his master instead 
of using him as a crutch; and, in the third place, he 
should approach one step closer to the ideal en-
visioned by his master, to the ideal of the man who 
has overcome himself, to the ideal of the Superman. 
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sought either the potential for the superhuman or, 
at the least, the aspiration to contribute to the 
evolvement of the superhuman. In Zarathustra, 
comrade-catechumen and Superman are closely 
identified for several reasons: Nietzsche adduces 
Zarathustra as Superman; Nietzsche intends Zara-
thustra's teachings to point out the road to the 
superhuman; and Nietzsche wishes to imply only 
a Zarathustra, or a reasonable facsimile thereof, is 
deserving of his company and instruction. Nietz-
sche's search for the friend and quest for the Super-
man frequently reduces to Nietzsche's search for 
Nietzsche or Nietzsche's quest for Nietzsche's 
Doppelganger. Nietzsche, like Whitman, recalls 
Narcissus. 
In an oft-quoted letter to his sister in 1886, 
Nietzsche wrote that a man of spiritual depth 
craves friends unless he still has God as a friend, 
but that he (Nietzsche) had neither God nor friends. 
It, therefore, appears that Nietzsche demanded 
much more from the friend than did Socrates; in the 
friend, in the future Overlords of the Earth, in 
himself, Nietzsche frantically tried to find a suc-
cedaneum for the God-Man he deemed dead. The 
melancholy spectacle, the disintegration of tra-
ditional religious belief, led Arnold to Dover Beach 
and Sweetness and Light; it led Nietzsche to the 
Man-God. Yet, no matter how often he susurrated 
to himself the incantation - 'The world is myself. 
Life is myself. God is in me or else is not at all.' -
he could neither realize the glow of reassurance his 
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the m1sg1vmgs evoked by his recall of Luther's 
words that one genuflects before God or an idol. 
Somewhat like Whitman who, though he bdieved 
in the divinity of Self, found it necessary to believe 
in the divinity of God as well before he could be 
perfectly at peace with himself, Nietzsche learned 
that the usurpation of God's Throne by Man's Ego 
left something to be desired. Notwithstanding, 
Nietzsche remained as true (if not truer) to his love, 
the Superman, than did Arnold to his love in Dover 
Beach. Nietzsche was no weathercock ready to 
capitulate with whimpers before life's nihility. 
There are mystical elements in Whitman and 
Nietzsche, but neither was a mystic and both were 
largely existential in their attitudes towards death 
and in their insistence on selfness as opposed to 
selflessness. As has been adumbrated, both viewed 
a stoic indifference to death as cowardice rather 
than courage, as a form of escape from reality, as 
a refusal to confront life. They told man to go 
through life constantly aware of the prospect of his 
certain death, constantly wary lest his death on the 
morrow render his life meaningless. They explained 
that, by boldly and intrepidly facing the inevita-
bility of the final and ultimate nothingness, man 
conquers time and death; and that, by concen-
trating on what is subject to time and death, man 
makes of death a constitutive part of life. Whitman 
and Nietzsche did not conceal from themselves 
either the reality or the horror of death, which they 
found not only at the end of life but also in life's 
midst (in the form of sleep, sickness, and suffering). 180 
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They would have found it impossible to say with 
St. Teresa "N!uero porque no muero" (I am dying 
because I cannot die). For them, life was the 
elimination of what was dead. They cherished the 
individual above all else and placed a greater em-
phasis on the "I" than on the "It." 
But, whereas Whitman was inclined to stop with 
man, Nietzsche would not hear of any such thing. 
He argued that man is not an end in himself; that 
man is a bridge to an end higher than himself. 
However, before man can attain that higher end he 
must relearn how to despise himself. (The Super-
man, once bred, would, in turn, be replaced by 
another who, by adhering to his own good and evil, 
would repudiate his predecessor's and, at the same 
time, prepare the way for his own eventual disap-
pearance and supersedure.) Man must acknowledge, 
that is, his shortcomings; and, once having ac-
knowledged them, he must overcome them, and 
must never thereafter suffer their resurgence. He 
must pursue perfection (the perfection defined by 
his own standards) and, towards that end, must 
not hesitate to demolish whatever blocks his path. 
Nietzsche held that the basic principle of life was 
the unceasing evolutionary process whereby life 
perpetually sought to surpass itself, to elevate itself 
from the level it occupied at any particular time to 
a higher level, to reject the goal recently achieved 
as vain and set its sights on a more distant goal, 
not necessarily a higher goal but at least a different 
goal, perhaps even a contrary goal: 
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I teach you the friend in whom the world stands com-
plete, a vessel of the good- the creative friend, who always 
has a complete world to bestow. 
And as the world once dispersed for him, so it comes back 
to him again, as the evolution of good through evil, as the 
evolution of design from chance. 
May the future and the most distant be the principle of 
your today: in your friend you should love the Superman 
as your principle. 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, p. 88 
At the same time, Zarathustra, in one of many 
climactic valedictories, tells those who wish to serve 
under his aegis, those who aspire to be creators 
(that is, men whose values are of their own making 
and not the illusions of listless conformity, men 
whose reach exceeds their grasp, men whose goal 
never fails their aspiration) that the road they will 
be required to take afoot with their vision will be 
treacherous and infested with homicidal renegades 
and pistareen officialdom. As pedestrians on this 
road, they will experience the solitude which is 
"Zero at the Bone." They will know gethsemane. 
They will be strangers in another country, astro-
nauts hurtling through the visible darkness and icy 
stillness of space, wandering exiles around whose 
collective neck an albatross, the deadweight of sole 
responsibility, will hang heavy. They must forearm 
themselves against the suicidal nihilism of Dos-
toievski's Stavrogin and against the despairing 
futilitarianism issuing from a sense of life's pur-
poselessness. Above all, they must constantly be 
on guard lest, out of pity for man or out of their 
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their own destruction by conceding society's illu-
sory authority and authoritarian illusions: 
It is terrible to be alone with the judge and avenger of 
one's own law. It is to be like a star thrown forth into 
empty space and into the icy breath of solitude. . .. 
. . . One day solitude will make you weary. 
you will cry: 'I am alone!' ... 
. . . One day you will cry: 'Everything is false!' 
One day 
Be on your guard, too, against holy simplicity! Every-
thing which is not simple is unholy to it: and it too,likes to 
play with fire - in this case, the fire of the stake. 
And be on your guard, too, against the assaults your love 
makes upon you! The solitary extends his hand too 
quickly to anyone he meets. 
To many men, you ought not to give your hand, but only 
your paw: and I should like it if your paw had claws, too. 
You must be ready to burn yourself in your own flame: 
how could you become new, if you had not first become 
ashes? 
Go apart and be alone with my tears, my brothers. I love 
him who wants to create beyond himself, and thus perishes. 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 89-91 
Patently, therefore, friend meant considerably more 
to Whitman and Nietzsche than is generally under-
stood by amicus or cp[Aoc;. Friend meant more to 
them than confidant, alter ego, and disciple although 
it meant these relationships also. They desired 
friends because they were human and yearned for 
companionship and because they were idealistic 
and desired to enlighten as many as they could. In 
183 addition, however, they desired friends for a reason 
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some might designate utilitarian rather than hu-
manistic: they prized the friend very much in the 
manner Shaw prized the human male drone and 
the New Woman - as precursors of the superior 
men of tomorrow. Nietzsche's Overman, in any 
event, is closer to Shaw's Superman than to Carlyle's 
Great Man. The prefix, over-, in Overman (tiber-
mensch) refers to man's overcoming (iiberwunden) 
himself, to man's conquest of his craving for domina-
tion. It should not be understood as referring to 
the strong man's dictatorial rule over the weak, the 
gullible, and the enslaved. Nor should it be used to 
designate one who considers himself above all laws 
and constraints, one whose disbelief in all values 
leads him not to a revaluation but to rapine and 
murder. Anarchy, like tyranny, is also slavery. 
Nietzsche's ideal is not a power-crazed, barbaric 
brigand intent on sating his appetites rather than 
transcending his animal ancestry. Nietzsche's ideal 
is the man who knows freedom is responsibility. 
The Nietzschean Superman is the man who by 
consenting to the world's divinity consents also to 
its repeated reproduction in the course of its eternal 
gyrations, and hence becomes creator of it and 
himself. Judge and avenger of his own law, pos-
sessor of a new type of anguish and a new type of 
happiness- a joy deeper than woe-theNietzschean 
Superman is easily able to effect Shelley's alchemy: 
to transform utter desolation into gustatory delight 
in our polymorphic world; to extract from his 
sickness unto death the strength to transcend re-
nunciation and resignation and to conquer freedom 184 
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and life anew every day; to transmute the agonies 
and pangs of loneliness into the milk and honey of 
his affirmative insight. 
Nietzsche did not agree with Schopenhauer that 
the basic drive in all human beings is the will to 
life. He did not think that the Darwinian struggle 
for survival, the biological instinct of self-preser-
vation enjoyed the primacy in human behavior. 
For the will to life, he substituted the will to power. 
More than pity (or compassion), more than love 
(sex), more than life itself, Nietzsche maintained, 
man desires power, self-aggrandizement (and is 
prepared to risk and lose his life in the effort to 
fulfill this desire). Hence history's abundant re-
cords of Master- &-Slave civilizations, perpetually 
reenacting the drama of the subjugation of the 
weaker by the stronger and the worship of the 
stronger by the weaker. Hence the bloody revo-
lutions whenever the will of the servant was found 
to contain the will to be master. And hence, too, 
the self-immolation of the strongest, for "as the 
lesser surrenders to the greater, that it may have 
delight and power over the weakest of all, so the 
greatest, too, surrenders and for the sake of power 
stakes - life" (Zarathustra, Hollingdale, p. 138). 
The Overman, however, Nietzsche explains, is the 
man who is not seduced by this will to power, who 
does not yield to its importunities, who does not 
identify right with might. The Overman is the man 
who has overcome the man in himself, who has 
sublimated the will to power into creative efflux. 
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examples. The world must either produce such 
men or risk perishing in an abortive effort to 
satisfy Bellona's insatiability. Only such men, 
Nietzsche averred, could forestall the nihilistic a-
pocalypse (which threatens and will surely come to 
pass in the twentieth century) by instituting a new 
renaissance: 
Watch and listen, you solitaries! From the future come 
winds with a stealthy flapping of wings; and good tidings 
go out to delicate ears. 
You solitaries of today, you who have seceded from society, 
you shall one day be a people: from you, who have chosen 
out yourselves, shall a chosen people spring - and from 
this chosen people, the Superman. 
Truly, the earth shall yet become a house of healing! And 
already a new odour floats about it, an odour that brings 
health- and a new hope! 
ZARATHUSTRA, Ho!lingdale, pp. 102-103 
Only by the rise of such men, Nietzsche belileved, 
could the death of God prove a blessing in disguise. 
And, evidently, it was precisely of such men that 
Whitman was thinking when he wrote: 
There will soon be no more priests ... A superior breed 
shall take their place . . . the gangs of the kosmos and 
prophets en masse shall take their place. A new order 
shall arise and they shall be the priests of man, and every 
man shall be his own priest. The churches built under 
their umbrage shall be the churches of men and women. 
Through the divinity of themselves shall the kosmos 
and the new breed of poets be interpreters of men and 
women and of all events and things. 
PREFACE, 1855, p. 425 
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quently, the link to the future, the sacrificial 
firstling who, like themselves, had to suffer im-
molation in order to clear the passage to India and 
Zoroaster, the passage to more than India and 
Zoroaster. They went before; the friends brought 
up the rear. To their John the Baptist, the friends 
must be the Christ. Whitman confidently waited 
upon the future not only to accord him the fame 
and acclaim he reaped in insufficient amounts while 
alive, but also to bring forth those stalwart youths 
and nubile maidens who were to fulfill the poet's 
American Dream. With characteristic assurance, 
he foretold 
A new race dominating prevwus ones and grander far, 
with new contests, 
New politics, new literatures and religions, new inventions 
and arts. 
STARTING FROM PAUMANOK, p. 23 
By such denizens of Whitman's American Canaan, 
Whitman was to be vindicated: 
Poets to come! orators, singers, musicians to come! 
Not to-day is to justify me and answer what I am for, 
But you, a new brood, native, athletic, continental, 
greater than before known, 
Arouse! for you must justify me. 
I myself but write one or two indicative words for the 
future, 
I but advance a moment only to wheel and hurry back in 
the darkness. 
I am a man who, sauntering along without fully stopping, 
187 turns a casual look upon you and then averts his face, 
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Leaving it to you to prove and define it, 
Expecting the main things from you. 
POETS TO COME, p. 13 
Nietzsche indulged in the same hope (or rational-
ization): 
I go among this people and let fall many a word; but they 
know neither how to take nor to keep. 
They are surprised that I have not come to rail at their 
lusts and vices; and truly, I have not come to warn 
against pickpockets, either! 
I am Zarathustra the Godless: where shall I find my equal? 
All those who give themselves their own will and renounce 
all submission, they are my equals. 
Oh, that you understood my saying: 'Always do what you 
will- but first be such as can will!' 
'Always love your neighbors as yourselves -but first be 
such as love themselves -
'such as love with a great love, such as love with a great 
contempt!' Thus speaks Zarathustra the Godless. 
But why do I speak where no one has my kind of ears? 
Here it is yet an hour too early for me. 
Among this people I am my own forerunner, my own 
cock-crow through dark lanes. 
But their hour is coming! And mine too is coming! 
Hourly will they become smaller, poorer, more barren 
-poor weeds! poor soil! 
And soon they shall stand before me like arid grass and 
steppe, and truly! weary of themselves- and longing 
for fire rather than for water! 
0 blessed hour of the lightning! 0 mystery before noon-
tide! One day I shall turn them into running fire and 
heralds with tongues of flame -
one day they shall proclaim with tongues of flame: It is 
coming, it is near, the great noontide! 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 190-192 188 
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Like Whitman, moreover, Zarathustra called for 
superior offspring. Zarathustra taught that one 
should avoid rushing into marriage recklessly lest 
his wedlock prove a bad lock and eventuate in 
adultery, or, what is worse, in the malcontent's 
paranoia. Pairing should be allowed before mar-
riage to ascertain true love and genuine compati-
bility. When, and only when love and compati-
bility had been concretely demonstrated, should 
couples be allowed to risk the deep plunge into 
matrimony. For only marriage partners well-ad-
justed and suited to each other would be able "not 
merely to reproduce, but to produce something 
higher," i.e., the Superman (Zarathustra, Portable 
Nietzsche, p. 323). 
Whitman and Nietzsche envisioned the way to 
the man of tomorrow as the conquest and recla-
mation of the quicksands of tradition and morality, 
as a titanic agon with all tergiversators of life, as a 
crusade against the Christian-pie-in-the-sky vul-
nerary adhibited as a cure-all by the vulpine after-
lifers. (Nietzsche's coinage is Hinterwelter: those 
who believe in an after life; afterworldsmen.) 
Whitman and Nietzsche knew the would-be trav-
eler on their widely-heralded road would need the 
audacity and enterprise of Odysseus as well as the 
strength and perseverance of Hercules. This em prise 
of emprises would require a strong being, an earnest 
and stout person capable of yoking destiny and 
charting his nation's course: 
189 All waits or goes by default till a strong being appears; 
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A strong being is the proof of the race and of the ability of 
the universe, 
When he or she appears materials are overaw'd, 
The dispute on the soul stops, 
The old customs and phrases are confronted, turn'd back, 
or laid away. 
SONG O:F THE BROAD-AXE, p. 139 
To such strong beings, Whitman and Nietzsche 
ascribed the cognomen, pioneers. Whitman mus-
ters his trailblazers to the colors with stirring mar-
tial strains; his rousing reveille melds with the roll 
of the band's booming drums. Whitman is deter-
mined to rouse from lethargy those lulled into 
semi-stupor by the lotus weeds of despair, diffi-
dence, dismay, and dysphoria: 
We must march my darlings, we must bear the brunt of 
danger, ... 
All the past we leave behind, ... 
Conquering, holding, daring, venturing as we go the un-
known ways, ... 
0 I mourn and yet exult, I am rapt with love for all, ... 
Raise the mighty mother mistress, 
'Waving high the delicate mistress, over all the starry 
mistress, (bend your heads all,) 
Raise the fang'd and warlike mistress, stern, impassive, 
weapon'd mistress, 
Pioneers! 0 Pioneers! ... 
Through the battle, through defeat, moving yet and never 
stopping, 
Pioneers! 0 Pioneers! 
0 to die advancing on! 
Are there some of us to droop and die? has the hour come? 
Then upon the march we fittest die, soon and sure the gap 
is fill'd, ... 
Not for delectations sweet, 190 
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Not the cushion and the slipper, not the peaceful and the 
studious, 
Not the riches safe and palling, not for us the tame en-
joyment, 
Pioneers! 0 Pioneers! 
Do the feasters gluttonous feast? 
Do the corpulent sleepers sleep? have they lock'd and 
bolted doors ? 
Still be ours the diet hard, and the blanket on the ground, 
Pioneers! 0 Pioneers! 
PIONEERS! 0 PIONEERS!, pp. 168-70 
Nietzsche's exhortation is of the same kidney albeit 
less martial : 
Pioneers. - I greet all the signs indicating that a more 
manly and warlike age is commencing. . .. For it has to 
prepare the way for a yet higher age, ... the age which 
will carry heroism into knowledge, and wage war for the 
sake of ideas and their consequences. For that end many 
brave pioneers are now needed, who, however, cannot 
originate out of nothing,- and just as little out of the sand 
and slime of present-day civilization and the culture of the 
great cities: men silent, solitary and resolute, who know 
to be content and resolute in invisible activity: men who 
with innate dispositions seek in all things that which is to 
be overcome in them: ... men more imperilled, more pro-
ductive, more happy! For believe me! - the secret of 
realizing the largest productivity and the greatest en-
joyment of existence is, to live in danger! Build your 
cities on the slope of Vesuvius! Send your ships into 
unexplored seas! Live in war with your equals and with 
yourselves! 
JOYFUL WISDOM, pp. 218-19 
Most of which, it is again interesting to note, had 
been said by Emerson in 1839-1840: 
I hope in these days we have heard the last of conformity 
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and consistency. . .. Instead of the gong for dinner, let us 
hear a whistle from the Spartan fife. Let us never bow and 
apologize more. . .. Let us affront and reprimand the 
smooth mediocrity and squalid contentment of the times . 
. . . Every true man is a cause, a countl-y, and an age. . .. A 
man Caesar is born, and for ages after we have a Roman 
Empire. . .. All history resolves itself very easily into the 
biography of a few stout and earnest persons. . .. Let us 
enter into the state of war and wake Thor and ¥1oden, 
courage and constancy, in our Saxon breasts. This is to 
be done in our smooth times by speaking the truth .... We 
are afraid of truth, afraid of fortune, afraid of death, and 
afraid of each other. Our age yields no great and perfect 
persons. We want men and women who shall renovate 
life and our social state. 
SELF-RELIANCE 
In common, Whitman and Nietzsche shared a su-
preme and, one is tempted to say, naively-sanguine 
trust in an halcyon future. In one particular, 
however, they did differ. Whitman's projected 
Garden of Adonis conforms more closely to any one 
of several variants of the archetypal myth of 
paradise. Joy conspicuously pervades the utopias 
of Whitman and Nietzsche to the point of surfeit, 
but the term is understood somewhat differently 
by each. Whitman's joy is the joy of paradise 
regained, the euphoric joy of Valhalla, the transcen-
dental, pristine, unalloyed joy that passes under-
standing. It is a superterrestrial joy, more poetic 
than real, more mystic than human, more Bl.akean 
than Nietzschean: 
A reborn race appears- a perfect world, all joy! 
Women and men in wisdom innocence and health- all joy! 
Riotous laughing bacchanals fill'd with joy! 192 
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War, sorrow, suffering gone - the rank earth purged -
nothing but joy left! 
The ocean fill'd with joy- the atmosphere all joy! 
Joy! joy! in freedom, worship, love! joy in the ecstasy of 
life! 
Enough to merely be 1 enough to breathe! 
Joy! joy! all over joy! 
THE MYSTIC TRUMPETER, pp. 327-28 
In one of the few really damning contradictions in 
Whitman, it is joy deferred, and, therefore, at the 
least, a partial betrayal of the unprovisional ac-
ceptance of the human condition. Whitman's joy 
envisages a transfigured rather than a perfected 
human nature. It is the joy of the Oversoul, not of 
Damocles. In contrast, Nietzsche's joy is wholly 
mundane and derives solely from Zarathustra's 
service to life. No vestigial traces of Edenic nos-
talgia intrude upon the magnificently somber 
splendor of Nietzsche's rapture. Nietzsche's is the 
joy of Kubla Khan who, undissuaded by ancestral 
voices prophesying doom, took pleasure in erecting 
his sunny dome amid caves of ice. His is the joy of 
the dreamer who, although forever denied the total 
recall of the Abyssinian maid's song, delights in 
perpetually being tantalized by the prospect of 
such a recall. It is the joy of the youth on Keats' 
Grecian urn: though the youth will never con-
summate his passion, he is perfectly content with 
his lot and would not have it otherwise. It is the 
joy of one who has drunk the milk of the only 
Paradise destined for man: 
193 All joy wants the eternity of all things, wants honey, 
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wants dregs, wants intoxicated midnight, wants graves, 
wants the consolation of graveside tears, wants gilded 
sunsets, what does joy not want! it is thirstier, warmer, 
hungrier, more fearful, more secret than all woe, it wants 
itself; it bites into itself, the will of the ring wrestles 
within it, it wants love, it wants hatred, it is superabundant, 
it gives, throws away, begs for someone to take it, thanks 
him who takes, it would like to be hated; 
so rich is joy that it thirsts for woe, for Hell, for hatred, 
for shame, for the lame, for the world- for it knows, oh it 
knows this world! 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, p. 332 
Joy wants banishment in order to savor the exile's 
solitude and in order to hone its sword of self-
reliance; joy wants torture in order to be an inter-
preter of human misery and in order to affirm all 
the elements in life's melange; joy wants injustice 
in order to assert the innocence of life. Joy wants 
the eternal recurrence, which sets the seal of eterni-
ty on the world of Becoming. 
Whitman's cup of joy contains dregs from the 
Last Judgment and several particles from the 
ineffable irenity of theopathy. His promised land 
has little to distinguish it from the topography 
usually associated with the state of innocence. 
Whitman's wish to build Jerusalem in America's 
green and pleasant land was sincere. But, once he 
had experienced the exhiliration of spiritual space 
flight, he evidently encountered difficulty in re-
entering earth's gravitational field. To the very 
end, he upheld the sanctity of the senses, and, like 
Zarathustra, always praised laughter, dancing, and 
wine. Debilitating age, however, led Whitman to 194 
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relinquish some of Nietzsche's unnerving realism 
and to turn a more receptive ear to the more 
reassuring idealism of Emerson. A distinct shift of 
emphasis from body to soul is discernible. And, 
although body and soul continued, at least inter-
mittently, to be one in Whitman, the soul, however 
imperceptibly, gained ascendancy over the body. 
As Wallace Stevens and other millions have pointed 
out: 'When one is young, everything is physical; 
when one is old, everything is psychic.' It is rea-
sonable to suppose that, had Nietzsche not ceased 
writing at the age of forty-five, had he, instead, 
continued to write into a ripeold age, he might have 
mellowed considerably, especially in regard to his 
radically-obdurate naturalism. But, although hu-
man nature, according to T. S. Eliot, is able to 
endure only a minimal amount of reality, and, 
although illusion is the mode in which man exists, 
it is still difficult to imagine Nietzsche giving up 
his belief in the eternal return for the doctrine of 
personal immortality. Zarathustra's love songs are 
addressed to Life without cause, to Life without 
purpose, to Life forever recycling, to Life always 
heartrending, to Life fraught with frustration, to 
Life festooned with fatal fascination. Those who 
accuse Nietzsche of misogyny would do well to note 
that Zarathustra attributes to his leman almost the 
whole of the wardrobe of masks that set off to best 
advantage woman's perennial allure and infinite 
variety: namely, her captivating coyness, her mis-
chievous teasing, her infuriating elusiveness, her 
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THE FRIEND AND THE SUPERMAN 
ful indifference, her perverse contrariety, her spe-
cious logic, her irresistible grace, her charming 
elegance, her taunting smile, her penchant for 
intrigue, her soulful eyes, her deceptive demureness, 
her melodious voice, her breathtaking beauty that 
redeems all her faults and follies. Of further inter-
est is the fact that Zarathustra, teacher of laughter, 
secures a laugh at his own expense. He good-
humoredly alludes to the advice given him earlier 
by an old woman who warned him: "Are you 
visiting woman? Do not forget your whip!" 
(Zarathustra, Hollingdale, p. 93). This is generally 
quoted out of context, assigned to Zarathustra-
Nietzsche as a serious utterance, and thus used to 
misrepresent the German philosopher as a notori-
ous woman-hater and sadist. But such miscon-
ceptions are readily dispelled when one reads one 
of the most enthrallingly beautiful passages in 
Zarathustra - Zarathustra's tender accents to his 
inamorata, Life: 
Into your eyes I looked recently, 0 life: I saw gold 
blinking in your night-eye; my heart stopped in delight: 
a golden boat I saw blinking on nocturnal waters, a golden 
rocking boat, sinking, drinking, and winking again. At 
my foot, frantic to dance, you cast a glance, a laughing, 
questioning, melting rocking-glance: twice only you 
stirred your rattle with your small hands, and my foot was 
already rocking with dancing frenzy. 
I leaped toward you, but you fled back from my leap, and 
the tongue of your fleeing, flying hair licked me in its 
sweep. Away from you I leaped, and from your serpents' 
ire; and already you stood there, half turned, your eyes 
full of desire. 196 
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I fear you near, I love you far; your flight lures me, your 
seeking cures me: I suffer, but what would I not gladly 
suffer for you? 
You, whose coldness fires, whose hatred seduces, whose 
flight binds, whose scorn inspires: 
Who would not hate you, you great binder, entwiner, 
temptress, seeker, and finder? \Vho would not love you, 
you innocent, impatient, wind-swift, child-eyed sinner? 
Whereto are you luring me now, you never-tame extreme? 
And now you are fleeing from me again, you sweet wildcat 
and ingrate! I dance after you, I follow wherever your 
traces linger. \Vhere are you? Give me your hand! Or 
only one finger! 
Your lovely little white teeth are gnashing at me; out of a 
curly little mane your evil eyes are flashing at me. 
Alongside me now! And swift, you malicious leaping belle! 
Now up and over there! Alas, as I leaped I fell. Oh, see 
me lying there, you prankster, suing for grace. I should 
like to walk with you in a lovelier place. 
Love's paths through silent bushes, pastmany-huedplants. 
Or there along that lake: there goldfish swim and dance. 
You are weary now? Over there are sunsets and sheep: 
when shepherds play on their flutes - is it not lovely to 
sleep? 
Oh, this damned nimble, supple snake and slippery witch! 
Where are you? In my face two red blotches from your 
hand itch. I am verily weary of always being your 
sheepish shepherd. You witch, if I have so far sung to 
you, now you shall cry. Keeping time with my whip, you 
shall dance and cry! Or have I forgotten the whip? Not I! 
ZARATHUSTRA, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, pp. 336-38 
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This by no means exhausts the parallels that can be 
researched profitably. Ready at hand, are many 
others. Whitman and Nietzsche, for example, were 
exponents of freedom and warned against any state 
that ignored the sovereignty of the individual. As 
was the case with the subjects of self-expression 
and self-perfection, Emerson's lead was also fol-
lowed here. Some of Whitman's tiresomely wordy 
discourses on Democracy are discursive amplifica-
tions of the germinal idea in The American Scholar, 
1837-38: 
Every thing that tends to insulate the individual, - to 
surround him with barriers of natural respect, so that each 
man shall feel the world is his, and man shall treat with 
man as a sovereign state with a sovereign state, -tends to 
true union as well as greatness. 
Whitman would never have sacrificed personal 
liberty for Democracy or Nationalism; Nietzsche 
would never have placed the welfare of the State 
before that of the citizen. Always, in their eyes, no 
price was too high, no danger too great, no ransom 
too dear, when individualism was at the stake. In 
their cosmography, man was the satellite around 
which all other bodies described orbits. To them, 
the Self was inviolable; they looked upon its dese-
cration as tantamount to slavery. ·whitman's 
phrenological terms and neologisms (e.g., adhesive-
ness, camerado, libertad) reveal the high regard he 
had for the individual's autonomy in government 
or in any other collective enterprise. As a diehard 
vitalist, Whitman insisted the organic bond deserved 198 
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primary consideration. Nonetheless, his diction in 
conveying the concept of many in one (e.g., linkage, 
adherence, coherence, correspondence, adhesion, 
cohesion, fusion, union, connection, correlation, 
relation, joining, conjoining, embracing, coupling, 
including, solidifying, combining, gluing, congeal-
ing) is ample proof of his abiding faith in human 
togetherness as well as in self-determination. In 
fact, in one instance, bias, largely although not 
entirely instinctual, together with his manic as well 
as mantic chauvinism, led him not only to lose 
sight of the universal fraternity of men but also 
brought him close to setting the many-in-one above 
the one. Although he opposed slavery and was 
dead set against its spread into new territories, this 
peerless champion of human rights, whose violently 
explosive vocables on freedom erupted like volcanic 
lava, was prepared to permit the institution to 
continue in the South. Why? Because the Union's 
preservation was his prime concern; because he 
resented outlanders' criticism of his America; be-
cause he believed no state had the right to dictate 
to any other state: 
I will make a song for these States that no one State may 
under any circumstances be subjected to another 
State, 
And I will make a song that there shall be comity by day 
and by night between all the States, and between any 
two of them. 
STARTING FROM PAUMANOK, p. 17 
Whitman was the spokesman for all the states, and, 
199 like a mother hen clucking over her brood, he was 
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impartial. In spite of sporadic outbursts of John 
Brown sentiments, he remained indifferent or, at 
best, lukewarm toward the plight of the slaves and 
toward the evil of slavery. He was angry with the 
abolitionists for endangering the life of what he 
loved most. And he indicted the South more for 
its treason than for its slavocracy. During the Civil 
War, he resented those responsible for the suffering 
of his white brothers, and, in Specimen Days, he is 
meticulously objective in transcribing the atroci-
ties of North as well as South. Notwithstanding, he 
did brand the South "Assassin!" (By Blue Ontario's 
Shore, p. 244) and he did join, albeit in a rejected 
poem, the ravening ravens led by Mistress Stowe: 
I say man shall not hold property in man; 
I say the least developed person on earth is just as 
important and sacred to himself or herself, as the 
most developed person is to himself or herself. 
I say where liberty draws not the blood out of slavery, 
there slavery draws the blood out of liberty. 
SAYS, p. 402 
Whitman tried to be just to the negro, but his 
honesty betrayed him on more than one occasion. 
Roger Asselineau's evidence, consisting of letters, 
reported conversations, and notebook entries, is 
conclusive in establishing that Whitman harbored 
a distinct prejudice against negroes to the point of 
physical revulsion. (The Evolution of Walt Whitman, 
Harvard University Press, 1962 Volume II, pp. 
179-91). Significantly, however, not a trace of this 
can be detected in his verse though many, including 
Roger Asselineau, remark on the absence of any 200 
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effusive lyric on the Emancipation Proclamation. 
In Song of Myself, Whitman befriends the runaway 
slave and praises the splendid physique of the 
negro driving a four-horse wagon (Song of Myself, 
pp. 33-34). And, in By Blue Ontario's Shore, even 
though he identifies them with the bondservants 
and the miserable ones of all countries and of all 
ages, he does espouse the cause of those exploited 
by the Plantation South: 
For the g1·eat Idea, the idea of perfect and free individuals, 
For that, the bard walks in advance, leader of leaders, 
The attitude of him cheers up slaves and horrifies foreign 
despots. 
\Vithout extinction is Liberty, without retrograde is 
Equality, 
They live in the feelings of young men and the best women, 
(Not for nothing have the indomitable heads of the earth 
been always ready to fall for Liberty.) 
BY BLC:E ONTARIO'S SHORE, p. 246 
It may be that, like Carlyle, Whitman would not 
have fancied Queequeg as a bedfellow, but neither 
his bias nor his obsession with his beloved Union, 
made him forget that governments which enforced 
obedience and allegiance by coercion rested on pre-
carious foundations: 
To hold men together by paper and seal or by compulsion 
is no account, 
That only holds men together which aggregates all in a 
living principle, as the hold of the limhs of the .body 
or the fibres of plants. 
BY BLUE ONTARIO'S SHORE, p. 245 
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in exposing the pretensions of the State in which 
majority rule could suborn minority opinion: 
I swear nothing is good to me now that ignores individuals, 
The American compact is altogether with individuals, 
The only government is that which makes minute of 
individuals. 
BY BLUE ONTARIO's SHORE, p. 249 
Elsewhere, in a rejected poem, Poem of Remem-
brance for a Girl or a Boy of these States, he 
cautioned: 
Remember, government is to subserve individuals, 
Not any, not the President, is to have one jot more than 
you or me, 
Not any habitan of America is to have one jot less than 
you or me. 
p. 393 
Against tyrants, he unleashed his he a vi est and most 
devastating artillery: 
The menacing arrogant one that strode and advanced 
with his senseless scorn, bearing the murderous knife, 
The wide-swelling one, the braggart that would yesterday 
do so much, 
To-day a carrion dead and damn'd, the despised of all the 
earth, 
An offal rank, to the dunghill maggots spurn' d. 
BY BLUE ONTARIO'S SHORE, p. 244 
Yet, at times, as one might guess, when aglow with 
his reading of Hegel, Whitman deified the omni-
potent state and saw it as protector-promoter of 
art, religion, and philosophy. In his less sibylline 
moments, he even contemplated a utopian com- 202 
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monwealth managed without the supervisiOn of 
poetic legislators. At such times, caution and con-
servatism made him stress law, order, and obedi-
ence instead of liberty, revolt, and individualism: 
And a song make I of the One form'd out of all, 
The fang'd and glittering One whose head is over all, 
Resolute warlike One including and over all, 
(However high the head of any else that head is over all.) 
STARTING FROM PAUMANOK, p. 17 
Whitman knew very well that the One manufactured 
out of the Many had to have sovereign dominion 
over the many if it were to be meaningful and 
operational. But his proclivity for chasing golden 
caches at the end of rainbows led him to the final 
paradoxical position we have mentioned before. 
With encroaching age, he saw with increasing lu-
cidity and with some dismay, both the limitations 
of absolute individualism and the pitfalls of de-
mocracy. His conclusion is not so much a compro-
mise or a strategic withdrawal from an untenable 
position as it is a petitio principii, the calm, confi-
dent prediction of a miracle that never could be 
brought to pass: 
I have allow'd the stress of my poems from beginning to 
end to bear upon American individuality and assist it -
not only because that is a great lesson in Nature, amid all 
her generalizing laws, but as counterpoise to the leveling 
tendencies of Democracy- and for other reasons. Defiant 
of ostensible literary and other conventions, I avowedly 
chant "the great pride of man in himself," and permit it to 
be more or less a motif of nearly all my verse. I think this 
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pride indispensable to an American. I think it not incon-
sistent with obedience, humility, deference, and self-
questioning. Democracy has been so retarded and jeop-
ardized by powerful personalities, that its first instincts 
are fain to clip, conform, bring in stragglers, and reduce 
everything to a dead level. While the ambitious thought 
of my song is to help the forming of a great aggregate 
Nation, it is, perhaps, altogether through the forming of 
myriads of fully develop'd and enclosing individuals. 
Welcome as are equality's and fraternity's doctrines and 
popular education, a certain liability accompanies them 
all, as we see. That primal and interior something in man, 
in his soul's abysms, coloring all, and, by exceptional 
fruitions, giving the last majesty to him - something 
continually touch'd upon and attain'd by the old poems 
and ballads of feudalism, and often the principal foun-
dation of them- modern science and democracy appear to 
be endangering, perhaps eliminating. But that forms an 
appearance only; the reality is qnite different. The new 
influences, upon the whole, are surely preparing the way 
for grander individualities than ever. To-day and here 
personal force is behind everything, just the same. 
A BACKWARD GLANCE p. 451-52 
In contrast, Nietzsche was never of two minds 
concerning the state. Despite his youthful patriot-
ism, Nietzsche soon reached the conclusion that 
the state was the bugbear of bugbears. He pointed 
out that, by its very raison d'etre, it was inimical to 
artistic and philosophic pursuits. He claimed that 
the best brains could not function to best advan-
tage under state control; he noted that every 
philosopher of any talent in his own day had found 
it necessary to leave a state-controlled university 
post or had been dismissed for not truckling to 
moral or political prescriptives. The state was, 204 
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therefore, the supreme Philistine (in Matthew 
Arnold's sense of the word) capable of temporary 
liaisons with Gretchen and Helen - humanity and 
art- but inevitably inclined to return to the Whore 
of Babylon- orientative illusions. All governments 
are creations of man, not vice versa. Take creation 
out of the hands of the individual and place it in 
the hands of a political abstraction, and man is 
enslaved. Subordinate man to the state, and you 
deprive him of the power of passion, doubt, happi-
ness, and imaginative invention. Even though it 
has no meritorious claim or right to the office, the 
state aspires to what by all life's laws is man's 
alone. The state blocks man's path to self-fulfill-
ment; it does not permit man to become what he is. 
The state is a mighty maze without a plan, a 
monster of such frightful mien that to see is to hate. 
Nietzsche contemptuously refers to it as an idol 
because it exacts from man the worship and tribute 
to which only the products of man's self-realization 
are entitled. With colossal effrontery, the state 
seizes the throne God's death left empty and pro-
claims far and wide that henceforth all must salaam 
to it; it decrees death for those who balk at doing 
its bidding. Like Christianity (Nietzsche, inciden-
tally, foretold the antagonisms which would arise 
between Christianity and Social States) with which 
it coexists in collusion or which it replaces, the 
State defers absolute justice and thereby sanctions 
wholesale injustice. Wherever its influence is felt, 
it undermines and demoralizes. It dehumanizes 
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machine, deprives him of idenity by imposing on 
him a conformist uniformity, and reduces him to 
an animal by placing him in a purely Darwinian 
environment. It is an opportunist whose primary 
consideration is its own self-aggrandizement. It is 
adept in debasing coinage and secularizing ideals. 
Worst of all it is nihilistic by being unrealistic; its 
rules and prohibitions are no more mindful of things 
as they are than are the Church's precepts: 
The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies, 
too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: 'I, the state, am 
the people.' 
It is a lie! It was creators who created peoples and hung a 
faith and a lover over them: thus they served life. 
'There is nothing greater on earth than I, the regulating 
finger of God' - thus the monster bellows. And not only 
the long-eared and short-sighted sink to their knees! 
It will give you everything if you worship it, this new idol: 
thus it buys for itself the lustre of your virtues and the 
glance of your proud eyes. 
Just look at these superfluous people! They acquire 
wealth and make themselves poorer with it. They desire 
power and especially the lever of power, plenty of money-
these impotent people! 
See them clamber, these nimble apes! They clamber over 
one another and so scuffle into the mud and the abyss. 
They all strive towards the throne: it is a madness they 
have- as if happiness sat upon the throne! Often filth 
sits upon the throne- and often the throne upon filth, too. 
Only there, where the state ceases, does the man who is 
not superfluous begin: does the song of the necessary man, 
the unique and irreplaceable melody, begin. 206 
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There, where the state ceases - look there, my brothers. 
Do you not see it: the rainbow and the bridges to the 
Superman? 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 75-78 
Since the state is an impediment in the path of the 
Superman, Nietzsche hates it. But equally if not 
more hateful are those whom Zarathustra terms 
poisonous tarantulas: 
I do not wish to be confused with these preachers of 
equality, nor taken for one of them. For justice speaks 
thus to me: 'Men are not equal.' 
And they should not become so, either! For what were my 
love of the Superman if I spoke otherwise? 
They should press on to the future across a thousand 
bridges and gangways, and there should be more and 
more war and inequality among them. . .. 
Good and evil, and rich and poor, and noble and mean, ... 
they should be weapons and ringing symbols that life must 
be overcome again and again! 
Life wants to raise itself on high with pillars and steps; 
it wants to gaze into the far distance and out upon joyful 
splendour- that is why it needs height! 
And because it needs height, it needs steps and conflict 
between steps and those who climb them! Life wants to 
climb and in climbing overcome itself! 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 124-25 
It is ironic that one hailed as the ne plus ultra 
Knight of Democracy should be found guilty of 
racial bias whereas one often denounced as a 
Germanic Macchiavelli and identified with Nazi 
Jew-baiting should be found innocent of any ethnic 
prejudice. In Whitman's behalf, it must be repeat-
ed that he took especial pains to uphold the negro's 
207 cause in his poetry which, after all, was the only 
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legacy he intended for general public scrutiny. 
Milton perhaps did not, but Virgil, in the Aeneid, 
certainly omitted many personal reflections that 
would have defeated his purpose of glorifying 
Augustan Rome. Whitman believed his duty to be 
that of inspiring confidence and exalting his coun-
try. Intimate, spontaneous, and unconventional as 
his verse may appear and as the poet tells us many 
times it is, we know very well that Whitman labor-
ed over it with \Vordsworthian thoroughness. 
Whether the focal center be Whitman, the Self, 
Man, America, or what have you, and whether its 
epic pretensions are justified or not, the unalterable 
fact is that the author intended it should be a 
showpiece and a gospel and hence strove for the 
sublimity usually associated with such endeavors. 
If he himself as well as his country fell far short of 
what he would have ideally wished them to be, he 
obviously was not going to announce this to the 
world even though he does on rare occasions cen-
sure himself as well as his native land. In his 
rejected poems, in the first versions of many poems, 
in his letters and prose, not to mention his con-
versation, the most demanding critic will find 
ample materials indicating misgivings, qualifica-
tions, and even a furtive pessimism which once in a 
while peeps out. Had Whitman been less obsessed 
with posturing as the Great Camerado and the 
many-faceted Uncle Sam, he might have written 
(or rewritten) less like the Browning of Rabbi Ben 
Ezra and Prospice and more like the Browning 
who explored the lower depths of the soul. One 208 
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who conceives his sacred m1ss1on as that of ex-
pressing incomparable things incomparably well 
must tread gingerly lest he fail of living up to his 
advance billing. Whitman was human and there-
fore culpable; but he was not ignoble. His Dutch 
stubbornness would never consent to withdrawing 
his poems of ithyphallic ardor- though Emerson 
himself were the pleader. All of which is not pre-
cisely germane to our inquiry except the often 
overlooked fact that Whitman shared a larger mea-
sure of Nietzsche's distrust of equality and the herd 
than one would ever guess. Whitman, too, hated 
life-draining uniformity and joined Nietzsche in 
lambasting Carlyle's aristocratic proclivities as well 
as the Scotchman's notion of the great man. 
Wars of conquest, needless to say, were repug-
nant to both Whitman and Nietzsche. Like Blake, 
they endorsed wars fought in the cause of political 
freedom. But first-hand experience rendered physi-
cal strife extremely distasteful to them. Nietzsche 
never completely recovered either his health or his 
equanimity after serving as an ambulance orderly 
in the Franco-Prussian War. Physical violence he 
found unendurable; his father's insanity and death 
following a fall haunted him like the lightning-
blasted tree is said to have haunted Swift. Whit-
man both was and was not so finical. Although he 
carried to his grave the American youngster's love 
of soldiers, parades, flags, fifes, and drums, he never 
was able to forget those terrible scenes of carnage 
which he steadfastly refused to shade from his 
209 vision and which he so faithfully transcribed in 
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Specimen Days. One of the most substantial por-
tions of his life's work, the poems comprising Drum-
Taps, for the most part represent his thoughts, 
observations, experiences, and reflections associat-
ed with the Civil War. Herein hardihood and valor 
are celebrated with the same romantic glow they 
are in Scott, Tennyson, and Kipling. What is more, 
Whitman's songs of arms and men are not restrict-
ed to Drum-Taps; they abound throughout Leaves 
of Grass and disclose a species of adolescent saber 
rattling without counterpart in Nietzsche who ad-
mired only the courage needed to defy the world's 
opinion. 
Although Nietzsche, unlike Whitman, did not 
believe in the Soul, Immortality, and God, there 
are many correspondences in their views on Christ 
and Christianity. Both respected the teaching of 
Christ and directed their criticisms against the 
Church. Once again, taking their cue from Emer-
son, they argued divine direction was identical with 
self-direction. Their quarrel was more with Religion 
than with religiousness, more with Faith than with 
faith, more with Christianity as Morality than with 
Christianity as Love. Whitman urged piety, rever-
ence, and mysticism, but he abominated wishy-
washy spiritualism. He continually speaks of a 
new religion although, as was his way, he is never 
very specific. In one place, the new theology seems 
to consist of a strange amalgam of all religions; 
in another, it appears to be a replacement of the 
bible and priests by poetry and poets; and, in still 
another, it is the substitution of scientific data and 210 
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scientists for psalms and clerics. In fact, one 
reason for ·whitman's enthusiastic reaction to 
Darwinism was his conviction that science would 
hasten the decease of established churches: 
\Vith Science, the Old Theology of the East, long in its 
dotage, begins evidently to die and disappear. But (to my 
mind) Science ~ and may be such will prove its principal 
service ~ as evidently prepares the way for One inde-
scribably grander ~ Time's young but perfect offspring ~ 
the New Theology~ heir of the West~ lusty and loving, 
and wondrous beautiful. 
PREFACE, 1872, p. 431 
Partly because he was of Quaker ancestry, partly 
because he was Emerson's pupil, and partly be-
cause he was possessed of much common sense 
though little formal schooling, Whitman, like 
Byron in Don juan, fleered at the multiplicity of 
Christian denominations. Moreover, since side by 
side with his idealism he espoused rationalism as 
well as free thought, he was an ardent defender of 
Thomas Paine. His doctrine of self-reliance natu-
rally made him an enemy of all and any churches 
and his mysticism logically dictated that he seek 
spiritual guidance from within rather than from 
without. He welcomed Christianity's "melancholy, 
long, withdrawing roar," and saw in it a golden 
opportunity for shaping the religion of the future 
which would be free of superstition, fables, pessi-
mism, and dogma: 
Abstract religion, I perceive, is easily led astray, ever 
credulous, and is capable of devouring, remorseless like 
211 fire and flame .... We want, for these States, ... a cheerful, 
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religious fervor, endued with the ever-present modifi-
cations of the human emotions, friendship, benevolence, 
with a fair field for scientific inquiry, the right of individu-
al judgment, and always the cooling influences of material 
~ature. 
DEMOCRATIC VISTAS, p. 494 
He was beforehand in deprecating the religion 
which maligns life by fanatical attrition and un-
believable mirabilia. Religion, Whitman preceded 
Nietzsche in saying, must be "sweet and unimpugn-
able alike to little child or great sa van" (Democratic 
Vistas, p. 495). Whitman was willing to be tolerant 
and generous to a fault, but he was firm in teaching 
that man's soul "can really confront Religion when 
it extricates itself entirely from the churches, and 
not before" (Democratic Vistas, p. 481). Here he 
was repeating Emerson, as he was in calling the 
Poet the true Son of God and in assigning to Him 
the task of blending Man and Nature (Passage to 
India, p. 291). For Whitman, as for Nietzsche, 
creation, not prayer, was true worship. "The priest 
departs, the divine literatus comes," Whitman 
evangelized (Democratic Vistas, p. 457). Whitman 
believed in immortality and, at times, was even 
prepared to grant that body and soul were not one 
and the same: 
I absolve you from all except yourself spiritual bodily, 
that is eternal, you yourself will surely escape, 
The corpse yon will leave will be but excrementitious. 
TO ONE SHORTLY TO DIE, p. 314 
Whitman shared most of Nietzsche's views on 
Christ. In his poem, "To Him that was Crucified," 212 
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he addresses Christ as one who has been seriously 
misrepresented. The implications are that Christ's 
message emphasized precisely those things which 
Christianity opposes: namely, non-resistance to 
evil; universal toleration of all faiths; an ecclesia of 
the heart rather than one of brick edifices; universal 
brotherhood of man; acceptance of man and earth 
as they are; a melioration in human terms: 
My spirit to yours dear brother, 
Do not mind because many sounding your name do not 
understand you, 
I do not sound your name, but I understand you, ... 
We, enclosers of all continents, all castes, allowers of all 
theologies, 
Compassionaters, perceivers, rapport of men. 
We walk silent among disputes and assertions, but reject 
not the disputers nor any thing that is asserted, 
We hear the bawling and din. we are reach'd at by di-
visions, jealousies, recriminations on every side, 
They close peremptorily upon us to surround us, my 
comrade, 
Yet we walk unheld, free, the whole earth over, journeying 
up and down till we make our ineffaceable mark 
upon time and the diverse eras, 
Till we saturate time and eras, that the men and women 
of races, ages to come, may prove brethren and lovers 
as we are. 
TO HIM THAT WAS CRUCIFIED, pp. 271-72 
Nietzsche did as countless others; he read his own 
thinking into Christ. Like Tolstoy, he interpreted 
the Gospels as preachments against all violence, 
and as injunctions to construct the kingdom of 
heaven with human hands out of the earth's ma-
213 terials. According to Nietzsche, Christ taught: 
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first, that man should consent to the world and the 
suffering this entailed; second, that man should 
not abet evil, but should seek to alleviate the sum 
total of misery; third, that man should not listen to 
the reward- &-punishment salesmen but should ac-
cept his fate joyously; fourth, that man should 
resist injustice not by a revengeful sic semper but 
by a passive yet firm non serviam. Nietzsche's 
Christ taught man should help man by deeds, not 
promises; by actions, not prayer; by eupeptic bread 
here, not eucharistic cake hereafter. Emerson's 
argument that man needed no guide, not even in 
the person of Christ since Christ was in every man, 
served Nietzsche well. He argued analogously that 
man as the creator of values permits the abrogation 
of his creativity at his own peril. He found the 
Church as culpable as the State in foisting upon 
man a pernicious morality. The Church taught man 
to pray that he might die; Nietzsche taught man 
to destroy the Church that he might live: "Every 
Church is a stone rolled onto the tomb of the man-
god; it tries to prevent the resurrection, by force" 
(Quoted by Camus, op. cit., p. 69). Elsewhere, in an 
hyperbole destined to be misread, he cried: "Rather 
Cesare Borgia than Parsifal" (Camus, op. cit., p. 75). 
He appropriated the epithet, godless, and antici-
pated Lenin in calling Christianity and alcohol 
Europe's narcotics, but he did not attack Jesus. 
He even granted that, had Jesus lived, he might 
have found and crossed the bridge to Overman; he 
might "have learned to live and to love the earth-
and laughter too" (Zarathustra, p. 185). Nor is this 214 
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all. Nietzsche was prepared to go further. He also 
anticipated Freud's concession to human frailty: 
Only Christian practice, a life such as he lived who died on 
the cross, is Christian. 
Such a life is still possible today, for certain people even 
necessary: genuine, original Christianity will be possible 
at all times. 
THE ANTICHRIST, PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, pp. 612-13 
Together with a host of others, such as Matthew 
Arnold, their near contemporary, and T. S. Eliot, 
an heir they disowned before his birth, Whitman 
and Nietzsche diagnosed the world's sickness as a 
loss of belief - not only in God, but in man and in 
life as well. They watched man irresistibly sucked 
into the Spenglerian maelstrom, engulfed by waves 
of despair, pitiably thrashing in nihilism's waters, 
scarcely hoping for rescue, actually almost wel-
coming the death by water so conveniently at hand. 
And they were determined to save his life. They 
felt sorry for him but they were also impatient with 
the folly which had precipitated him into such a 
plight. Zarathustra dedicated his whole life to this 
task, and Whitman wrote: 
I seize the descending man and raise him with resistless 
will, 
0 despairer, here is my neck, 
By God, you shall not go down! hang your whole weight 
upon me! 
SONG OF MYSELF, p. 57 
Only that day dawns to which man is awake. Only 
215 that endures to which man consents. Only that is 
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attainable which man wills. Only if man believes 
in himself is Rilke's Zustimmung zum Da-sein pos-
sible. 
But Whitman and Nietzsche were also realists 
and well tutored in man's basic frailties. In the 
last analysis, they realized, man must save himself 
all by himself. And, naturally, before he can 
commence on this task of salvation, he must face 
the truth about himself: 
Never was there, perhaps, more hollowness at heart than 
at present. . .. Genuine belief seems to have left us. . .. 
Nor is humanity itself believed in. . .. We live in an 
atmosphere of hypocrisy throughout. . . . A scornful 
superciliousness rules in literature. . .. A lot of churches, 
sects, etc., the most dismal phantasms I know, usurp the 
name of religion. Conversation is a mass of badinage. . .. 
In fashionable life, flippancy, tepid amours, weak infi-
delism, small aims, or no aims at all, only to kill time .... 
The best class we show, is but a mob of fashionably 
dress'd speculators and vulgarians. 
DEMOCRATIC VISTAS, p. 461 
In a phillippic in the same vein, Nietzsche uses 
imagery suggestive of Eliot's hollow men and the 
waste land. He harps on the sterility of his con-
temporaries, derides their hypocrisy, laments their 
loss of virtu and creativity, likens them to scare-
crows and walking-dead, denounces their defeatism, 
and decries their lack of confidence: 
Truly, you could wear no better masks than your own 
faces, you men of the present! ... 
And if one tests your virility, one finds only sterility! You 
seem to be baked from colours and scraps of paper 
glued together. . . . 216 
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All customs and all beliefs speak motely out of your 
gestures. 
He who tore away from you your veils and wraps and 
paint and gestures would have just enough left over 
to frighten the birds. . .. 
I would rather be a day-labourer in the underworld and 
among the shades of the bygone! - Even the in-
habitants of the underworld are fatter and fuller 
than you! ... 
You are walking refutations of belief itself and the fracture 
of all thought. . .. 
You are unfruitful: therefore you lack belief. But he who 
had to create always had his prophetic dreams and 
star-auguries- and he believed in belief! 
You are half-open doors at which grave-diggers wait. And 
this is your reality: 'Everything is worthy of perish-
ing.' 
ZARATHUSTRA, Hollingdale, pp. 142-43 
Whitman and Nietzsche agreed that to help hu-
manity emerge from the slough of despair and from 
the prickly aridity of cactus land what was needed 
was a creative man who not only possessed creative 
ability himself but would be able to stimulate the 
innate creativity of others. They were convinced 
the only ruler worthy of the title was the creator. 
It was their way of censuring a society too pre-
ponderantly productive and too insufficiently cre-
ative. When the product assumes more importance 
as we have since been told ad nauseam, than the 
human labor expended in making the product, the 
era of the autocratic, inhuman machine commences. 
Man's status as a creator is lost or minimized 
drastically. The mechanical erects a barrier be-
217 tween man and his production. He is no longer a 
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maker; he is the manipulator of a machine. His 
work is subordinated to production; and he himself 
is subordinated to the machine. Whitman sternly 
insists man must not abdicate the responsibility 
and dignity of creation. Man must never forget he 
is the center from which all emanates; whatever 
exists exists because man exists and because man 
wills it to exist: 
List close my scholars dear, 
Doctrines, politics and civilizations exurge from you, 
Sculpture and monuments and any thing inscribed any-
where are tallied in you, 
The gist of histories and statistics as far as the records 
reach is in you this hour, and myths and tales the 
same, 
If you were not breathing and walking here, where would 
they all be? 
The most renown'd poems would be ashes, orations and 
plays would be vacuums. 
A SONG FOR OCCUPATIONS, p. 158 
Nietzsche subscribed to the identical sentiments: 
"Instead of the judge and the oppressor, the cre-
ator," was his formula for government (Quoted by 
Camus, op. cit., p. 273). Every act of creation, by 
its mere existence, denies the world of master and 
slave. The perfect tribute to Walt Whitman is 
contained in what conceivably might also be a self-
portrait of Nietzsche. In it, Nietzsche recites the 
grounds upon which he bases his praise of the 
creativity and creations of the poet: 
I see here· a poet, who, like so many men, exercises a 
higher charm by his imperfections than by all that is 218 
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rounded off and takes perfect shape under his hands, -
indeed, he derives his advantage and reputation far more 
from his actual limitations than from his abundant pow-
ers. His work never expresses altogether what he would 
really like to express, what he would like to have seen: he 
appears to have had the foretaste of a vision and never the 
vision itself: - but an extraordinary longing for this vision 
has remained in his soul; and from this he derives his 
equally extraordinary eloquence of longing and craving. 
With this he raises those who listen to him above his work 
and above all "works," and gives them wings to rise 
higher than hearers have ever risen before, thus making 
them poets and seers themselves; they then show an 
admiration for their originator of their happiness, as if he 
had led them immediately to the vision of his holiest and 
ultimate verities, as if he had reached his goal, and had 
actually seen and communicated his vision. It is to the 
advantage of his reputation that he has not really arrived 
at his goal. 
JOYFUL WISDOM, pp. 110-11 
Such is the VISIOn we have been examining: the 
vision which counsels the conquest not the circum-
vention of Circe; the vision which perceives one is 
pregnant only with one's own child; the vision 
which mediates between the man against the sky 
and the hardly discernible star-splinter; the vision 
which recognizes the world-weary as cowards and 
the depreciators of life as etherized patients; the 
vision which rejoices in the conditions of life as 
they actually are. Sartre describes our human lot 
as a stark quest after that which can never be 
realized in itself or in its finite surrogate. Whitman 
and Nietzsche advised just the opposite. They 
219 taught us to respond to any and every occurrence 
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in life with the reaction: 'Was that life? Well then! 
Once more!' They taught us to think for ourselves, 
to approach opposing authorities with caution and, 
at the same time, to investigate such authorities 
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